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INTRODUCTION

OnJanuary 17, 1993, Christopher Battiste, a homeless man from
New York, was arrested for bludgeoning eighty-year-old Doll Mamie
Johnson to death in front of her church in the Bronx. Mentally ill
for much of his life, Battiste had spent years "drift[ing] in and out
ofjails, homeless shelters and psychiatric emergency rooms."2 Less
than two months later, Larry Hogue, notorious for his very public
and very bizarre behavior on the Upper West Side, was ordered by
a state appeals court to be civilly committed' for six months in a
psychiatric center in Queens.4 At the same time that these events
were transpiring in New York, similar stories were being told in
5
cities across the United States.
The frequency of these incidents has helped fuel an ongoing
debate between advocates of the mentally ill and those concerned
2

Joseph B. Treaster, Behind a FatalBeating a Life of Drugsand Rage, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 1993, at Al, 40.
3 Civil commitment refers to hospitalizing the mentally ill. The terms commitment, hospitalization, and institutionalization will be used interchangeably throughout
this Comment.
4
See Joseph P. Fried, Court Orders Confinement of Drug User, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
1993, at Bi. Larry Hogue's odyssey has been a constant source of grist for the press's
mill. On August 25, 1993, the New York Times reported that Larry Hogue had been
conditionally released the day before from the Queens Psychiatric Center and had
gone to live with his son in Bridgeport, Connecticut. See CharisseJones, Mentally Ill
Homeless Man Goes to Bridgeport,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1993, at B1, B3. On September
26, 1993, the New York Times once again ran a story on Larry Hogue, reporting that
he had been brought back into custody, and raising concerns that the system could
not meet his needs. See Robert D. McFadden, Homeless Man of West Side Is Held Again,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1993, at 37, 40.
s SeeAdrianne Carr, TheScaty Situationin OurSheters,WASH. POST, Dec. 13,1992,
at C8 (noting that a mentally ill homeless person, who had been deemed dangerous
by psychiatric professionals, was being tried in the murder of a young woman in
Bethesda, Maryland); Malcolm Gladwell, A Brush with Madness: A Tormented Artist Is
Free, WASH. POST, May 12, 1993, at BI (depicting the story of David Moser, who, in
a delusional rage, attacked his parents with broken glass in their home in Massachusetts, but was deemed not dangerous enough to be civilly committed); E. Fuller
Torrey, The Mental-HealthMess, NAT'L REV., Dec. 28, 1992, at 22,23 (describingjuan
Gonzalez, who killed two people with a sword on New York's Staten Island Ferry;
Sylvia Seegrist, who shot ten people in a shopping center near Philadelphia; Laurie
Dann, who shot six children in an elementary school in Chicago; Herbert Mullin, who
randomly killed thirteen people near San Francisco; andJames Bicady, who shot five
people in a shopping mall in Atlanta).
6 Use of the expression "the mentally ill" is not meant to imply that mental illness
defines the individual. While the expression "persons with mental illnesses" is
certainly preferable as a descriptive matter, its use has proven to be too cumbersome
for purposes of this Comment.
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that America's mental health policies have ignored basic issues of
public safety.7 The debate was rekindled in the mid- to late-1980s
when news reports began chronicling the conditions and actions of
the mentally ill homeless.' As the conditions of homelessness have
become more visible, Americans have begun to equate homelessness
with mental illness and deinstitutionalization 9 with the homeless
mentally ill.1" Not surprisingly, the connection between the two
has been exaggerated,1 1 and as a result, America's impatience and
7 Characterized in a less sympathetic light, Washington Post staff writer Malcolm
Gladwell notes that "[t]his is an area where the paternalism of the medical professions
comes into full conflict with the absolutist civil libertarian perspective of the mental
health bar." Gladwell, supra note 5, at B9.
s See, e.g., Mark A. Davis, Homeless Mentally Ill Don't Belong in Institutions, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 11, 1987, at A13 (decrying, as "reactionary," the increased calls for
institutionalization of the mentally ill homeless);Jane Gross, A FirstLook at Homeless
Is Raw Sightfor Tourists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1987, at B1 (providing vivid details of
bloated women with ulcerated legs and of men shouting obscenities); see also Leona
L. Bachrach, The Media and Homeless Mentally Ill Persons, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 963, 963 (1990) (noting that through the 1980s the media "fail[ed] to
draw a clear division between homeless individuals who are mentally ill and those who
are not").
' Simply stated, deinstitutionalization refers to the removal of patients from
hospitals and their placement in alternative care settings within the community. See
Ingo Keilitz et al., Least Restrictive Treatment of Involuntary Patients: Translating
Concepts into Practice, 29 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 691, 693, 698 n.30 (1985).
10In Boston and New Orleans, for example, public and private agencies
knowledgeable about these issues cite "deinstitutionalization" as a primary cause of

homelessness among the mentally ill. See LAURA D. WAXMAN, THE UNITED STATES
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, MENTALLY ILL AND HOMELESS: A 22-CrrY SURVEY 18-19
(1991) [hereinafter MENTALLY ILL AND HOMELESS SURVEY]; see also Lynda Richardson,

Business as UsualforShelter Teams: State's Plansfor the Mentally ill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
1993, at BI (noting how state officials in the aftermath of Doll Mamie Johnson's
murder by a homeless mentally ill man took immediate steps to facilitate civil
commitment of New York's mentally ill homeless population).
" SeeJOHN Q. LA FOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE
OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 103 (1992). La Fond
and Durham argue that many have exaggerated the proportion of homeless
individuals who are mentally ill by putting the figure as high as 90%. "These
inaccurate estimates [have] reinforced a natural inclination to assume that a situation
so frightening and unfortunate as homelessness must be caused by mental illness
rather than by socioeconomic factors...." Id.; cf.Jan C. Costello &JamesJ. Preis,
Beyond Least Restrictive Alternative: A ConstitutionalRight to Treatmentfor Mentally
DisabledPersonsin the Community, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1527, 1532 (1987) (noting that
neglect of the homeless population has "reached the public consciousness as a result
of publicity surrounding the 'mentally disabled homeless'"). A nine-year comparison
of the homeless in major American cities has consistently placed the percentage of
homeless individuals afflicted with severe mental illness at approximately 30%. See
THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND
HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA'S CITIES: 1993 app., tbl. 1 (1993) (analyzing data from
1985 to 1993 in 26 U.S. cities).
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frustration with its homeless population has served to further
alienate an already stigmatized population of mentally ill individuals.'

2

Evidence of this trend can be gleaned from the fact that many
states eased their civil commitment criteria; actions which appear to
have been motivated by a desire to forcibly remove the homeless
masses from city streets.' 3
But by focusing attention on the
homeless mentally ill, states have not only ignored the real problems

Echoing La Fond and Durham, Michael Perlin notes that while "conventional
wisdom posits that the policy of deinstitutionalization has 'caused'" a rise in homelessness, "[t]he blame is misplaced." Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization,
and Homelessness: A Stoy of Marginalization,28 Hous. L. REV. 63, 67 (1991). Perlin
lists four factors that have contributed to increased homelessness. First, the baby
boom generation has placed increasing demands on housing stock, while the supply
has not kept up with the demand. See id. at 74-75. Second, federal funding for
subsidized housing, especially for single room occupancy hotels ("SROs"), has
decreased dramatically. See id. at 75-77 (noting that federal aid has been reduced by
81% in the past decade). Third, government aid to the poor has dwindled. See id. at
78-79 (noting that Reagan era purges of the Supplemental Security Income ("SSI")
system left 350,000 without benefits). And fourth, unemployment rates have
contributed greatly to increased homelessness. See id. at 79.
12 See MENTALLY ILL AND HOMELESS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 76-78 (depicting
increased negativity toward the mentally ill homeless in 17 U.S. cities, including calls
in Los Angeles and Louisville to institutionalize these individuals); TASK FORCE ON
HOMELESSNESS AND SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS, OUTCASTS ON MAIN STREET 24 (1992)
(noting that "[pleople with severe mental illnesses have had a long history of being
stigmatized-reviled, shunned, shut away, and in previous eras, killed," and that many
of the homeless mentally ill today continue to be kept out of certain communities);
cf. Steven E. Hyler et al., HomicidalManiacs and NarcissisticParasites: Stigmatization
of Mentally ilIPersons in theMovies, 42 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1044,1045-46
(1991) (arguing that movie stereotypes that characterize the mentally ill as homicidal
maniacs and seductresses tend to stigmatize the mentally ill).
" See generally LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at ix (noting, in 1992, that
there has been a noticeable trend back to the asylum). For a more detailed
discussion, see infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
In addition to eased commitment standards, manyjurisdictions are "criminalizing
the mentally ill." Behind Bars: Criminalizingthe Mentally Ill, WASH. POST, Nov. 24,
1992, at E5 (quoting a study conducted by the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill
and the Health Research Group of Public Citizen which found that 29% of the jails
nationwide confine seriously mentally ill people who have no criminal charges against
them, often because no facilities are available in the community to respond to
psychiatric emergencies). According to this study, only five states and the District of
Columbia reported that they had no mentally ill people incarcerated without criminal
charges. See id. This practice of "mercy bookings" has contributed to the almost
100,000 seriously mentally ill individuals incarcerated. See Torrey,supranote 5, at 23.
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facing the homeless, 4 but have also managed to diminish or
threaten to diminish the rights of the mentally ill."
Many of those concerned with these trends have suggested other
avenues for addressing the needs of the mentally ill homeless,
avenues that are less restrictive of their rights than civil commitment. 16 One such approach calls for a restructuring of, and
renewed reliance upon, community treatment programs originally
intended to help the deinstitutionalized assimilate into the community. 7 Taking myriad forms, including day- and night-hospital
14Michael Perlin notes that "'[b]y focusing on the mentally ill, [New York City]

perpetrates the stereotype that the homeless are insane.... By categorizing the
homeless as insane, no fundamental economic dislocations need to be examined, and
society can salve its conscience by attributing the problem to pathology rather than
poverty.'" Perlin, supra note 11, at 112 (quoting Neil McKittnick, The Homeless:
JudicialIntervention on Behalf of a Politically Powerless Group, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
389, 428 (1988) (alteration in original)).
" The number of those committed to institutions is certainly not staggering, and
many jurisdictions, in fact, are actually lowering the ranks of their institutionalized.
See Celia W. Dugger, A Debate Unstilled, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 22, 1993, at B2 (noting that
Governor Cuomo's new budget proposal will cut the number of patients in mental
hospitals from 11,000 to 9700 by 1994). The fact remains, however, that several
jurisdictions are easing their commitment criteria or finding alternative methods
(such as outpatient treatment) to control the mentally ill. See infra note 58 and
accompanying text. Moreover, after each tragic incident is sensationalized in the
press, the calls for less liberty and more safety increasingly threaten the liberty
interests of the mentally ill. See Carr, supra note 5, at C8 (criticizing the legal system
for placing individual rights above personal safety); Dugger, supra,at BI (noting that
while the numbers of those institutionalized in the state is decreasing, New York state
Mental Health Commissioner, Richard Surles, has been criticizing the city for "failing
to act aggressively enough to involuntarily commit mentally ill people who are a
danger to themselves or others"); Joseph P. Fried, Court Orders Confinement of Drug
User, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at BI (quoting state Attorney General Robert Abrams
as saying that the institutionalization of a mentally ill drug abuser will reinforce for
"other judges hearing these kinds of cases that they have both the power and
responsibility to retain mentally ill and dangerous individuals in the state's psychiatric
facilities"); Heather MacDonald, The Tyranny of Freedom, NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 1993, at
36 (characterizing the current mental health system as "utter madness: a system that
disregards the community's right to live free of violence and fear in favor of the
'freedom' ofpotentially violent psychotics to refuse the therapeutic intervention they
so desperately need"); Torrey, supra note 5, at 25 (calling for easier civil commitment
criteria); When MICA's Commit Murder, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1993, at A24 (editorial
page) (arguing that in light of recent violent acts perpetrated by mentally ill chemical
abusers ("MICAs"), New York City should step up its efforts to civilly commit those
individuals and that emergency room psychiatrists should be held liable for the
subsequent
behavior of MICAs).
16
see, e.g., Edmund V. Ludwig, The Mentally Ill Homeless: Evolving Involuntary
Commitment Issues, 36 VILL. L. REv. 1085,1106-09 (1991) (critically analyzing theJoyce
Brown case where a New York City homeless woman was removed from the street
and sent to Bellevue Hospital and a New York appellate court decision to civilly
commit
a mentally ill homeless person).
1
7 See E. FULLER TORREY, NOWHERE TO Go: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE
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care, half-way houses, home-health services, and even employment
programs," community-based mental health services-if properly
designed and coordinated with other service delivery systems-are
more cost-effective"9 and less liberty-restricting than hospitalization. If this strategy were adopted, not only would care for the
deinstitutionalized improve, but all potentially committable
individuals would also benefit from having community treatment
settings made available as workable alternatives to hospitalization.
Implicit in the conception of community-based services is the
notion that the state should help those in need, but in a manner
that is least intrusive of their liberty. Characterized in constitutional
terms as the least restrictive alternative doctrine, or the doctrine of

HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 25-29, 110-13 (1988); Dugger, supra note 15, at B2 (noting

that "politics has kept the state from shifting enough resources from mental hospitals
to services in the communities where mentally ill people now live"); Amy Goldstein,
Court Takes over D.C. Mental Services; Judge Gives Reins to Outside Specialist, WASH.
POST, May 18, 1993, at Al (reporting that U.S. DistrictJudge Aubrey Robinson, Jr.,
appointed a "special" master to accelerate the District of Columbia's efforts at
keeping its promise to build a community network of psychiatric services, fully 17
years after a federal appeals court ordered the District of Columbia to comply with
its own laws); Sarah Lyall, PressureMounts to Keep PsychiatricCenters Open, N.Y. TIMES,
March 1, 1993, at B7 ("'There's absolutely no question that over the 30-year period
of deinstitutionalization, there's been an almost total abdication of the original intent
to shift dollars, along with patients, into the community.'" (quoting Daniel R.
Coughlin, Commissioner ofMental Hygiene Services in Broome County, NewYork)).
For a general discussion on one possible way to require states to improve such
services, seeJonathan P. Bach, RequiringDueCare in the ProcessofPatientDeinstitutionalization: Toward a Common Law Approach to Mental Health Care Reform, 98 YALE L.J.
1153, 1154-55 (1989) (arguing that the state retains a duty of care under common law
to those whom the state has deinstitutionalized).
18
See e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5670.5, 5671 (West Supp. 1993) (stating
California's intent to encourage residential treatment programs); HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 334-3.5 (Supp. 1992) (establishing a community-based employment program); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-21-73(4) (1993) (requiring commitment of the mentally ill or
retarded to the least restrictive treatment facility); see also David L. Chambers,
Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill PracticalGuides and Constitutional
Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1118 (1972) (discussing the various forms that
community-based treatment programs take); infranotes 85-87 and accompanying text.
9
See Sam H. Verhovek, PoliticsKeeps New York State Mental Unit Open, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1992, at Al (noting that because of severe opposition to the dosing of several
mental hospitals, New York cannot afford the beds needed in community residences,
which are "far cheaper and considered by experts to be more humane and more
effective in treating most sick people"); Richardson, supra note 10, at B5 (quoting
Norman Stiegel, Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, as blaming
the state for "ducking its larger responsibilities to provide more community care").
For a more detailed discussion of how community-based treatment is more effective
and cheaper than institutionalization, see infra notes 116-33 and accompanying text.
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least drastic means,2" it has come to be equated with communitybased treatment in the context of mental health law. 21 From this
author's perspective, it would require the state to give thoughtful
consideration to the needs of all individuals afflicted with severe or
chronic mental illnesses, 22 whether they are currently institutionalized, deinstitutionalized, or simply at risk of becoming institutionalized for the first time. 2 Application of the least restrictive means
doctrine would not, of course, compromise the effectiveness of
treatment. It would not choose less restrictive alternatives that are
also less effective. Rather, the doctrine would require state officials
to reorder their treatment and funding priorities so that communitybased approaches offer a realistic, as well as preferred, alternative
to hospitalization.
Where to find this mandate for community-based services poses
yet another problem. Because states have sought to diminish the
ranks of their homeless populations by expanding their civil
o See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
21See Keilitz et al., supra note 9, at 693 (arguing that the least restrictive

alternatives and deinstitutionalization "have beenjoined in expression of public policy
and legislative intent").
'e Chronic mental illnesses, also characterized as serious mental illnesses, have yet
to be consistently defined. See Leona L. Bachrach, Defining ChronicMentalIlln s: A
Concept Paper, 39 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 383, 384-86 (1988). Most
statutory definitions include diagnosis, duration, and disability criteria. For example,
Arizona defines the "seriously mentally ill" as individuals with a schizophrenic, major
affective, or paranoid disorder (diagnosis), who have had persistent psychotic
symptoms (duration), and as a result, are dysfunctional emotionally and behaviorally
in such areas as work, social relations, and self care (disability). See ARIz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 36-550(4) (Supp. 1993). Questions remain, however, particularly regarding
the durational element. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 5 1 .01(3g) (West 1987).
According to the American Psychiatric Association, an individual is afflicted with
a severe mental illness when "[s]everal symptoms [are] in excess of those required to
make the diagnosis and [the] symptoms markedly interfere with occupational
functioning or with usual social activities or relationships with others." AMERICAN
PsYCHIATRIC Assoc., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(DSM-m-R) 24 (1987). As a general matter, however, the "severity" of mental illness
differs with respect to the various mental disorders. Schizophrenia, for example,
which at some point always involves "delusions, hallucinations, or [other] ...
disturbances," see id. at 187, becomes "chronic" when the symptoms of schizophrenia
last for more than two years. See id. at 195. The definition of schizophrenia, itself,
incorporates a time dimension, requiring the continuous signs of the illness for at
least six months. See id. at 190. Despite the APA's best efforts, however, most states
use prior hospitalization as the primary indicator of chronicity. See Bachrach, supra,
at 385.
" As this Comment defines them, those "at risk" of being civilly committed are
those who have been brought into the civil commitment process either voluntarily or
involuntarily and whose placement fate awaits.
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commitment criteria, state statutes are not likely to be a source of
great protection. Although most state statutes require or allow the
consideration of less restrictive alternatives in their civil commitment proceedings, 24 few actually follow the mandates and even
fewer are likely to in the future. 25 Federal statutes are not likely
to be of much help either. Most federal statutory provisions are
26
directed towards the mentally retarded, not the mentally ill.
Moreover, as interpreted by the courts, no federal statute has been
found to require states to consider less restrictive alternatives to
civil commitment. 7
As for a constitutional mandate supporting the right to
community-based services, cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
over twenty years ago may have held the key. But within the past
twenty years, the Supreme Court has undergone a retrenchment of
its own, rendering it an unlikely source of protection for the
mentally ill.2" As the Supreme Court has retreated, however, state
courts have tended to fill the void. The re-emergence of state
courts and state constitutions as sources of aggressive rights protection bodes well for the establishment, in a new context, of a right to
treatment in the least restrictive environment. 29 Although the
scope of state court decisions that rest on state constitutional
provisions is limited, enough of a foundation has been laid upon
which additional rights for the mentally ill may be built.
Part I of the Comment will trace the history of civil commitment
in the United States, detailing the factors leading up to deinstitutionalization, the failures of deinstitutionalization, and the retrenchment of rights in the 1980s and 1990s. Part II will begin by
exploring the concept of least restrictive alternatives and its
connection with the doctrine of community-based alternatives.
Once theoretically established, the doctrine of community-based
treatment will be analyzed through political lenses, as the Comment
explores the economic and social benefits associated with community-based approaches to mental health. Part III will detail why resort
to federal statutory and constitutional, as well as state statutory
remedies is not likely to be an effective strategy, as they have
24

See infra text accompanying note 186.

See
2See
See
21 See
2' See
2

infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
infra text accompanying notes 146-51.
infra text accompanying notes 146-56.
infra text accompanying notes 160-79.
infra text accompanying notes 205-06.
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increasingly tended to favor the concerns of the majority over the
rights of the minority. Part IV urges advocates for the mentally in
to resort to state constitutionalism in order to preserve the liberty
interests of their clients. Part V proposes several ways in which the
due process and equal protection provisions of state constitutions
can serve this end.
I.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND DEINSTITUrIONALIZATION:
HISTORY AND POLICY

A. Civil Commitment Procedures
The state's power to commit a mentally ill individual must rest
on one of two grounds. Either the commitment is justified by the
state's police power or its parens patriae power."
Under the
police power rationale, commitment is necessary to protect the
public from individuals the state considers to be potentially
dangerous.-" Under the parens patriae power, the state assumes
3 2
the obligation to protect those who cannot protect themselves.

SoSee SAMUELJ. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 24 (1985).
Brakel's work is one of the most comprehensive, as well as one of the most often
cited, works on the mentally ill.
S Before committing the noncriminal mentally ill, the state, in mostjurisdictions,
is required to show with clear and convincing proof, that (1) the individual is unable
to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law or to the limits of social
tolerance; (2) the individual is unable to appreciate the deterrent force of the law; and
(3) the individual is therefore potentially dangerous as measured by both magnitude
and probability of harm. See id. at 24-25. For all three criteria, the individual's
deficiencies must stem from his or her mental illness. See id.
" To satisfy the requirements justifying parens patriae commitment, the state
must show, with clear and convincing proof, that (1) the individual lacks the
competence, because of his or her severe mental illness, to make decisions affecting
her condition and thus is unable to seek appropriate treatment on her own; and (2)
the potential of harm to the patient is so great that a deprivation of liberty for the
patient's own good is warranted. See id. at 24. States have increasingly allowed the
commitment of "gravely disabled" individuals, independent of a finding of decisional
incompetence. See id. at 24 n.28; Fay A. Freedman, The Psychiatrist'sDilemma: Protect
the Publicor SafeguardIndividual Liberty?, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 255, 264 n.58
(1989) (discussing how today the doctrine of parens patriae "authorizes involuntary
commitment of mentally ill persons who cannot care for themselves, are unable to
seek appropriate treatment or are gravely disabled"); see also infra text accompanying
notes 181-83. Other states have followed the American Psychiatric Association's
Model Law provision for commitment of those "likely to suffer substantial mental or
physical deterioration." Clifford D. Stromberg & Alan A. Stone, Statute: A Model
State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 280
(1983). For a more extensive discussion of the implications of these more lenient
standards, see infra discussion accompanying notes 55-65.
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Although the procedures for civil commitment vary, typical state
proceedings are either initiated through third party petitions to the
state courts or through emergency detentions made by police
officers. Commitment proceedings that followjudicial channels are
typically initiated by family members or other individuals who can
personally attest to the actions of the proposed patient. The
petitions must allege that the proposed patient is mentally ill and
that the state's criteria for commitment are satisfied. Moreover, in
most jurisdictions, a medical certificate supporting the petitioner's
clinical claims is required. If, based on this information, the
reviewing judge has probable cause to believe that the state's
commitment criteria are satisfied, the proposed patient will be
subjected to a brief observational stay in a psychiatric ward so that
an independent examination can be conducted. If the commitment
process is initiated on an emergency basis, these preliminary steps
are usually bypassed, and the proposed patient is immediately
detained for purposes of examination.
In either case, a commitment hearing takes place after the
examination is complete. In most states the hearing is automatic,
but some states only grant review hearings upon request. At the
hearing, the proposed patient enjoys a panoply of due process
protections, including the right to legal counsel, a limited right to
confront adverse witnesses, and in some states, the right to a jury
trial. At the close of the hearing the court determines whether by
clear and convincing evidence the proposed patient is mentally ill
and satisfies the state's commitment criteria. If the appropriate
criteria are, in fact, met, the court then considers where best to
33
treat the patient.
Although these formalistic procedures have remained relatively
constant over time, the actual implementation of civil commitment
laws has changed radically over the years.
B. Pre-1980s
Guided by a combination of goodwill, self-interest, and
scientific bravado, progressive reformers in the early twentieth
century sought not only to care for, but also to remove, the mentally
ill from crowded city tenements. Between 1900 and 1940 they

" For a good, though somewhat dated, description of the civil commitment
process, see BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 56-73. Alternatively, one could simply
browse through the civil commitment provisions of the fifty states. See infra note 337.
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succeeded in increasing the number of institutionalized mentally ill
from 150,000 to approximately 445,000. s 4 By 1955, inpatient
episodes 5 totalled 819,000 in state and county mental hospitals. 6
By the 1960s, however, concerns for the civil rights of patients, 3 among other things," inspired a trend towards deinstitu-

, See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 83. Edward Purcell describes this era

as one highlighted by an emergent faith in the good uses of science that over time
lost its teleological zeal and lapsed into mere instrumentalism. Science was no longer
good or bad; it was just science:
Rapid technological advance[s] contributed further to the general faith in
science and confirmed it as the most reliable method of attaining useful
knowledge.... [and as] the perfect instrument to bring about the
continuous improvement of society.
By the second decade of the twentieth century the ideal of a science of
society was firmly entrenched in American thought.
Gradually methodology replaced moralism in the minds of many
younger reformers and social scientists, and the instrument of social
research came to overwhelm the goal of social reform.
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 6, 15, 25 (1973). Purcell provides a

wonderful guide to the changing themes of American cultural and intellectual
thought from 1870 to 1960.
Characterized as the "medical model" years, civil commitments during this period
worked on the assumption that the mentally ill needed someone else to provide
decision-making authority. Not only were doctors given broad authority to
involuntarily hospitalize citizens, but the superintendents and staff who ran these
institutions were given almost complete discretion about decisions affecting the
patient. See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 83-84. La Fond and Durham note
that "[s]uperintendents were under no legal obligation to review cases for discharge
or to justify a decision to retain a patient." Id. Moreover, there often were no
maximum limits on how long a patient could remain committed; most patients simply

died while in institutions. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 203. In fact, when
patients walked through the hospital doors, they lost not only their freedom, but also
other rights not directly associated with the commitment, such as voting and property
rights. See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 84.
These practices were justified on several grounds. First, "[m]ost mentally
disabled people were assumed to be incapable of comprehending or exercising their
rights. In addition, severely limiting many personal rights was believed necessary for
effective treatment. Finally, orderly hospital administration required the restriction
of many patient privileges." Id.
" Inpatient episodes are the number of patients in residence at the beginning of
a 12-month reporting period, plus those admitted during that period. During
deinstitutionalization, the number of inpatient episodes was cut in half. See Costello
& Preis, supra note 11, at 1531-32 n.20 (noting that the population in state mental
hospitals declined from 560,000 in 1950 to less than 140,000 in 1980).
s See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 83.
s Exposes on the sordid conditions within mental institutions, such as Albert
Deutsch's book, The Mentally Ill in America, contributed mightily to the vigilant
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tionalization, a movement marked both by reduced levels of
commitment and increased due process protections for those still
committed. 9 This concern with civil rights was reflected best by
the willingness of courts both to tighten the criteria for identifying
committable individuals and to create procedural and substantive
safeguards, including the right to treatment in the least restrictive
environment. 40
Spurred on by these judicial mandates, state

concerns of civil rights activists. See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 85. One
particularly poignant passage in Deutsch's book recalls: "In some of the wards there
were scenes that rivaled the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps-hundreds of
naked mental patients herded into huge, barnlike, filth-infested wards, in all degrees
of deterioration, untended and untreated, stripped of every vestige of human
decency, many in stages of semi-starvation." ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL
IN AMERcIA: A HISTORY OF THEm CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMEs 449
(2d ed. 1949). See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961) (analyzing the social
conditions of patients in state mental hospitals).
' Psychotropic drugs, a group of chemical agents that have an effect on the mind,
were introduced to treat mental illness. See Costello & Preis, supra note 11, at 153132 n.20. These drugs served to inhibit the more serious manifestations of mental
illness, thus the need for institutionalization was reduced. See id.; see also BRAKEL ET
AL., supra note 30, at 47-48, 328-29 (discussing four categories ofpsychotropic drugsantipsychotic, antidepressant, lithium, and anti-anxiety drugs-and the side effects
associated with each); Ludwig, supra, note 16, at 1088 (discussing dozapine, a new
drug that some think may facilitate the release of as many as 30% of the long-term
patients still in mental hospitals).
Also of importance was the fiscal health of states during the 1960s. See BRAKEL
ET AL., supra note 30, at 203 n.3. In addition to the overcrowded conditions of
mental facilities in the 1960s, see id. at 203, presumably requiring ever greater public
expenditures for upkeep and manpower, federal law, which favored community-based
treatment, had created economic incentives for states to discharge institutional
residents. See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 89 (noting that federal law
prevented patients at state institutions and mental hospitals from receiving benefits
during inpatient treatment, but did reimburse some nursing homes and other health
care providers). "The 1966 amendments to the Comprehensive Health Planning and
Public Health Services Act mandated that 15 percent of state grant allotments for
public health services be directed toward community-based mental health services.
By 1967, this proportion was increased to 70 percent." Id. Not surprisingly, states
took advantage of this federal largess. See id. at 90.
'" See Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Disabled, 70 CAL. L. REv. 54, 55 (1982). As social
reformers, psychiatrists, lawyers, and political leaders became more aware of the
decrepit and horribly dehumanizing conditions of mental institutions, states began
to reform their commitment laws and courts began to apply "stringent substantive
and procedural due process protections to the involuntary commitment process." Id.;
see also Perlin, supranote 11, at 83 (noting that social reformers, psychiatrists, lawyers,
and political leaders were each responsible in part for creating alternatives to
institutions).
40 See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 26; LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at
95-97. In a decision reflecting the liberal spirit of the times, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals held that district courts should bear the burden of inquiring
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legislatures also began to reform the civil commitment process and
to enact new laws to protect the liberty interests of the mentally
ill. 4 1

C. 1980s and 1990s
By the 1980s, it became clear that the progressive roots planted
during the previous generation had not fully taken hold. As one
commentator notes:
[D]einstitutionalization ... has not lived up to its promises and
... the ideal of community treatment has resulted in the abandonment of many mentally disabled persons to virtually unsupervised,
unprotected lives in flophouses located in dangerous or delapidated [sic] areas or even in "psychiatric ghettoes" that have sprung
up in some of our larger cities.... The irony of the original least
restrictive alternative case, Lake v. Cameron, was that there turned
out to be no alternative, and the patient, having been accorded an
empty right, remained hospitalized for the remaining five years of
her life.4

into "other alternative courses of treatment," more suitable to the appellant's needs
than civil commitment. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(reading this requirement into the District of Columbia Code, but not finding a
constitutional right to less restrictive treatment alternatives).
41 See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 90-92 (noting that the courts
compelled state legislatures and agencies into action by holding several state
commitment statutes unconstitutional, thereby forcing legislatures to address the
courts' concerns). For example, many states not only limited commitment to those
individuals who were dangerous either to themselves or to others, but also defined
dangerousness by whether the danger was "imminent" and "substantial," intending
that only the most pressing public concerns would warrant civil commitment. See id.
at 92-93.
42BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 31. In the 1960s, states often released patients
who should not have been released, simply to capitalize on the availability of federal
funds for community mental health centers ("CMHCs"). See Torrey, supra note 5, at
23. Once patients were released, community facilities did not have the resources to
keep track of everyone who depended on their services. The disappearance of single
room occupancy hotels, due to the increasing gentrification of the inner cities, also
dealt a particularly heavy blow to the mentally ill who not only needed a bed, but also
an address where benefit checks could be received. See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra
note 11, at 104; TORREY, supra note 17, at 141-42.
Today, states continue to "dump" their patients. See William Claiborne, 'Quaint'
MaineBattles UrbanProblem as FacilitiesReleaseMentally Ill Patients,WASH. POST, Mar.
9, 1993, at A9 (noting that "financially strapped state mental hospitals throughout
Maine are increasingly 'dumping' severely disturbed patients into the streets to cut
costs"). The willingness of states to release as many patients as possible, and the
resulting housing shortage has combined to increase the homeless population. See
LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 10, at 103, 105; see also Dugger, supra note 15, at B2
(noting that the "stock of single room occupancy hotels that traditionally provided the
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Part of the problem was transforming community mental health
centers from merely helping the "worried well" to assisting the
chronically mentally ill."' As one commentator noted with a tinge
of irony, "[tlhere appears to be virtually no relationship between
community mental health centers and community services for the
mentally ill."" For the deinstitutionalized who needed continuing
psychiatric aftercare services, the hope that community mental
45
health centers would provide those services was a false one.
The result has been a constant flow of mentally ill individuals
out of state mental institutions, into the community, and then back
into the institutions. The chronically mentally ill:
deteriorate in the community to the point where they are admitted
in acute crisis to a hospital, oftentimes via the local jail. They are
then stabilized on medication in the hospital and released with no
discharge planning or aftercare services. Without treatment or
community support services, they again decompensate to the point
of requiring hospitalization, revolving continuously back and forth
46
between hospitals and the streets.

mentally ill with a cheap place to stay disappeared as developers upgraded the
properties); Sarah Lyall, Red Tape Thwarts Efforts to House Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1993, at B1 (noting that community opposition to the construction of homes
for the mentally ill and tensions between city and state governments have slowed
down efforts to build these units).
I See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 109 (describing the "worried well"
as those wanting brief, intermittent therapy, such as marriage counseling or stress
management). The "worried well" benefitted, but the "programs did not prove
successful with chronic patients whose disabilities require[d] management over an
entire lifetime." Id. Without greater federal assistance or state support, these
community organizations could not expand their services to meet the needs of the
chronically mentally ill. See id. at 110-11.
In fact, many community mental health networks were not only ill-equipped to
handle the mentally ill, but in the case of the homeless mentally ill, many of these
organizations were also simply unwilling to get involved. See Carr, supra note 5, at
C8. But see Shelley Brook et al., TrainingVolunteers to Work with the ChronicMentally
ill in the Community, 40 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 853,853-54 (1989) (arguing
that careful training of volunteers can improve the patients' treatment needs, as well
as the volunteers' experience); see also Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Note, Community Mental
Health Treatmentforthe Mentally Il-When Does Less Restrictive TreatmentBecome aRight?
66 TUL. L. REV. 1971, 1973 n.8 (1992) (noting that many of the homeless mentally ill
would refuse treatment even when it was available).
44 TORREY, supra note 17, at 26; Bob Herbert, Mental Health Failures,N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1993, § 4, at 11 (noting that although one billion dollars is spent each year
on community mental health services in New York state, the chronically mentally ill
are not benefitted).
4 See TORREY, supra note 17, at 142-50.
4' Costello & Preis, supranote 11, at 1532. While the number of patients in public
mental institutions at any one time has fallen precipitously, the number of those
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Today, deinstitutionalization has become associated with
crime,47 homelessness,48 and public anxiety."
Of course, many
of the civil rights advances for the mentally ill remain intact. 0
Constitutional and statutory protections have not been totally
abandoned. Nonetheless, majoritarian values and a "law and order"
mentality have begun to threaten the civil libertarian advances that
favored the mentally ill.5
One force behind this trend has been the American Psychiatric
Association (APA).12 In its Model Law for Civil Commitment,
promulgated in 1983, the APA suggested expanding involuntary
commitment to persons "likely to cause harm to [themselves] or to
suffer substantialmental orphysical deterioration,or ... likely to cause
harm to others."5 3 Under the traditional understanding of parens
patriae and police power justifications for civil commitment, the
variable "harm" had always been a necessary criterion for civil
commitment."
Under the suggested model law, however, the
APA, "[s]ignificantly ...
expand[ed] current parens patriae

admitted to institutions has actually increased. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 30, at

47; see also Costello & Preis, supra note 11, at 1554-55 n.124 (noting that in one
California hospital, the rehospitalization rate has topped 50%); Charles A. Kiesler,
Mental Hospitalsand Alternative Care: Noninstitutionalizationas PotentialPublicPolicy
for Mental Patients, 37 AM. PSYCHOL. 349, 349-50 (1982) (noting that the number of
inpatient episodes increased between 1955 and 1975 from 477,000 to 1.2 million).
47 Many of the mentally ill who remained in communities without adequate
support structures got into trouble with the law. Once in jail, both the social and
clinical condition of these individuals worsened. See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note
11, at 101-02; see also TORREY, supra note 17, at 13 (noting that many of the mentally
ill were
charged with petty crimes simply to get them off the streets); supra note 13.
48
See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 100. Soon scholars were pointing
fingers at deinstitutionalization for the growth of the homeless population,
reinforcing public perceptions and stereotypes. See, e.g., TORREY, supra note 17, at
14142 (1988); cf. H. Richard Lamb, Deinstitutionalizationand the Homeless Mentally Ill,
in THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 55,55 (H. Richard Lamb ed., 1984) (noting that the
poor implementation of deinstitutionalization has contributed to the homelessness

problem); see also supra note 10.
"' Deinstitutionalization as a concept is problematic because it has a "pejorative
connotation, evoking images of the discharge of a great number of patients into
communities that lack adequate planning or funding for community care." Keilitz et
al., supra note 9, at 699; see also supra note 12.
'o See infra text accompanying notes 185-86.
See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 15.
52 See Stromberg & Stone, supra note 32, at 275 (presenting and commenting on
the model APA statute on civil commitment).
"Id. at 330 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 30-32. "These 'need for treatment' provisions represented a
clear departure from the narrow commitment criteria of the 1960s, which required
dangerousness to self or others." LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 118.
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commitment" authority to reach "many of those severely mentally
ill people who ... roam the streets aimlessly and without hope,"
regardless of the danger they pose to themselves or to others.5 5 As
a practical matter, therefore, the APA proposal called for the
commitment of those who had been deinstitutionalized, but,
because of inadequate aftercare services, were at risk of being
recommitted.
These individuals were deemed a "danger" to
themselves not because of what they would actually do to themselves, but because of what they would, in fact, not do for themselves.
Several states have incorporated this "passive harm" (deterioration) standard into their commitment statutes.5 6 Several other
states have simply interpreted their civil commitment laws broadly
and construed the "harm" requirement expansively in order to
reach the homeless. 7 And for those states reluctant to alter the

Stromberg & Stone, supra note 32, at 280-81.
See ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.2 (Supp. 1993) (noting that one "may be committed
to outpatient treatment if ... as a result of the mental illness the respondent ... will
continue to experience deterioration of the ability to function independently");
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(7)(B) (1990 & Supp. 1992) (describing a civilly committable
individual as one who "will, if not treated, suffer or continue to suffer... and this
distress is associated with significant impairment ofjudgment, reason, or behavior
causing a substantial deterioration of the person's previous ability to function
independently"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59 -2 9 02(g)(2) (Supp. 1992) (defining"'[likely to
cause harm to self or others' [as a person who]... is unable.., to provide for...
basic needs... causing a substantial deterioration of the person's ability to function
on the person's own"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-102(8)(e) (1991) (defining the
"'[m]entally ill' [as those] suffering from a mental disorder which ... will, if
untreated, predictably result in further serious deterioration in the mental condition
of the person"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(a) (1989 & Supp. 1992) (characterizing
as civilly committable an individual "in need of treatment in order to prevent further
disability or deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness"); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02(11)(c) (Supp. 1993) (defining a "'[p]erson requiring
treatment' [as one] who ... if... not treated[,] there exists a serious risk of harm
[which means] a substantial likelihood of... [s]ubstantial deterioration in physical
health .... based upon recent poor.. .judgment in providing one's shelter, nutrition
or personal care"); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.005(2)(c)(C), (D) (Supp. 1992) (defining a
"'[m]entally ill person' [as one] who ... [i]s exhibiting symptoms or behavior
substantially similar to those that preceded and led to [prior] hospitalization.. ., and
[u]nless treated, will continue ... to physically or mentally deteriorate"); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(a)(2)(C) (West 1992) (characterizing as civilly
committable one who "will, if not treated,... continue to experience deterioration
of his ability to function independently"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020(l)(b)
(West 1992) (characterizing as civilly committable one who "manifests severe
deterioration in routine functioning").
Note further that most states have also adopted a "gravely disabled" or "unable
to provide for basic needs" standard, which similarly extends the parens patriae
authority to "passive" harms. See infra note 183.
'7 For example, in the early 1980s, New York social workers were authorized to
'6
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terms or interpretation of their inpatient commitment provisions,
the growing national trend has been towards outpatient 8 and

detain and seek commitment of those who refused shelter during the brutal winter
months. The underlying assumptions for these commitments were that one had to
be insane to brave sub-freezing temperatures, and that this behavior placed homeless
individuals in "grave danger" of harming themselves. Although New York
commitment statutes would only allow civil commitment of those proven to be
mentally ill and imminently dangerous to themselves or to others, Mayor Edward
Koch broadly interpreted the state's commitment statutes to involuntarily detain the
homeless who chose to brave the elements. See Mark S. Kaufman, 'Crazy" Until
Proven Innocent? Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill Homeless, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 333, 339-40 (1988); see also Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,
523 N.Y.S.2d 71, 86 (App. Div. 1987) (rejecting arguments that the problems ofJoyce
Brown, a homeless person, resulted from a lack of adequate housing for the poor,
and not mental illness), appeal dismissed,525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988); Ludwig, supra note
16, at 1104-11 (detailing this much publicized case).
Other states have upheld these expanded commitment criteria despite
constitutional challenges based on claims of overbreadth and vagueness. See e.g., In
re LaBelle, 728 P.2d 138, 144-45 (Wash. 1986) (upholding Washington's "gravely
disabled" standard, while acknowledging that inquiries under this standard may
involve "imposing majoritarian values on a person's chosen lifestyle"). But see In re
Long, 606 N.E.2d 1259, 1263-64 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (noting that "[c]ontrary to the
State's assertion, a person is free to live on the street, if the person chooses to do
so"); In re J.A.D., 492 N.W.2d 82, 85 (N.D. 1992) (noting that "[n]ot all homeless
people are mentally ill and in need of treatment .... [The problems of homelessness]
may also be the result of economic hardship or simply lifestyle choice").
' Envisioned as a compromise between community treatment proponents and
civil commitment proponents, involuntary outpatient commitments generally refer to
the coerced community placement of nondangerous individuals either initially or after
release from a state mental hospital. See Steven J. Schwartz & Cathy E. Costanzo,
Compelling Treatment in the Community: DistortedDoctrinesand Violated Values, 20 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1329, 1346-47 (1987).
Several commentators believe that outpatient commitments lead to unnecessary
restraints on patients who do not meet the conventional criteria for involuntary
treatment. Schwartz and Costanzo, for example, argue that outpatient commitments
extend involuntary treatment to those who fit the APA's "deterioration" standard, as
well as to those not quite as bad off. See id. at 1361, 1367 (noting North Carolina and
Georgia as examples and citing their statutes, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-263(d)(1)-(2)
(1992) and GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(12.1)(A) (Supp. 1993), which provide outpatient
commitment based on a "deterioration" standard); see also Robert D. Miller & Paul
B. Fiddleman, Outpatient Commitment: Treatment in the Least Restrictive Environment?,
35 Hosp. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHATRY 147, 149-50 (1984) (describing outpatient
commitments as less restrictive, but acknowledging that oftentimes outpatients occur
because judges cannot legally justify inpatient treatment, but feel treatment is
advisable, and because mental health professionals are often pressured to get
unpleasant people off the street).
As of 1987, 31 states and the District of Columbia either allowed or mandated
outpatient judicial commitments. See Schwartz & Costanzo, supra, at 1363-64 &
nn.144-47. Schwartz and Costanzo further noted that "the only jurisdictions which
have substantially amended their commitment laws," are the ones that have passed
comprehensive provisions for outpatient commitment, "lending substantial support
to the claim that comprehensive schemes for involuntary community treatment are
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conditional commitments,5 9 extending the state's parens patriae
powers well beyond their traditional limits. The increased use of
outpatient and conditional commitments and "deterioration"
provisions has not only enabled states to maintain control over the
mentally ill, but has also enabled states to avoid many of the due
process requirements constitutionally and statutorily associated with
inpatient commitments."0 Not immune to this retrenchment of
rights, many courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have
narrowed the range of protections available to the mentally ill.6 1
Many other courts have simply adopted a posture of judicial
restraint, not only refusing to second-guess statutory trends towards
eased civil commitment criteria, but also the psychiatric professionals' determinations of who requires civil commitment.62 Some
courts have simply ignored statutory provisions requiring that the
least restrictive alternatives be considered before one is civilly committed.'

a national trend." Id. at 1366.
" Conditional releases generally involve allowing the patient to be deinstitutionalized as long as certain requirements are met. For example, a release order may
stipulate that the individual periodically return to the institution for follow-up care
or seek treatment in an outpatient facility. Failure to adjust to the outside world or
to properly comply with these "conditions" may result in the individual being
returned to the asylum. See e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 66-338, -339 (1989); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-277(a) (1989 & Supp. 1992); see also BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 30, at
205. As Brakel notes, conditional release provisions "are of little practical value
unless there are adequate outpatient facilities in each jurisdiction that work in close
cooperation with the mental institutions." Id. at 207.
60 See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 120-21 (listing several state due process
statutory provisions for inpatient commitments).
61 See infra text accompanying notes 164-79.
62
See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 117-19; see also Youngbergv. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307,322 (1982) (establishing the deferential standard); Kaufman, supra note
57, at 362 (noting that "Ujiudges have routinely deferred to the psychiatrist's expert
testimony, abdicating their decisional role to the medical professional, even when
their intuitions tell them that the professional's testimony is highly inaccurate").
When courts do second-guess the mental health professionals, it oftentimes
results in a decision to commit. See e.g., State v.Johnson, 843 P.2d 985, 986 (Or. Ct.
App. 1992) (holding that homeless person was unable to meet her basic personal
needs for food and shelter due to a mental disorder, despite examiners' having
determined that there was no disorder); State v. Evjen, 826 P.2d 92, 92-93 (Or. Ct.
App. 1992) (basing decision to commit on history of appellant's inability to take
medication, despite examiner's findings to the contrary).
' See, e.g., In re Robinson, 601 N.E.2d 712, 717 (Ill. 1992) (holding as "harmless
error" the state's failure to present a predispositive report as to what less restrictive
alternatives exist in the community). See generally BRAEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 28
(noting that courts ignore statutory provisions largely because they are "overly
complicated" and mostly "unnecessary"); Stromberg & Stone, supranote 32, at 332-33
(noting that while 35 states require that least restrictive alternatives be considered
before institutionalizing someone, "this requirement is more aspirational than real").
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The result of these statutory and judicial trends has not simply
been a retrenchment in the niceties of due process. Instead, at least
in some of the states that have expanded their civil commitment
criteria, the result has been significant increases in the number of
those civilly committed."
In Washington state, for instance,
La Fond and Durham point to some startling and depressing
developments:
When Washington State ...

changed its law in 1979 to permit

commitment of mentally ill individuals in need of treatment as
well as those who were dangerous, there was a 180 percent
increase in total admissions to the largest state mental hospital
over the two years following the legal change. Involuntary admissions increased by 91 percent in the first year after the legal
change. Involuntary admissions actually began to rise nine months
before the effective date of the revised statute, the result of an
anticipation effect in which mental health professionals and judges
simply operated as though the new statute was actually in effect.65
With the threat of expanded institutionalization on the horizon,
and the continued neglect of the deinstitutionalized, we need a very
powerful arsenal of policy and legal arguments to combat this
increasing retrenchment of the rights of the mentally ill. Part II sets
the stage by establishing the conceptual foundation for the least
restrictive alternative doctrine and its derivative theory--community-

But see infra note 188 (referencing several cases where the courts have taken less
restrictive alternative requirements seriously).

As long as community mental health services remain underfunded and
understaffed, risk-averse mental health professionals and courts will continue
committing the not-so-dangerous mentally ill, despite statutory requirements to the
contrary.
"See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 147. Some place the current figure
of inpatient episodes at 3 million, 60% more than typically reported in the literature.
See CHARLES A. KIESLER & AMY E. SIBUIlN, MENTAL HOSPrrALIZATION: MYTHS AND
FAcTs ABOUT A NATIONAL CRisis 272 (1987).
0 LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 147. La Fond and Durham also point
to an increase in the number ofjuveniles being placed in institutions. See id. at 115;
see also Lois A. Weithorn, Mental Hospitalizationof Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of
Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 773 (1988).
Because Washington state has been researched extensively on this issue, while
other states have not been similarly researched, numbers are not yet available for
each state. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, see supra note 46, the number of
inpatient episodes has increased dramatically over the past several years. Moreover,
the logic of expanding the criteria for civil commitment dictates that inpatient
episodes will continue to increase. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text
(noting increased use of the "gravely disabled" standard for justifying parens patriae
commitments).
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based treatment. Once the terms are defined, we will explore in
depth the policy arguments that suggest that community-based
treatment is not only morally superior to institutionalization, but
also clinically and economically superior.
II. COMMUNITY-BASED TREATMENT AND THE POLICY
ARGUMENTS FAVORING IT
A. The Concept of Least Restrictive Alternatives:
Three Progressions
The least restrictive alternative doctrine has enjoyed a "rich and
varied history.""5
Used by courts in negative commerce, due
process, and equal protection clause cases, as well as by federal and
state legislators, its genesis can be traced to the case of Shelton v.
Tucker.6 In Shelton, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed
in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
68
purpose.
Soon, the least restrictive alternative doctrine began to gain
ascendancy in the context of mental health law, finding expression
both in state and federal statutory provisions as well as in lower
federal court opinions. 9
The most commonly recognized expression of the doctrine in
the mental health context has involved requiring states to provide
individuals with the least restrictive type of treatment within the

P. Browning Hoffman & Lawrence L. Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the
Mentally Ill: A Doctrine in Search of Its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1100, 1101 n.1
(1977); see also Schwartz & Costanzo, supra note 58, at 1350-51 (summarizing the
history of the usage of the least restrictive alternative doctrine).
67364 U.S. 479 (1960) (holding unconstitutionally overbroad a state statute
requiring public school teachers to divulge the names of organizational associations
to which they belonged).
" Id. at 488 (footnotes omitted).
69 One of the clearest examples of its use by federal courts in the context of
mental health litigation was in Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
See infra text accompanying notes 74-78. As for state statutes, consider South
Dakota's definition of the Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine: "[T]reatment and
conditions of treatment which ... are no more intrusive or restrictive of mental,
social, or physical freedom than necessary to achieve a reasonably adequate
therapeutic benefit." S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 27A-1-1(11) (1992).
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institution.
Based on the notion that states cannot commit
individuals in order to treat them and then not provide the
treatment, this use of the doctrine has enjoyed great success. In
70
Covington v. Harris,
for instance, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals, in extending the concept of least restrictive
alternatives to treatment decisions made during involuntary
hospitalization, held that "[i]t ma[de] little sense to guard zealously
against the possibility of unwarranted deprivations prior to
hospitalization, only to abandon the watch once the patient
disappears behind hospital doors." 71
Similarly in Rouse v.
Cameron, 72 the same court validated the petitioner's claim that
continued commitment at St. Elizabeth's Hospital could not be
justified without some form of adequate treatment being provided.7"

At work in these cases is a form of quid pro quo: "We take your
liberty away, but promise to treat you so as to expand your capacity
for liberty in the future." Limited conceptually to only those whose
liberty has already been infringed, this approach could not faithfully
be extended to preserving the rights of those who are "at risk" of
being civilly committed or recommitted.
Another approach to the least restrictive alternative doctrine has
required state trial courts to consider alternatives to hospitalization
before institutionalizing the mentally ill. This concept was clearly
enunciated in Lake v. Cameron.74
In Lake, a nondangerous,
mentally retarded woman sought on statutory grounds to have the
committing trial court consider less restrictive alternatives before
committing her to St. Elizabeth's Hospital. Finding for the plaintiff,
Chief Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit instructed
the trial court to make "an earnest effort... to review and exhaust
" 75
available resources of the community.
70 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
71 Id. at 623-24.
72 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir 1966).
73 See id. at 452-53.

4 See 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974
(D.D.C. 1975), this concept was applied to those who were already institutionalized,
but sought release. The court held that pursuant to the District of Columbia Code,
the city needed to make a bona fide effort to consider alternatives to commitment for
those who were inappropriately committed. The court also went so far as to require
the city to draw up plans outlining how it was going to satisfy its statutory duties. See
id. at 977, 980. The court noted that "[iun the estimation of the Hospital's clinical
staff, approximately 43% of these inpatients currently require care and treatment in
alternative facilities." Id. at 976.
75 Lake, 364 F.2d at 660; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-101(2), (3) (1991)
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What Chief Judge Bazelon did not do, however, is equally
important. He refused to decide whether the District of Columbia
would be required to construct community-based alternatives should
none be found available. 6 By reserving judgment to some future
77
date, Chief Judge Bazelon effectively "emasculated" the doctrine.
As discussed earlier, Ms. Lake spent the remaining five years of her
simply because no less
life locked away at St. Elizabeth's Hospital
78
restrictive alternatives were "available."
A third approach, the one proposed here, is to do what Chief
Judge Bazelon did not do: obligate the states to develop community-based services that are "appropriate." This argument is founded
on the reality that too often mental health professionals decide
where to place individuals on the basis of what is available, not on
the basis of what is most appropriate. A standard of appropriateness would require states to expend money to bring their community facilities up to the professional standards currently in vogue.
Falling somewhere between the extremes of allowing states to rely
on the status quo of "availability" and requiring them to expend
unlimited resources for programs that are only "imaginable," the
"appropriate" standard would require states to develop communitybased alternatives at a realistic pace determined by professional
norms. Although one federal district court,79 and a handful of
state courts," ° have ordered legislatures to fund and develop mental
health services in the community, these cases have, with one
(providing that one can be institutionalized "only when less restrictive alternatives are
unavailable
or inadequate").
7
6 See Lake, 364 F.2d at 662.
" See Eric D. Paulsrud, The Least Restrictive Alternative: A Theoiy ofJusticefor the
Mentally Retarded, 10 U. ARK. LrrrL ROCK L.J. 465, 491 (1987). The court in Dixon
did require that such facilities be made, but it limited its decision to those who were
already institutionalized, refusing to extend the statutory obligation to those not yet
institutionalized. See Dixon, 405 F. Supp. at 980. Moreover, to date, these facilities
and services have not been created. See Goldstein, supra note 17, at Al (reporting
that a federaljudge had appointed a special master to oversee implementation of the
decision in May 1993).
78 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
9 See Dixon, 405 F. Supp. at 980 (finding a statutory right to less restrictive
treatment for those who were determined to be inappropriately committed at St.
Elizabeth's Hospital); see also infra note 163 and accompanying text.
' See Arnold v. Arizona Dep't of Health Servs., 775 P.2d 521,522 (Ariz. 1989) (en
banc) (ordering the state to establish residential treatment programs for the mentally
ill, but explicitly refusing to address what would happen if the legislature failed to
fund such programs); In re D.E.R., 455 N.W.2d 239,241-43 (Wis. 1990) (ordering the
county to place appellant in community-based treatment program under state law,
despite claims by the county that it lacked the funds).
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exception, concerned the rights of those currently institutionalized."' This Comment calls for the extension of this right to those
who are "at risk"8 2 of being institutionalized for the first time or
"at risk" of being recommitted. As will be shown later,"3 support
for this conception of the least restrictive alternative doctrine can
be found in state constitutions.
In practice, "appropriate" community-based care would include
a full continuum of services: "medications, case management, day
treatment, crisis stabilization, transportation, residential services,
work adjustment, socialization, recreation, outreach, and mobile
crises services." s4 Taken together, community-based services such
as these are most effective when their focus is rehabilitative, that is,
when the emphasis is on developing the skills necessary to maintain
self-sufficiency and independent functioning in the community. 5
A full continuum of services-properly coordinated with the social
services system as a whole, 6 and offering various types of treatments for the particularized needs of the mentally illS 7 -would
ensure that the mentally ill not only receive treatment in the
community, but remain there as well. Although not all forms of
community care are of equal value, they all exceed whatever benefits
88
civil commitment provides.
" See Arnold, 775 P.2d at 529-34 (holding that under Arizona statutory law, the

mentally ill were entitled to have the state fund the creation of community mental
health services, unrelated to whether any of these individuals were previously
institutionalized or not); see alsoJose M. Santiago et al., ChangingaState Mental Health
System Through Litigation: The Arizona Experiment, 143 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 1575, 1578
(1986) (noting thatArnold's predecessor was the first case in the country in which the
plaintiffs successfully established a legal right to receive community mental health
services).
2 See supra note 23.
See infra part V.
Arnold, 775 P.2d at 524. For some novel forms of mental health services,
consider Hawaii's "Employment Program for the Chronically Mentally Ill," providing
community-based employment opportunities for the chronically mentally ill through
education, placement, and even housing services, see HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-3.5
(Supp. 1992), and Minnesota and Texas's provision of case managers to assist those
released into the community. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.093 subd. 2 (West Supp.
1993); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 534.053(b) (West 1992).
' See infra notes 104-07, 133 and accompanying text. Several states have, at least
statutorily, recognized the importance of this rehabilitative aspect of mental health
care. See e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5670.5, 5671 (West Supp. 1993); HAW.
REv. STAT. § 334-102 (1985).
" See id.
s 7 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 12-22-2-3 (West Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43A, § 5-403i (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 40.1-5-8(10) (1990); Tx
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 534.053(a)(1)-( 7 ) (West 1992).
" This is not to say that civil commitment is never an appropriate option. In fact,
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B. Social Benefits
The most obvious social benefit that can be attributed to
community-based treatment is increased liberty. Conversely, it is
beyond dispute that the deprivation of liberty associated with civil
commitment is one of the most serious infringements on individual
autonomy that a state may impose. If society is going to accept this
infringement, it should only be imposed with good reason. As will
be shown, the reasons generally offered fail to satisfy even cursory
examination.
1. Avoiding Unnecessary Civil Commitments
Involuntary commitment rests on several faulty assumptions
regarding the abilities and activities of the mentally ill. For
example, most civil commitments are justified on the mistaken
belief that the mentally ill are incapable of reasoning,89 incapable
of controlling their behavior, or incapable of knowing what they
want or what is in their best interests. 9' Community-based treatment is thus seen as not providing enough control and guidance for
the mentally ill. As proof for this proposition, many point to the

for many of the severely, chronically mentally ill who are dangerous to themselves or
to the public, civil commitment may be the best forum for their needs. What
community-based alternatives provide, however, is a choice-a choice that both mental
health professionals and the courts are compelled to consider to ensure treatment in
the least restrictive, and yet most "appropriate," setting.
59
See Morse, supra note 39, at 60 n.25.
0 As Morse notes, the only difference between a "hot tempered patient," who
threatens a doctor, and the "delusional patient," who fears his doctor, is that one can
be civilly committed and the other cannot, even though "no conclusive means" exist
to prove that one has greater or lesser control than the other. Id. at 61. Morse
concludes that there exists little support for an involuntary commitment system that
is imposed only on the mentally disordered. See id. at 66.
91See Stromberg & Stone, supra note 32, at 334 (recognizing that "many mental
disorders do not impair a person's ability to assess her desire for hospitalization or
a particular therapy"). Moreover, many researchers have noted that when it does
come to preferences, the mentally ill prefer treatment in the community to treatment
in state-run hospitals. See Robert L. Okin, Patients'Perceptionsof Their Quality ofLife
11 years After Dischargefroma State Hospital, 44 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 236,
239 (1993) (concluding that"patients with serious and chronic mental illness who are
placed in well-staffed community programs perceive this change to be a genuine
improvement in the quality of their lives," and that their preference for community
life persists over a long period of time); Mark Olfson, Assertive Community Treatment:
An Evaluationof the Experimental Evidence, 41 HosP. & COMMUNITY PsYCHIATRY 634,
640 (1990) (noting that based on studies done on the Training in Community Living
program in Madison, Wisconsin, patients consistently "prefer community-based
treatments to traditional hospital-based care").
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homeless mentally ill who are deemed absolutely crazy for "wanting"
to brave the natural and man-made challenges of life on the
street. 92 But as some researchers believe, the indices of behavioral
disturbance are often conflated with those most commonly
associated with homelessness (for example, dirty clothes and poor
hygiene).9"
As a result, some of the homeless mentally ill are
institutionalized on the mistaken belief that their actions (remaining
homeless and avoiding shelters) reflect an impaired ability to do
g4
what is in their best interests.
At the heart of the state's police power lies yet another mistaken
assumption: "Mental disorder is both an over and underinclusive
predictor of dangerousness; most crazy persons are not dangerous
and many normal persons are."" Since fears abound regarding
the homeless, and statutes associate the likelihood of harm with
"deterioration," the threat of overinclusive commitments is
severe. 6 Even back in 1975, when concern for the civil rights of
the mentally ill was at an all time high,9 7 fully 90% of those
compulsorily detained in mental institutions were not sufficiently
dangerous to warrant hospitalization."

92See supra note 57.
" See Kaufman, supra note 57, at 362.

' See id. at 364 (noting that many of the homeless living in the streets "may
actually be making a rational 'choice' when shelter is available but unsafe").
95 Morse, supra note 39, at 62.
' As one frustrated jurist has noted, the conditions of the homeless can be
explained in many different ways:
[T]he homeless are generally unkempt, dirty, poorly clad, and often reek of
urine and feces, yet respondents expressly deny that the mere condition of

being homeless and malodorous makes a person dangerous to himself....
Petitioner's conduct on the street is understandable if we appreciate
her obvious pride in her independence and in her ability to survive on her
own. She derives a unique sense of success and accomplishment in her

street life.
Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 71, 92-94 (App. Div.
1987) (Milonas,J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988).
9 See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
See Michael L. Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rightsfor the
Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier?,20 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1249, 1253 n.22 (1987); see
also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (detailing the criteria necessary
to civilly commit, and holding that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without

more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends").
Kaufman points out that too many are institutionalized because psychiatrists
overpredict out of fear of"professional and litigious charges of incompetence," and
that "mental health professionals are predisposed to provid[ing] mental health care
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As is the case with defining "capacity," defining who is or is not
dangerous escapes scientific certitude. 99 Ultimately, the criteria
depend on political and moral conceptions. In the 1980s, for instance, deciding who was committable reflected an expanded notion
of dangerousness and ultimately resulted in increased commitment."°
Given the imprecision and malleability of these standards, one can only assume that many of the institutionalized have
been unnecessarily, and in some cases arbitrarily, deprived of their
liberty. Moreover, because legal and medical liability have encouraged mental health professionals to err on the side of
overcommitment, 01 many individuals have been unnecessarily
committed for this reason as well. 2 Although new and improved
legal norms could provide more guidance, risk-averse mental health
professionals will likely continue to choose commitment unless and
until the states create and adequately fund effective communitybased treatment centers.0 3

and are less inclined to safeguard liberty rights." Kaufman, supra note 57, at 361.
' See Jur Strobos, The Constitution and the Rights of the Mentally 111, 10 J. LEGAL
MED. 661, 661 (1989) (noting that "'imminent harm' defies logical explanation as it
is irrelevant to professionally accepted" indices of mental illness); see also Heller v.
Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2644 (1993) (upholding Kentucky's higher burden of proof
standard for commitment of the mentally ill than for the mentally retarded because
"Kentucky's basic premise that mental retardation is easier to diagnose than is mental
illness has a sufficient basis in fact"); Elizabeth Rosenthal, Who Will Turn Violent?
Hospitals Have to Guess, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1993, at Al (noting that "predictions
about who will be violent are often made on the basis of limited information, and
even more limited science, leading to a sometimes mediocre batting average").
100 See BRAKEL ET AL., supranote 30, at 36 n.132. Brakel also notes that "[s]tudies
of mentally disabled persons, though not uncontroverted, have tried to show that as
a group they are no more dangerous than the general population and, moreover, that
identifying those few who are likely to do harm is a task to which the medical
profession is demonstrably not equal." Id. at 25 (footnote omitted).
101Despite the clear benefits of community care, hospitalization is still popular
among clinicians, see Keiitz et al., supra note 9, at 703, in part because most clinicians
were trained in an era when hospitalization was seen as the best place to treat the
mentally ill. SeeJohn A. Talbott & Ira D. Glick, The InpatientCare of the Chronically
Mentally Ill, 12 SCi-nZOPIENIA BULL. 129, 130 (1986). Another reason for the
popularity of hospitalization stems fromjudges who fear releasing mentally ill patients
into the community because they may later harm someone. See Chambers, supra note
18, at 1122-23.
102See Morse, supra note 39, at 67-69.
10 Evidence exists to suggest that mental health professionals determine that
community alternatives are inappropriate because they are not available not because
they are inappropriate. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 43, at 1983-84; see alsoJackson
v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 964 F.2d 980,992 (10th Cir. 1992) (upholding
considerations of community service availability when placement decisions are being
made). By conforming their recommendations to perceived financial constraints,
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2. Receiving Effective Liberty-Enhancing Treatment
In addition to the obvious freedom from restraint, community
programs provide yet another liberty dimension-liberty to develop
and maintain the skills necessary to exercise freedom. 0 4 Although
one may no longer be caged in by walls, one may still be constrained by one's own deficiencies. Community treatment, unlike
civil commitment, enables the mentally ill to adjust to their real
world surroundings and develop the skills needed to live autonomous lives with dignity.0 5 Therefore, a less obvious, though no
less important, benefit of community-based treatment is its
"Providing appropriate treatment and
prophylactic qualities:
support services in the community will substantially reduce the risk
Not only will those
"...106
of confinement in an institution .
never-before institutionalized be less likely to find themselves
committed, but, for those who have been institutionalized, wellcoordinated and sufficiently funded community services may stop
07
the door from revolving.
On the other hand, civil commitment, even under the best of
conditions, is not likely to "'cure' more than a handful of those
committed of their deviant behavior."108 The fact that very few

mental health professionals are not only exceeding their role, but are also validating
the status quo. See Kiesler, supra note 46, at 359 (arguing that deference to
professionals "lead[s] to excessive hospitalization"). In Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F.
Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975), the court noted that St. Elizabeth's own clinical staff had
conceded that 43% of its inpatients could be treated in alternative facilities, but that
such facilities still did not yet exist. See id. at 976. Without these community
alternatives in place, risk-averse health professionals will continue to choose
commitment.
0 See Costello & Preis, supra note 11, at 1541.
105 See Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 96 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J., concurring)
("Liberty is more than merely the absence of physical confinement; as the Supreme
Court's privacy cases make clear, the right of liberty is a right to personal autonomy."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986).
" Costello & Preis, supra note 11, at 1533; see also LA FOND & DURHAM, supra
note 11, at 90 ("In enacting [much of its progressive mental health legislation in the
1960s] Congress assumed that, in many cases, mental illness could be prevented by
early treatment in the community .... ").
Conversely, "[s]eparation ... impedes reintegration into community life."
Chambers, supra note 18, at 1113 (noting that isolation breeds further "withdrawal
and deterioration"). Chambers also refers to one incident where a patient, long
hospitalized, made a visit outside the hospital, and "literally could no[t] ... bring
himself
to choose what he would have for lunch." Id. at 1128.
10
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
10
Morse, supra note 39, at 80. With the help of accreditation committees, which
have demanded that mental institutions maintain high standards, and a vigilant press,
conditions in mental institutions have improved somewhat. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra
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psychiatrists desire to practice in public or private mental institutions sheds light on the quality of the clinical treatment received by
the mentally ill in those settings. 9 What is arguably most troubling about the ineffectiveness of civil commitment, however, is that
very few of the institutionalized ever learn how to adjust to living
outside the institution."1 In fact, involuntary hospitalization may
actually make people less capable of living in the community.'
If this is true, the promise of institutionalization-as a place for
treatment and normalization-does nothing but "propagate a cruel
2
myth.""

3. Eliminating the Stigma Through Interaction
Community treatment also serves to educate. Although the
presence of the mentally ill in communities often arouses anxiety,"3 the overuse of civil commitment stigmatizes mentally ill
individuals, fueling and sanctioning well-developed stereotypes and
prejudices."' Moreover, the cycle of periodic releases and recom-

note 30, at 337 (noting that "[w]hile most mental institutions today are providing far
better care and treatment than they did a decade or two ago, the baseline from which
progress is measured is very low"); see also Chambers, supra note 18, at 1125-26
(noting that hospitals used to be understaffed, overcrowded, and in physical decay
and that many hospital staff members were foreigners who had inadequate training
and who often did not speak English); Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Law:
Protectingthe Rights of People with Mental Disabilities, 13 VT. L. REV. 305, 309 (1988)
(detailing "warehouse"-like conditions at Willowbrook, a large state-run mental health
facility).
109 See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 47 ("The number of fully licensed
psychiatrists willing to work in public facilities remains well below the need for
them."); LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 85 (stating that "[in 1948 approximately one-half of all psychiatrists were employed full time in state mental hospitals,"
but, "[b]y the mid-1960s ... only 14 percent were practicing in public or private
hospitals"). In South Dakota, five mental health centers currently share a single
psychiatrist, and, in many other rural areas, community services have no psychiatric
professionals. See Torrey, supra note 5, at 24 (noting that federal requirements
ensuring that mental health professionals work in the public service for a period of
time were not implemented until 1981, following a marked reduction of training
funds).
10
See Kiesler, supra note 46, at 350 (noting that institutionalization fosters
"institutional dependency in various ways, leading over time to [the] progressive loss
of social and vocational competencies").
"I See KIESLER & SIBULKIN, supra note 64, at 163.
112 Morse, supra note 39, at 84.
11
See Strobos, supra note 99, at 666 (noting that people's fears of the mentally
ill are often irrational and pointing out that some believe that mental illness is
contagious).
. See Christopher Slobogin, Treatment of the Mentally Disabled: Rethinking the
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mitments interferes not only with the developmental growth and
normalization of the mentally ill, but also with the community's
ability to accept them. Meaningful community involvement over an
extended period of time would help dispel fears through understanding, and thereby, protect the rights of thousands of mentally
ill and homeless people currently threatened with commitment. As
John Hart Ely noted in his general discussion of discrete and insular
minorities:
Increased social intercourse is likely not only to diminish the
hostility that often accompanies unfamiliarity, but also to rein
somewhat our tendency to stereotype in ways that exaggerate the
superiority of those groups to which we belong. The more we get
to know people who are different in some ways, the more we will
begin to appreciate the ways in which they are not .... 115
C. Economic Benefits
Several well-respected, oft-cited studies suggest that community
care is cheaper than institutionalization, and yet equally, if not
more, effective." 6 One of the most influential books on the
relative costs of community treatment and mental hospitalization is
7
The book reKiesler and Sibulkin's Mental Hospitalization."1
viewed fourteen studies in which serious psychiatric patients were
randomly assigned to either inpatient or some alternative mode of
outpatient care. Kiesler and Sibulkin determined that "the most
general conclusion one can draw from [these studies] is that

Community-FirstIdea, 69 NEB. L. REV. 413, 419 (1990) (noting how group integration
can facilitate acceptance of mentally disabled people).
"JoHN
H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 161 (1980).
6
11 See KIESLER & SIBULKIN, supra note 64, at 169 (reviewing 14 studies in which
serious psychiatric patients were randomly assigned to inpatient or outpatient
settings). Michael Perlin also concluded that "an ample, largely uncontradicted but
regularly ignored body of evidence.., indicates that a well-conceived deinstitutionalization program ... has a positive and significant effect on the length of the expatients' 'tenure' in the community." Perlin, supra note 11, at 89. Moreover, there
does not appear to be any data that "support[s] ... hospitalization instead of
outpatient alternatives for most of [the mentally ill]." Talbott & Glick, supra note

101, at 130 (referring to the chronic schizophrenic and noting further that "there is
a consistent conclusion that alternative care is as, if not more, effective than inpatient
treatment in reducing symptomatology, rehospitalization, interpersonal difficulties,
and vocational disablement" (citations omitted)); see also Kiesler, supra note 46, at 357
(noting that "[ifn no case did the cost of alternative care exceed that of inpatient
care" while at the same time arguing that "[t]here is not an instance ... in which
hospitalization had any positive impact.., which exceeded that of alternate care").
117KIESLER & SIBULKIN,

supra note 64, at 179.
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alternative care is more effective and less costly than mental
hospitalization.""'
In fact, regardless of the outpatient setting
used, 9 the outcome indices by which their effectiveness is measured, 20 or the patient population using them, 121 alternative
care programs have universally provided more positive results more
cheaply than institutionalization.
Conversely, operating mental institutions has become exceedingly costly and not nearly as effective in treating the needs of the
mentally ill. 122 Higher accreditation standards, 2 ' public employee union demands, 124 and labor intensive functions, such as
supervision and security, have contributed to escalating costs for
state-run institutions. This, in an age of fiscal conservatism, has
rendered the maintenance and expansion of mental institutions very
difficult.
Since "[a]Ilmost all mental health treatment.., available can be
provided as efficaciously and usually more cheaply in less restrictive
u8 id.

at 179.
See id. at 158-59 (noting more positive results regardless of whether the
individuals were treated in hostels, day care centers, or total community care
programs).
120See id. at 172 (listing psychopathology, employment opportunities, and
independence as some of the indices).
121See id. at 173.
12 "In 1974 the annual average cost of care for a patient in a public mental
hospital was $11,250," whereas, the annual average cost for outpatient care was only
$531. LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 89. Today in New York, the state pays
$105,000 per person per year, or a total of $1.23 billion for individuals in institutions;
whereas only $482 million is allotted for the more than 150,000 people treated in the
community. See Richardson, supra note 10, at B7 (discussing the politics of hospital
expenditures); Verhovek, supranote 19, at 1 (noting how the state spends $2.9 million
a year to take care of 14 mentally ill patients in one psychiatric hospital). While the
costs associated with providing "effective" outpatient treatment will likely narrow this
gap, the majority of the studies have determined that compared to institutionalization,
effective (actually more effective) alternative care programs are less costly.
" See MarkJ. Seling & Gary W.Johnson, A Bridge to the Community for ExtendedCare State Hospital Patients, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 180, 180 (1990).
Ironically, the liberalizing efforts of those who sought to upgrade the conditions of
mental institutions also contributed to rising costs. Naturally, with increased costs for
personnel and upkeep, the expected savings from reduced patient loads never
materialized. Likewise, the deinstitutionalization dividend that was expected to fund
community-based services never appeared. See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11,
at 88, 110-11; Seicshnaydre, supra note 43, at 1974 (noting that many advocates of the
mentally disabled point to the funneling of funds into institutions for why conditions
in the community are so bad).
124 The unionization of hospital labor resulted in "[e]ight-hour work days and
forty-hour workweeks doubl[ing] the unit cost of state hospital care." LA FOND &
DURHAM, supra note 11, at 88.
19
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community settings than in closed hospitals," 125 why then have
states, as fiscally constrained as they are, not switched? Although
politics 126 has been the major factor, economics have ironically
played a role as well. Per patient, the costs for effective community
127
treatment are certainly less than the costs of civil commitment.
But since community treatment is premised on more individuals
receiving adequate care, total short run costs may actually exceed
current mental health expenditures. 128 Not only would these
programs be catering to larger numbers-particularly the chronically
125 Morse,

supra note 39, at 84.
See Ludwig, supra note 16, at 1092 ("State hospitals were political fiefdoms.
Shutting down a state hospital was not much different from trying to close a military
base or a naval shipyard.").
12 In a study completed two years after Kiesler and Sibulkin's, the researchers
concluded that:
Compared with inpatient state hospital treatment for chronic mentally ill
subjects, an intensive residential treatment program was able to achieve
comparable results in a shorter period of time, with greater cost efficiency,
and with less rehospitalization of patients after discharge from the index
treatment. These comparisons validate the clinical and economic value of
this highly structured program.
Jeffrey Bedell &John C. Ward, An Intensive Community-Based Treatment Alternative to
State Hospitalization, 40 HoSP. & COMMuNITY PSYCHIATRY 533, 535 (1989). The
treatment provided in this study included 14 hours of psychoeducational activities,
focused primarily upon the development of social skills. See id. at 533. Although the
daily cost per patient in the intensive residential treatment unit was almost $40 more
than in the state hospital, the average overall cost per patient in the community
program was $9152 less. See id. at 534. The discrepancy in these figures was due to
the fact that the average hospital patient spent 165 days in the mental wards, as
compared with 35 days for patients treated in the community. See id.; see also Kiesler,
supra note 46, at 358 (pointing out that the mentally ill "could be treated in
alternative settings more effectively and less expensively").
128 See Morse, supra note 39, at 87 n.144 (noting that increased costs will be
generated not by "the high costs per patient of community treatment compared to
hospitalization," but "the increase would be the result of providing adequate
treatment to vastly greater numbers of persons"); see also Carl A. Taube et al., New
126

Directions in Research on Assertive Community Treatment, 41 HOSP. & COMMuNIrrY

PsYCHIATRY 642, 642 (1990) (noting that assertive community treatment programs
tend to cost more than traditional outpatient care, but these programs appear to be
more "cost-effective alternatives to traditional hospital and aftercare programs"). But
see TORREY, supranote 17, at 205 (arguing that the public funds spent on the mentally
ill in 1985 would "probably [be] sufficient to provide excellent care of the seriously
mentally ill jf the money is used wisely"); Celia W. Dugger, Albany Accord Supports
Clinics for Mentally ill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at Al, B4 (reporting that the
Governor of New York and the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees of
the State legislature had agreed to a mental health bill that would take $210 million
in projected savings from the dosing of five mental hospitals and place the funds into
services for the mentally ill in the community, increasing the state's spending on
community mental health services by 20-25%).
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mentally ill, but states would also be required to develop and
staff129 the programs.

The long-term benefits and cost-savings of

such an approach, however, are numerous. As already mentioned,
community treatment is a "prophylactic," reducing the need for
future hospitalization and.thus preserving individual liberty. 3 0 A
form of preventative medicine, community-based treatment also
offers an economic boon. In an age of skyrocketing health care
costs, reformers are increasingly calling for preventative approaches
to health care.131 By most accounts, preventing illness is more
cost-effective than treating illness.3 2 So too with mental illness.
A strategy of mental health that is directed towards identifying and
treating those "at risk" would be in the vanguard of modern health
care reform.
Additionally, for those who are or have been institutionalized,
well-funded, coordinated, community-based services would ensure
that the chronically mentally ill could leave the institutions permanently. With effective community-based health services, fewer
numbers of mentally ill patients fall through the cracks, and many
more actually have a chance at normalization. 3 Not only does
129 A few commentators have suggested that medical school residents training for
a career in psychiatry be given incentives to work in public mental health facilities.
This innovation could presumably include working in community treatment centers
and outpatient clinics. See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 161 (stating that
because "America heavily subsidizes the training of thousands of psychiatric residents
each year," the country "deserve[s] a modicum of public service from them in
return"); Torrey, supra note 5, at 25 (calling for an "automatic one-year-for-one-year
payback obligation attached to all state-funded training programs" for psychiatrists).
129
See Slobogin, supra note 114, at 431 (noting that the rationale behind group
integration is to allow "the mentally disabled [to] become familiar to and interact with
the rest of society [such that] they have [a] chance at successful assimilation into the
community"); supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
" See Hawaii Health Care Is Called a Modelfor U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1993, at
A13 [hereinafterHawaii Health Care](noting that health care costs were relatively low
in Hawaii where the health care system emphasizes prevention and early treatment);
Spencer Rich, Administration to Provide Free Vaccines for Children, WASH. POST, Apr.
1, 1993, at A14 (noting that "[e]mphasizing vaccination is in accord with the
administration's focus on preventive health care").
112 See Hawaii Health Care, supra note 131, at A13.
...
For example, in NewJersey, the 450 Plan (designed to deinstitutionalize 450
mental patients) has successfully assisted formerly committed patients adjust to living
in the community. See Jacqueline Shaheen, Helping the Mentally Ill R oin the
Community, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1993, § 13, at 1; see also Jos6 D. Arana et al.,
Continuous Care Teams in Intensive Outpatient Treatment of ChronicMentally ll Patients,
42 Hosp. & CoMMUNry PSYCHIATRY 503, 503 (1991) (noting that 32 of 39 patients
treated in an intensive outpatient treatment program experienced "increased rates of
treatment compliance, decreased frequency of crises, and decreased frequency and

772

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 142:739

this improve their potential for successful treatment, 3 4 but
perceptions of the mentally ill in the community improve as
well." 5 No longer is re-institutionalization discussed as a solution
for our homeless population;"' instead, the creation of community services addresses the problems of the portion of the homeless
population that is mentally ill. As for the majority of the homeless
population that is not, exposing the myth of deinstitutionalization
directs our attention to the real cause of homelessness: poverty.
Although community mental health services do exist, 3 7 there
are no guarantees that policymakers will be persuaded to improve
upon and expand their current systems. If, however, a given policy
can be shown to be more effective and cheaper than some other
alternative, the stage may be set for political reform.
What
transforms a policy idea into law is the existence of a "window of
opportunity.""'8 Although the emergence of eased commitment
criteria in recent years seems to indicate that most windows are now

duration of hospitalization"); Alberto B. Santos et al., ProvidingAssertive Community
Treatment for Severely Mentally Ill Patients in a Rural Area, 44 Hosp. & CoMMUNrrY
PsYcmATRY 34, 34 (1993) (noting that assertive community treatment programs in
rural South Carolina have resulted in a "79 percent decrease in hospital days per year,
a 64 percent decrease in the number of admissions per year, a 75 percent decrease
in the average length of stay per admission, and a 52 percent reduction in estimated
direct cost of care").
1m See supra text accompanying notes 117-21.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
157
See Frances L. Randolph et al., ResidentialProgramsforPersonswith Severe Mental
Illness: A Nationwide Survey of State-Affiliated Agencies, 42 HOsP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 1111, 1111 (1991) (noting the rapid growth since 1980 in the number of
residential programs, most offering only social and recreational activities and
medication supervision, and lacking professionally trained mental health program
staff).
" According toJohn W. Kingdon's agenda-setting model, political events occur
and policies are made when:
[s]olutions become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to
favorable political forces. This coupling is most likely when a policy
window-an opportunity to push pet proposals or one's conception of
problems-is open.
Policy windows are opened either by the appearance of compelling
problems or by happenings in the political stream....
... [Meanwhile, policy e]ntrepreneurs who advocate their pet
alternatives are responsible for this coupling. They keep their proposal
ready, waiting for one of two things to happen: a problem that might float
by to which they can attach their solution, or a development in the political
stream.., that provides a receptive climate for their proposal.
JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 204 (1984).
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closed, other legal sources may provide the catalyst needed to let in

the air.'3 9
II.

SEARCHING FOR A RIGHT TO COMMUNrIY-BASED TREATMENT
IN FEDERAL STATUTORY, CONSTITUTIONAL,
AND STATE STATUTORY REMEDIES

The discussion so far has revealed two very distinct pictures. On
one hand, the rights of the mentally ill are seriously threatened. As
society increasingly equates mental illness with homelessness, the
calls for relaxed civil commitment laws become more strident and

more difficult to ignore. That several states have already heard the
call and acted makes the issue more urgent. On the other hand,
these calls for increased commitment face an overwhelming mass of
evidence indicating that civil commitment is not only more libertyrestricting, but also less effective, more costly, and, in the long-run,
more harmful than other less restrictive approaches to treating the
mentally ill.
Assuming one wishes, as this author does, to protect the
interests of the mentally ill, the next step must be to understand
how the mixed reality of the mentally ill's condition will affect the
institutional organs that are traditionally relied on for such
protection. Will state legislatures be loath to offer assistance, given
the public pressures to do otherwise? Will Congress, elevated
somewhat above more localized political pressures, prove a useful
source? Or should the courts be turned to for protection of the
rights of the mentally ill? And if so, which courts, federal or state?
These questions must be asked and the following discussion
attempts to answer them.
A. FederalStatutes

In 1963, Congress passed the Mental Retardation Facilities and
Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act (the "Construction Act"). 4 ' Designed to create incentives for states to
provide health care services in the community, the Construction Act
See Schwartz & Costanzo, supra note 58, at 1379 (noting that today "[t]here is
an unusual degree of consensus among parties who rarely share common views that
the first priority for almost all states should be the development of an adequate array
of less restrictive community alternatives").
" Pub. L. No. 88-164,77 Stat. 282 (1963), repealedby Omnibus Budget Reconciliadon Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 902(e)(2)(B), 95 Stat. 560.
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authorized the allocation of money to states that had developed
comprehensive mental health plans. Presumably, these comprehensive health plans would cater to both the mentally retarded and the
mentally ill. In subsequent years, extending well into the 1970s,
Congress maintained its commitment to community-based service
development, helping fund over 760 community centers across the
4

country.1

1

In 1981, however, Ronald Reagan convinced Congress to pass
42
his Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (the "Omnibus Act").
14
The Omnibus Act, created in the spirit of "fiscal federalism"
that dominated the 1980s, block granted federal funding for mental
health services to the states. The result was an aggregate reduction
in federal mental health funding for the states, and because of the
block granting, proportionately less funding for community mental
health centers. 44 Additionally, Medicaid, Medicare, and SSI
policies during the Reagan era limited the incentives for states to
develop community mental health centers, further reducing their
45

demand and supply.1

Another assistance program, designed to assist the mentally
disabled, is the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act ("DD Act").14 Section 6009 of the DD Act provides
141See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 626.

142 Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
143 See generally THOMASJ. ANTON, AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY 2024 (1989) (discussing the conceptual model of fiscal federalism, by which the federal
government devolves responsibility for the implementation and funding of
government services onto states and localities).
144 Compounding the problem of reduced federal assistance has been the severe
fiscal problems facing many state governments. See Susan B. Hansen, State Fiscal
Strategiesfor the 1990s: BalancingBudgets in a Recession, PUBLIUS, Summer 1991, at
155, 156 (noting that "northeastern and Middle Atlantic states have been hardest
hit").
145
See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 675 (discussing how Medicaid has left little
money for noninstitutional community-based services); M. Gregg Bloche & Francine
Cournos, Mental Health Policy for the 1990s: Tinkering in the Interstices, 15J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 387, 397 (1990) (discussing cutbacks by the Reagan administration
of SSI and SSDI benefits for the chronically mentally ill); William Gronfein, Incentives
and Intentions in Mental Health Policy: A Comparisonof the Medicaid and Community
Mental Health Programs, 26J. HEALTH & Soc. POL'Y 192,203 n.10 (1985) (noting that
both Medicare and Medicaid are "tilt[ed] away from providing outpatient services to
the mentally ill"); Kiesler, supra note 46, at 350 (noting that "[wihile NIMH supports
a national policy of deinstitutionalization and outpatient care, the Medicaid/Medicare
programs have incentives favoring hospitalization").
146Pub. L. No. 98-527, 98 Stat. 2662 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6000-6083 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
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that "[p]ersons with developmental disabilities have a right to
appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation for such disabilities." 147 Subsection 2 further requires that treatment "should be
provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's
personal liberty. "148
Invoking the least restrictive alternative
language, the DD Act was seen by many as requiring states that
received federal assistance to actually create community facilities.1 49 In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman5 '
("Pennhurst 1"), however, the Court, per Justice Rehnquist, noted
that "nothing in the Act... suggest[s] that Congress intended to
require the States to assume the high cost of providing 'appropriate
treatment' in the 'least restrictive environment.'"' 5 ' What was
characterized as an aspirational right could not be translated into an
affirmative right.
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),' 52 passed in 1990
as an antidiscrimination measure, has been cited by at least one
student of the Act as yet another possible source for the affirmative
right to community-based treatment.5 "
On its face, the ADA
prohibits discrimination in public services on the basis of disability.'5 4 Its underlying purpose is to reintegrate handicapped individuals into the community by providing them with an opportunity
to partake in regular governmental programs or programs geared
specifically to their needs.'5 5 Some, however, have construed the
ADA to place an affirmative obligation on states and localities to
"ensure 'meaningful access' to community programs, even for the
most disabled." 5 '
147 Id. § 6009(1).

I Id. § 6009(2).
..While the law was directed towards the developmentally disabled, and not the
mentally ill, the creation of community alternatives would theoretically have

benefitted both.
150451 U.S. 1 (1981).
151Id. at 18.

152Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (current version at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12101-12213 (Supp. II 1990 & Supp. III 1991)).
...
15 See Seicshnaydre, supra note 43, at 2000.
155

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (Supp. III 1991).

See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disabilityin State and Local Government
Services,
28 C.F.R. § 35 (1992).
15
Seicshnaydre, supra note 43, at 1990 (quotingJackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. &
Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243, 1298-99 (D.N.M. 1990), rev'd in part, 964 F.2d 980

(10th Cir. 1992)); see also Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: The
Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L.Q. 393 (1991) (discussing generally how the ADA
cannot work unless the mentally and physically disabled are actually brought into the
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Upon closer examination, it is unlikely that the ADA would ever
fulfill what its advocates believe to be the Act's underlying promise.
On its face it incorporates absolutely no language dictating the
creation of a positive right. Instead, the language is negative,
indicating what Congress and the states cannot do, rather than what
they must do. Moreover, to believe that the courts would construe
such a document to compel the construction of community facilities
for the mentally handicapped ignores the lessons learned from
Pennhurst L The ADA is not geared towards ensuring that those
for them;
who are mentally ill have community services developed
15 7
only that those that already do exist be open to them.
The future of congressional action on the mental health care
front is likely to be more promising during the Clinton administration. With a Democratic Congress and President concerned
generally about health care reform, 5 ' the nation may begin to
focus its attention on the needs of the mentally ill.' 59 Unfortunately, with the nation's economy as it is, and with most health care
reforms directed towards reducing both short-term and long-term
costs, the likelihood of Congress and the President authorizing large
appropriations for capital construction projects is minimal. Just as
unlikely is the prospect of Supreme Court intervention on behalf of
the mentally ill.
community, not simply provided an empty right).
" See Williams v. Secretary of Executive Office, 609 N.E.2d 447,453 (Mass. 1993)
(holding that "[a]lthough we recognize that deinstitutionalization with subsequent
services may be highly desirable for individuals in the plaintiffs' position, such services
are not required as a matter of law by the ADA"); Stephan Haimowitz, Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990: Its Significancefor Persons with Mental Illness, 42 HOSP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 23, 24 (1991) (noting that while the ADA may protect
individual liberty from state action, it does little to ensure the development of

community services).

1
" See, e.g, Richard L. Berke, The Health Plan: Rising Expectations and Fearof the
Bills Create an Opening,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1993, § 4, at 1 ("[N]early 50 years after

President Harry S. Truman proposed national health insurance, a consensus has
finally emerged among Republicans, Democrats, labor, and business groups that the
nation needs to change the system.").
"' It should be noted, however, that preliminary reports on the probable effects
of Clinton's health care package on the mentally ill present a mixed message. See, e.g,
Marlene Cimons & Karen Tumulty, Package Draws Words of Praise, Warning, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at A12, A13 (noting that "[m]ental health groups cheered the
recognition that mental illness should be considered on a par with physical disease
but said they were unhappy that full coverage would not be provided until the year
2001"); Irvin D. Rutman, Health-CarePlan Should Include Provisionfor Mental-Health
Services, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 18, 1993, at All (editorial page) (expressing concern
that Clinton's health care plan will cut back on psychiatric rehabilitation services).
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B. FederalConstitution
Beginning with Lake v. Cameron,"6 federal courts seemed quite
receptive both to the least restrictive alternative doctrine and the
compelled provision of community-based alternatives. Although
Judge Bazelon expressed no opinion on whether the District of
Columbia would be required to fund the creation of an "alternative,"1 6' he nevertheless tacitly acknowledged that such an argument could be made on due process or equal protection
grounds. 162 Similar "close calls" occurred in several other lower
federal court decisions; many articulating a statutory right to
treatment in the least restrictive environment, but leaving open the
issue of whether states could be forced to create such alternatives
on constitutional grounds. 63 By 1983, no cases had yet determined whether a mentally ill person "at risk" of being civilly
committed could sue on constitutional grounds to obtain adequate
care in the least restrictive environment.
'- 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). For a discussion of the Lake case, see supra text
accompanying notes 74-78.
161Lake, 364 F.2d at 662.
162
See id. at 662 n.19 (noting that"[s]uch questions might be whether so complete
a deprivation of appellant's liberty basically because of her poverty could be
reconciled with due process of law and the equal protection of the laws").
6
" See, e.g., Wyatt v. King, 773 F. Supp. 1508, 1510, 1516-17 (M.D. Ala.) (holding
that the state must conduct periodic judicial reviews of the need for continued
commitment, and in conducting those reviews, must consider the least restrictive
alternatives "necessary and available"), orderclarified by 781 F. Supp. 750 (M.D. Ala.
1991); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379, 384 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (noting that
"[p]atients have a right to treatment in the least restrictive conditions necessary to
achieve the purposes of commitment," and ordering the state to formulate and
oversee the implementation of a patient plan), af/'d in part and remanded in part sub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1095-96 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (noting that the mentally ill cannot be
institutionalized if other less restrictive, equally effective, alternatives are available,
but leaving open the issue of whether states were required to provide alternative
programs), vacated and remanded on othergrounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); see also Dixon
v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974, 979-80 (D.D.C. 1975) (requiring both the federal
government and the District of Columbia to submit plans detailing their intentions
on how best to provide the mentally ill plaintiffs in this case with a less restrictive
placement than St. Elizabeth's Hospital where it was deemed they were inappropriately held). Dixon goes the farthest of all the cases in establishing a positive right to least
restrictive alternatives. See id. However, Dixon was decided on statutory grounds and
only concerned those whom the state had already institutionalized. See id.
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1. The Youngberg Case
Youngberg v. Romeo' involved the claims of Nicholas Romeo,
a profoundly retarded adult, involuntarily committed at the
Pennhurst mental institution. Mr. Romeo presented three claims
regarding the nature of his commitment: (1) that he be guaranteed
safe conditions of confinement; (2) freedom from bodily restraints;
and (3) minimal training and development of basic skills. He based
all three claims on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'6 5 Although the Court accepted all three claims,'
it chose to read the third right, that of minimal training, as
restricted to "such training as an appropriate professional would
consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability
" 16 7
to function free from bodily restraints.
In further determining whether the state had violated Mr.
Romeo's rights, the Court reasoned that it would defer to the
judgment of mental health professionals unless it could be shown
that the professionals' decisions were clearly unfounded. 6 ' By
entitling the professionals' conclusions to a presumption of
correctness, 169 and thereby subjecting due process claims of the
mentally ill to minimal level scrutiny, the Court left little doubt that
a right to community-based treatment, 170 that is, treatment in the
least restrictive setting, would not be found in the U.S. Constitution.
Although the Court had not explicitly addressed the least restrictive
164 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
16 See id. at 315-17.

id. at 318, 322.
Id. at 324. The Court noted that "[a]s a general matter, a State is under no

166 See
67

constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border." Id. at
317. Nonetheless, the Court conceded that the state has a duty to provide services
and care to those whose liberty it had restricted. See id. at 322.
168 See id. at 323.
169 The degree to which the Court was willing to defer to the judgment of mental
health professionals is fascinating. As the Court noted, "liability may be imposed [on
the professional] only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such
ajudgment." Id. The Court failed to indicate what constitutes accepted professional
judgments, practices, and standards. Presumably, mental health professionals define
them. Such a deferential standard is reminiscent of the pre-1960 "medical model" of
civil commitment when mental health professionals were given virtual carte blanche
authority to devise their own treatment programs. See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra
note 11, at 83-85.
170 Note that the Court has acknowledged that an individual cannot be involuntarily confined for mental illness if the state provides no treatment. See O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-76 (1975).
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alternative doctrine, the clear implications of the decision are that
mental health professionals, not courts, will determine which types
of treatment and treatment settings are most appropriate. Since
professional judgment, as already discussed, 171 is unlikely to be very
liberal, relying on professional judgment in striking a balance
between treatment needs and civil liberties is not really striking a
balance, but rather ensuring an outcome, that outcome being civil
1 72
commitment.
Several court of appeals decisions interpreting Youngberg have
173
made the implications of that landmark case more explicit.
Although some decisions actually resulted in the plaintiffs' being
placed in community settings, the courts never strayed from the
Youngberg mandate, releasing individuals into the community only
when there was a clear consensus among mental health professionals that the individuals belonged in the community. 17 Moreover,
171 See supra note

172Youngberg

103 and accompanying text.

involved the rights of the developmentally disabled. As will be

discussed, infra, the courts have tended to be less solicitous of the rights of those

individuals with mental illness than with mental disabilities. Butsee Hellerv. Doe, 113
S. Ct. 2637, 2645 (1993) (accepting as rational Kentucky's requiring a higher burden
of proof for the mentally ill than for the mentally disabled before the state can civilly

commit; the Court emphasized, however, its deference to the state in light of
Youngberg).
175

SeeJackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 964 F.2d 980, 991 (10th Cir.

1992) (interpreting Youngberg, the court held that "the mere fact that the [state]
consider[ed] the availability or unavailability of community services when they ma[d]e
care and training recommendations does not, alone, support a conclusion that the
[state] fail[ed] to exercise reasonable judgment"); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243,
1247 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1057 (1987); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 93 n.9
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986); Society for Good Will to Retarded
Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1250-51 (2d Cir. 1984); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d
266, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1983).
In Society for Good Will, the court reiterated the restricted interpretation of
Youngberg, noting that "[e]ven if every expert testiftied] ... that another type of
treatment or residence setting might be better, the federal courts... may rule only
on whether a decision to keep residents at [the institution] is a rational decision based
on professional judgment." Society for Good Will, 737 F.2d at 1248-49. The court
reversed the district court's finding that residents in the state mental institution were
entitled to community placement. See id. The courts in Rennie, 720 F.2d at 266, and
Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1983), reached similar conclusions.
Several other lower federal court decisions declared explicitly that there existed no
constitutional right to placement in the least restrictive community. See, e.g., Daniel
B. v. O'Bannon, 633 F. Supp. 919, 924 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
14
" See Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 85-86 (3d Cir.) (noting that the professional
staffwhere Ms. Clark was committed were all in agreement that her confinement had
been unnecessary since 1976), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986); Thomas S. v. Morrow,
781 F.2d 367, 374 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that professional judgment had repeatedly
recommended Thomas's placement in the community), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124
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most of those cases involved individuals currently in institutions and
dealt with their right to be released and placed in community
settings, or to have certain basic rights assured within the institution.'75 None of those cases concerned the rights of individuals
not yet institutionalized, and none came close to requiring the state
to provide substantive assistance to the mentally ill through the
creation of community mental health services.
Although the federal district and circuit courts have admittedly
attempted to breathe life into the requirement of least restrictive
Court, their
care, without guidance and support from the Supreme
76
law.'
the
shape
definitively
never
will
attempts
2. The PennhurstII Case

As will be discussed shortly, most states do formally require that
less restrictive alternatives be considered in determining whether
commitment is the most appropriate treatment setting. 77 After
the Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst State School and Hospital
v. Halderman'7" ("Pennhurst IF), however, federal court judges
cannot force reluctant state officials to consider these alternatives. 79 Interpreting the Eleventh Amendment as barring federal
courts from ordering state officials to comply with state laws, the
Supreme Court effectively left the rights of the mentally ill in the
hands of the states.
(1986); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 629 F. Supp. 1487, 1493 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (requiring lower
courts to defer to the judgment of professionals), rev'd in par4 afl'd inpart, 807 F.2d
1243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1057 (1987).
" See Armstead v. Coler, 914 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1990) (affirming the lower
court's finding that mentally disabled plaintiffs had been denied appropriate services
while committed in an institution).
'76 While the Supreme Court assumed an aggressive posture during the 1970s,
amenable to all sorts of institutional reform litigation, see Perlin, supra note 98, at
1256-57 n.36, the Court's posture during the 1980s changed radically. As Perlin
notes, "the fact is inescapable that the Court has not-either covertly or overtlyencouraged expansive decisionmaking in institutional cases brought on behalf of the
mentally disabled." Id. at 1261. A similarly pessimistic read of the court was voiced
byAlan Meisel: "The most striking conclusion arising from the [major] mental health
cases in which the Supreme Court has engaged in plenary review is that the Court
cannot be relied upon to break new constitutional ground in securing rights to
psychiatric patients on the civil side of the mental health system." Alan Meisel, The
Rights of the Mentally Ill Under State Constitutions,45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 15
(1982).
77
' See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
178465 U.S. 89 (1984).
7 Because litigants could "forum shop," many claims made their way to federal
district court, challenging the manner in which state law had been enforced.

1993]

COMMUNITY TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL

781

C. State Statutes
As discussed earlier, states have in recent years passed laws
making it easier to civilly commit the homeless mentally ill.180
What was a trend in the mid-1980s has now become the norm.
Today, virtually all states provide for the civil commitment of those
whose condition is either deteriorating or can be labelled "gravely
disabled." 1 ' As compared to 1974, when only four states had
gravely disabled laws or functional equivalents," 2 today there are
39 states that employ this criteria.8 8 Several other jurisdictions
"* See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
.81
Gravely disabled is generally defined as being unable to provide for one's
essential needs. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 405, para. 5/1-119 (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(providing that a "person who is mentally ill and who because of his illness is unable
to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm" is
subject to involuntary submission).
The "deterioration" standard is generally used to extend the state's reach to the
deinstitutionalized homeless who, without community support, do not receive the
support necessary for their health and safety. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 426.005(2) (1987 & Supp. 1992); see also supra note 56. Despite the obvious
extension of the states' parens patriae powers, the "deterioration" standard has
survived several constitutional challenges. See, e.g., State v. Brungard, 789 P.2d 683,
687 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); In re LaBelle, 728 P.2d 138, 146 (Wash. 1986).
182See Kaufman, supra note 57, at 353 n.94.
18 In addition to the 10 states which provide for "deterioration" commitments,
see supra note 56, the following 39 states allow for the commitment of those deemed
"gravely disabled" or equivalently"unable to provide for basic needs." See ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 36-501(15) (Supp. 1992) ("gravely disabled"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47207(c)(1)(C) (Michie 1991) (noting that "'a clear and present danger to himself' is
established by demonstrating that the person's behavior demonstrates that he so lacks
the capacity to care for his own welfare"); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h) (West
1984 & Supp. 1993) ("gravely disabled"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-102(5)(a) (1989)
("gravely disabled"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-495 (West 1992) ("gravely
disabled"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1)(a) (West 1993) (noting that a "person may
be involuntarily placed for treatment upon a finding of the Court... that.., he is
manifestly incapable of surviving alone.., and... he is likely to suffer from neglect
or refuse to care for himself"); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(9.1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1993)
(characterizing an "[i]npatient [as] a person who is mentally ill and . . . who is ...

unable to care for that person's own physical health and safety"); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 334-1 (1985) ("gravely disabled"); IDAHO CODE § 66-317(n) (1989) ("gravely
disabled"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 405, para. 5/1-119(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (defining a
"'[p]erson subject to involuntary admission'... [as]... [a] person who ... because
of his illness is unable to provide for his basic physical needs"); IND. CODE ANN. § 1226-1-1 (West Supp. 1992) ("gravely disabled"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 22 9 .1(14)(c) (West
1993) (characterizing as "'[s]eriously mentallyimpaired'. . the condition ofa person
who ... because of that illness [i]s unable to satisfy the person's needs for
nourishment, clothing, essential medical care, or shelter"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 202A.011(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (describing the conduct of one who is a
"'[d]anger ... to self'.. . [as] including actions which deprive self, family or others
of the basic means of survival including provision for reasonable shelter, food, or
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clothing"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:2(10) (West 1989) ("gravely disabled"); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 1 (Law Co-op. 1989) (defining the "'[1]ikelihood of serious

harm' [as] ... a very substantial risk of physical impairment or injury to a person
himself as manifested by evidence that ... he is unable to protect himself in the
community"); MICH. COMB. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401(b) (West 1992) (defining a
"'person requiring treatment' [as] ... [a] person who ... as a result of... mental
illness is unable to attend to those of his basic physical needs such as food, clothing,
or shelter"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 subd. 13(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993)
(defining "'[m]entally ill person' [as] any person [with mental illness] which... poses
a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self.., as demonstrated by... a failure
to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 4121-61(e) (1993) (defining "'[m]entally ill person' [as] any person who ... poses a
substantial likelihood of physical harm to himself... as demonstrated by... a failure
to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care"); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 632.005(9)(b) (1988 & Supp. 1993) (characterizing the "'[1l]ikelihood of serious
physical harm' [as]... [an] inability to provide for his own basic necessities of food,
shelter, safety or medical care"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-102(15) (1991) (defining
the "'[s]eriously mentally ill' [as] suffering from a mental disorder which has ...
deprived the person afflicted of the ability to protect his life or health"); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 83-1009(2) (1987) (characterizinga "'[m]entallyil dangerous person'. .. [as]
present[ing]... [a] substantial risk of serious harm to himself... as manifested by
evidence of ... inability to provide for his.., basic human needs"); NEV. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 433A.115(2) (Michie 1991) (noting that "[a] person presents a clear and

present danger of harm to himself if... he has [a]cted in a manner from which it
may reasonably be inferred that ... he will be unable to satisfy his need for
nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, self-protection or safety"); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 135-C:2(XV) (1990) (describing the "'[s]everely mentally disabled' [as]
having a mental illness which ...

cause[s] a substantial impairment of a person's

ability to care for himself or to function normally in society"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:427.2(h) (West Supp. 1993) (defining "'[d]angerous to self' [as] mean[ing] that by
reason of mental illness the person.., is unable to satisfy his need for nourishment,
essential medical care or shelter"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3(K) (Michie 1993) ("grave
passive neglect"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(11)(a) (1989 & Supp. 1992) (describing
an individual as a "'[d]anger to himself' [because] ... [t]he individual has acted in
such a way as to show [t]hat he would be unable.., to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety"); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 5122.01(B)(3) (Anderson 1993) (defining a "'[m]entally ill person
subject to hospitalization'... [as] a mentally ill person who... is not providing for
his basic physical needs because of his mental illness"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A,
§ 1-103(14)(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993) (defining a "'[p]erson requiring treatment'

[as]... a person.., who.., is unable to attend to those of his basic physical needs
such as food, clothing or shelter."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301(a) (Supp. 1993)
(noting that "[a] person is severely mentally disabled when.., his capacity to... care
for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of
harm... to himself"); R.I. GEN. LAws § 40.1-5-2(14)(c) (1990) ("grave... risk to his
or her physical health and safety"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-410(2) (Law. Co-op. 1985
& Supp. 1992) (noting that "[a] person may be [committed if] ... that person is
mentally ill and because of his condition is likely to cause harm to himself through
neglect, inability to care for himself, personal injury or otherwise"); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 27A-1-1(5)(b) (1992) (characterizing behavior as "'[d]anger to self'...
which show[s] there is a danger of serious personal harm . .. as evidenced by an
inability to provide for some basic human needs such as food, clothing, shelter,
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have either interpreted their civil commitment laws more freely or
have used outpatient and conditional commitments to serve their
ends. 4 Although these provisions do not by themselves exclude
the possibility of treatment in the community, the fact that most of
these provisions were devised as a reaction to the perceived growth
of the mentally ill homeless population evinces a preference for
getting the mentally ill out of the community, not back into it.
Of course, other state statutory provisions do provide procedural and substantive due process protections for the mentally ill. Ever
since a federal district court in Alabama appended a model patient's
bill of rights to one of its decisions, 8 5 states have been very
receptive to incorporating such rights into their own statutes. In
fact, as of 1985, forty-four states had enacted statutes that to some
extent embodied the right to treatment in the least restrictive setting.

8 6

physical health or personal safety."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-104(a)(1)(D) (1984 &
Supp. 1993) (noting that a person can be committed if and only if "the person is
unable to avoid severe impairment or injury from specific risks"); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 62A-12-234(10)(b) (1989 & Supp. 1993) (noting that the court will commit if the
court finds that the patient "poses an immediate danger of physical injury to himself
which may include the inability to provide the basic necessities of life"); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 7101(17)(B)(ii) (1987) (defining a "'person in need of treatment' [as
one] who is... unable ... to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical
care, shelter, or self-protection and safety"); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (1990 &
Supp. 1993) (noting that a person can be committed if he is "so severely mentally ill
as to be substantially unable to care for himself"); W. VA. CODE § 27-1-12(1) (1992)
(characterizing a person as -'[1]ikely to cause serious harm' [if he has] a substantial
tendency to physically harm himself which is manifested by... conduct, either active
or passive, which demonstrates that he is dangerous to himself"); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 51.15(1)(a)(4) (West 1987) (an individual maybe taken into custody if she is "unable
to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, medical care, shelter or safety"); WYO. STAT.
§ 25-10-101(a)(ii)(C) (1990 & Supp. 1993) (defining an individual who is "'[d]angerous
to himself or others' [as one who is] unable to satisfy basic needs for nourishment,
essential medical care, shelter or safety").
'u See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
' See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379L86 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Perlin, supra
note 98, at 1299 & n.357 (discussing the effect Wyatt had on the states).
" See Keilitz et al., supra note 9, at 709. Keilitz summarizes the material as
follows: "39 states now require courts to consider alternatives to hospitalization prior
to or at the time of the actual involuntary commitment." Id. at 709 n.101. Five other
states allow courts the discretion to consider least restrictive alternatives, but do not
require it. See id.; see also BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 114-19, thl. 2.6, cols. 7-8
(detailing prehearing procedures for the mentally ill for all 50 states); id. at 122-26,
tbl. 2.7, col. 16 (detailing hearing and post-hearing procedures for the mentally ill for
all 50 states). Brakel notes that "26 states require that patients receive, while
institutionalized, the least restrictive form of treatment" as well. Id. at 266. The data
are for statutory provisions in existence in 1985.
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As applied, however, some state courts, in interpreting their civil
commitment criteria, have viewed the least restrictive alternative
condition to civil commitment as a "mere formality."18 7 Granted,
most courts have remained faithful to the doctrine and its particular
statutory requirements.18
But few courts have construed state
187See, e.g., In re Robinson, 601 N.E.2d 712, 717 (IMI.1992) (characterizing as
"harmless error," Illinois's failure to present a formal predispositional report on less
restrictive treatment availability as required by law); see also Schwartz & Costanzo,
supra note 58, at 1347 n.7 8 (noting that in North Carolina, despite the existence of
outpatient commitment procedures in lieu of inpatient institutionalization, little use
was made of the procedure).
In 1977, Hoffman and Foust surveyed Virginia state judges on what treatment
options they would choose and found that judges were reluctant to investigate
community options. See Hoffman & Foust, supra note 66, at 1122-37. For example,
when asked:
While hospitalization would "probably be beneficial," the examining
physician testifies that it would "definitely not be necessary" if the proposed
patient could be admitted to an intermediate care facility. No intermediate
care facility is available. You would:

(1) Commit to institution
(2) Dismiss the petition
When the grounds for commitment for the hypothetical patient was "unable
to care for self," 69% said they would commit to an institution; 31% would
have dismissed the petition.
Id. at 1128, tbl. II.
"88
According to Perlin, "[a] review of several pertinent cases reveals that most
[state] courts have continued to read relevant state statutes broadly even in the
aftermath of Youngberg." Perlin, supra note 98, at 1312. For example, in Chasse v.
Banas, 399 A.2d 608 (N.H. 1979), the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in arguing
that the state hospital had a duty to provide adequate and humane treatment, held
that the legislature's enunciation of general goals also implied the existence of civil
rights for the mentally ill. See id. at 610; see also Estate of Early v. Early, 673 P.2d 209,
211 (Cal. 1983) (holding that "the trial court's failure to admit evidence of and to
instruct on the availability of assistance of others to meet the basic needs of a person
afflicted with a mental disorder was prejudicially erroneous requiring reversal"); Foy
v. Greenblott, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84, 90 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the requirement to
treat patients under the least restrictive conditions feasible implies that the institution
should minimize interference with a patient's autonomy); In reJames, 507 A.2d 155,
157 (D.C. 1986) (requiring, on statutory grounds, the city to make explicit findings
that inpatient treatment is the least restrictive alternative available before revoking
a patient's outpatient commitment); In re Long, 606 N.E.2d 1259, 1264 (III. App. Ct.
1992) (noting that the fact that the plaintiff did not want to be put into a halfway
house or other less restrictive placement setting was irrelevant because the Florida
statute did not require plaintiff agreement); In reJames, 547 N.E.2d 759, 761-62 (111.
App. Ct. 1989) (finding that it was "contrary to the balancing of interests" established
by the state code to not require consideration of a predispositional report on the
availability of alternative treatment settings); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of
Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308,321 (Mass. 1983) (holding that the civilly committed
have a right to refuse treatment under state law, and that any involuntary injection
of drugs can only occur if no less intrusive alternatives exist); In re Danielson, 398
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statutory provisions to require the development of community-based
services,' 89 despite virtually universal recognition that community
mental health services are less restrictive and more effective than
civil commitment.'
In fact, a majority of the states' civil commitment schemes explicitly require only the consideration of less
restrictive alternatives that are "available." 191 And since the
community mental health centers that have been developed rarely
cater to the needs of the chronically mentally ill,192 what is "available" is usually inappropriate. The statutory right to live in the least
restrictive setting and to be treated in the least restrictive manner

N.W.2d 32,36-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (remanding to the trial court to consider less
restrictive alternatives as required by state law); New Jersey Ass'n for Retarded
Citizens v. NewJersey Dep't of Human Servs., 445 A.2d 704,712 (N.J. 1982) (holding
that the state statute requires the use of the least restrictive alternative and that this
requirement implies the provision of the "spectrum" of settings); In re J.A.D., 492
N.W.2d 82, 86-87 (N.D. 1992) (holding that the pro forma consideration of less
restrictive alternatives was not sufficient); O'Callaghan v. L.B., 447 N.W.2d 326,328
(N.D. 1989) (holding as reversible error the state's failure to consider halfway homes
which were available); Kottke v. U.A.M., 446 N.W.2d 23,28 n.4 (N.D. 1989) (urging
active consideration of less restrictive alternatives); Rhode Island Dep't of Mental
Health, Retardation & Hosps. v. R.B., 549 A.2d 1028, 1030 (R.I. 1988) (holding that
the state statute required the court to fully consider alternatives to inpatient care); In
re R.A., 501 A.2d 743, 744 (Vt. 1985) (broadly interpreting its civil commitment
statute); In re W.H., 481 A.2d 22, 25 (Vt. 1984) (holding that although a consideration of less restrictive alternatives is only legislatively required for a commitment
hearing, it is also required before involuntarily transporting an individual to a hospital
for a psychiatric examination).
1 See supra note 80.
190See supra notes 116-36 and accompanying text.
19 See ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.1(a) (Supp. 1993); ALAsKA STAT. § 47.30.735(d)
(1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540(B) (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 2047-202I(i)
(Michie 1991 & Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-101(1)(b) (1989); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17a498(c) (West 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5010(2) (1983 &
Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1)(b) (West 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 33460.2(3) (1985 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 66-329(k)(2) (1989 & Supp. 1993); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 405, para. 5/3-810 (Smith-Hurd 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 202A.011(7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B,
§ 3801(4)(C) (West 1988); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10-617(a)(5) (1990); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1469(1) (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-127(2)(c)
(1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1035 (1987); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2(m) (West Supp.
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-2 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-21(1) (1989 &
Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(E) (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 45A, § 5-405(A) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(f)
(Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 40.1-5-8(10) (1990); S.D. CODIFMED LAws ANN. § 27A10-9.1(3) (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-3-601(b)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1993); TEx.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 571.004(1), 576.021(1) (West 1992); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 7617(c) (1987); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-3(a) (1992).
19 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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appropriate to one's needs is a right guaranteed in theory, but
rarely realized in fact.
At a time when federal courts and state and federal legislatures
are steadily eviscerating individual rights, advocates for the mentally
ill must look elsewhere. The place to start is with state constitu93
tions.
IV.

STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM

"Four years ago, Professor Alan Meisel characterized state
constitutions as a 'virtually untapped source of rights' and perhaps
194
'the most promising source of rights' for the mentally disabled."
Writing in 1987, Michael Perlin presented evidence that since
Meisel's 1983 article there had been a "modest body of [state
constitutional] law" developed recognizing rights for the mentally
disabled.' 95 Written six years after Perlin, this Comment con-

"-' While state constitutions will not necessarily be interpreted more liberally than
state statutes, as the remainder of this Comment will show, claims that are expressed
in "constitutional rights" terms deserve, and often get, more attention. Moreover, it
is not that state statutes do not evince a concern for treatment in the least restrictive
setting; for, as shown, they in fact do. Rather, the problem is that courts are often
reluctant to foist economic mandates upon the legislature when the courts engage in
statutory construction. But such hesitancy, though still present, should not be as
chilling when the courts engage in constitutional interpretation.
194 Perlin, supra note 98, at 1279 (quoting Meisel, supra note 176, at 9, where
Meisel noted that "[t]o date, only a few significant cases involving the rights of
persons on the civil side of the mental health process have been decided on the basis
of state constitutional provisions").
The enthusiasm for the use of state constitutions has not come from academia
alone. Judges, both federal and state, have evinced a strong desire to make better use
of state constitutions. For example in 1983, New Jersey Supreme Court Associate
Justice Pollock, warned that "[a] lawyer who ignores the change in tide towards state
constitutions runs the same risk as a sailor who ignores a change in the tides of the
sea." Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as SeparateSources ofFundamentalRights,
35 RUTGERS L. REv. 707, 715 (1983).
195 See Perlin, supra note 98, at 1280. Nowhere in Perlin's analysis, however, was
there mention of a constitutional right to treatment in the least restrictive setting.
Perlin divided his analysis into four parts. First, he explored procedural rights in the
civil commitment process, citing several cases that established a right to periodic
reviews of the propriety of commitment, the right to be present at the commitment
hearings, and the right to a jury trial. See id. at 1280-83. Second, Perlin discussed
cases interpreting state constitutions as providing a right to refuse treatment, focusing
primary attention on the New York case, Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
See id. at 1283-92. Third, he noted the dearth of cases interpreting a state
constitutional right to treatment. See id. at 1292-93. Finally, he concluded with a
short discussion on rights involving sterilization. See id. at 1293-94. While the
language of many of the cases analyzed by Perlin point to the possibility of a right to
community-based treatment, neither Perlin nor any other scholar has comprehensively
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cludes that state constitutions can provide not simply a "modest,"
but rather a potent source of rights protection for the mentally ill.
A. History of the Role of State Constitutions
The history of state constitutionalism reflects the historical
relationship between the federal and state systems. Before the
ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the original colonies had
created detailed bills of rights. 96 In fact, according to California
Supreme CourtJustice Stanley Mosk, "[w]hen the Founding Fathers
put this one nation together, they recognized the primacy of the
states in protecting individual rights." 9 ' The independence and
primacy of state constitutionalism was further solidified in 1833
98
when Chief Justice John Marshall decided Barron v. Baltimore,
holding that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights were not directly
99
binding on the states.1
This federal-state dichotomy, however, began to change after
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the process
commonly termed incorporation.. did not start for another sixty
years,20 ' the groundwork was laid for increased federal involve-

addressed the issue.
" See Developments in the Law: The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95
HAav. L. REV. 1324, 1326 (1982) [hereinafter Developments].
" Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberaland Conservative,63 TEX. L.
REv. 1081, 1082 (1985). Soon a tradition of state court innovation began, including
the formation of the concept ofjudicial review-long before ChiefJustice Marshall
had created the doctrine in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803). See
A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REv. 873, 877 (1976) (discussing the case of Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va.
(4 Call) 5, 8 (1782), whereJudge George Wythe declared an act of the state legislature
unconstitutional). Howard also notes that "[1long before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, state courts had begun to develop abody of substantive due
process law, drawing on state constitutional due process or 'law of the land'
provisions." Id. at 881-82.
198 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
1
" See id. at 250 (reasoning that "[h]ad the framers ... intended them to be
limitations on the powers of the state governments, they would have... [explicitly]
expressed that intention"). Perlin notes that the case reflected the belief that state
constitutional protections were enough, and that passage of the first eight amendments had been sought more to allay the fears of those opposed to the Constitution
than to create ajusticiable source of rights. See Perlin, supra note 98, at 1269.
" Incorporation refers to the application of the Bill of Rights to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 772-74 (2d ed. 1988).
201 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), marked the beginning of the
incorporation movement. In Gitlow, the Supreme Court declared that the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech applied to state actions as well. See id.
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ment in the affairs of the states. By the time of Chief Justice Earl
Warren's tenure on the Court in the late 1960s, most of the Bill of
Rights had been applied to the states. 20 2 This, of course, meant
that state constitutionalism had taken a back seat. More importantly, however, incorporation "'obscured the functional independence
of the original state ...
guarantees.'" 2°3
In time, state courts
law.'" 20 4
constitutional
federal
than
further
"'no
would look
By the end of the 1970s, however, it became apparent that state
constitutions would once again play a more prominent role.

The

primary catalyst for the re-emergence of state constitutionalism was
20 5
the rights-retrenchment jurisprudence of the Burger Court.
Beginning with Chief Justice Burger and continuing today under the

leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the unmistakable trend has
been for the Court to narrowly and restrictively interpret the

guarantees of liberty advanced during the Warren years.

In reac-

tion, state courts have increasingly looked to state constitutional

provisions to fill the void.

20 6

at 666.
22 See TRIBE, supra note 200, at 772-73. Justice William Brennan noted this by

writing:
Most fittingly, the date upon which Benton, the capstone of the revolution,
was handed down was also the final day of Earl Warren's service on the
Court. The tenure of this great Chief Justice saw the conversion of the
Fourteenth Amendment into a guarantee of individual liberties equal to or
more important than the original Bill of Rights.
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 545 (1986)
(referring to Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 704 (1969), where the Court held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states).
203Perlin, supra note 98, at 1270 (quoting Developments, supra note 196, at 1328).
206
Id. (quoting Howard, supra note 197, at 878).
20 Not all commentators attributed the rebirth of state constitutionalism to the
rights retrenchment of the Burger years. James Henretta notes that after Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), state legislatures, forced into equal apportionment, became
more democratic, and thus more responsive to populist-based state constitutional
revisions. See James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State Constitutional
Tradition,22 RUTGERS L.J. 819,839 (1991). These revisions placed greater checks on
the state legislatures. See id. at 839. Moreover, many state courts, their dockets
cleared by the rush to liberal federal venues, became available to address state
constitutional issues in a more coherent, independent fashion. Instead of being a
reaction to the Burger Court, the revival of state constitutionalism, seems be the
logical offshoot of the advances made during the Warren years. In any case, no one
disputes the increased importance of state constitutions during this time.
206 See G. Alan Tarr, ConstitutionalTheo2j and State ConstitutionalInterpretation,22
RUTGERS L.J. 841, 841 (1991) (arguing that reliance on state constitutions was in
reaction to the Burger Court's decisions); see also Brennan, supra note 202, at 548
(noting that "[b]etween 1970 and 1984, state courts, increasingly reluctant to follow
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B. A More AggressiveJurisprudence
20
In Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council,

7

the Washington Supreme Court cited two reasons why state
supreme courts can afford to be more aggressive protectors of
individual rights than the U.S. Supreme Court.
[F]irst... when the United States Supreme Court interprets the
Fourteenth Amendment, it establishes a rule for the entire
country.... a rule which accounts for all the variations from state
to state and region to region....
The second factor, which is related to the first and actually
results from it, is that the Supreme Court must take a conservative
theoretical approach to applying the Fourteenth Amendment 08

the federal lead, have handed down over 250 published opinions holding that the
constitutional minimums set by the United States Supreme Court were insufficient
to satisfy the more stringent requirements of state constitutional law"); William J.
Brennan,Jr., State Constitutionsandthe ProtectionofIndividualRights,90 HARv. L. REv.
489, 495 (1977) (noting that "more and more state courts are construing state
constitutional counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens
of their states even more protection than the federal provisions, even those identically
phrased"); Ronald K.L. Collins et al., State High Courts, State Constitutions and
Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A JudicialSurvey, PUBLIUS, Summer 1986, at
141, 142 (noting, after surveying state high court judges, that there has been an
increase in the use of state constitutions since 1977). Collins also points out
variations regionally, noting that the Northeast and the West tend to be more prone
to using independent state constitutional analyses than their Midwestern and
Southern counterparts. See id. at 146-50; see also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,
120-21 (1975) (reminding the states that they could properly bestow on their citizens
more individual rights than the federal constitution requires) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
A frequently cited example of state courts' acceptance of Brennan's challenge in
Mosley is the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272
(Cal. 1976). See id. at 280 (reaffirming the "independent nature of the California
Constitution and [the court's] responsibility to separately define and protect the
rights of California citizens despite conflicting decisions of the United States Supreme
Court interpreting the federal Constitution"); see also Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494,
511 (Alaska 1975) (holding that "possession of marijuana by adults at home for
personal use is constitutionally protected under the Alaska constitution"); People v.
Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099,1113 (Cal. 1975) (determining that "California citizens are
entitled to greater protection under the California Constitution against unreasonable
searches and seizures than that required by the United States Constitution"); State v.
Sklar, 317 A.2d 160, 165 (Me. 1974) (holding that notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme
Court's differing interpretation of the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution;
the right to trial byjury is guaranteed "in all criminal prosecutions" under the Maine
Constitution); People v. Jackson, 217 N.W.2d 22, 27 (Mich. 1974) (holding that
"independent of any federal constitutional mandate ... a suspect is entitled to be
represented by counsel at a corporeal identification or a photographic identification").
207

2

635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981).

08 Id. at 115.
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Reserving judgment for only the most invasive, most generally
illegitimate, governmental incursions into individual rights, the
Supreme Court has evinced a concern for preserving its political
capital. At the state level, however, "states may be political science
laboratories, to experiment, to improvise, to test new theories. If
a state experiment succeeds, others may follow. If it fails, only one
20 9
of 50 states is affected."
Moreover, separation of powers concerns that often constrain
the Supreme Court's review of congressional legislation do not exist
at the state level. Although state courts are not allowed to ride
roughshod over the powers of state legislatures, they are generally
expected to be more of a counterweight to the legislative branch
210
than the Supreme Court is to Congress.

' Stanley Mosk, The Power of State Constitutions in ProtectingIndividualRights, 8
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 651,652 (1988) (paraphrasingJustice Brandeis in New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
One of the best examples of how federalism concerns play out in constitutional
jurisprudence is in the area of school-finance reform litigation. In deciding that
disparities in educational expenditures across districts did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court, in San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), noted that
[q]uestions of federalism are always inherent in the process of determining
whether a State's laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of
constitutionality.... [Ilt would be difficult to imagine a case having a
greater potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us,
in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public education
presently in existence in virtually every State.

Id. at 44. In response to the Supreme Court's concerns, several state courts explicitly
referred to the lack of federalism questions in their determination that such
disparities violated their own state constitutions. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d
929, 952 (Cal. 1976) (noting that constraints of federalism are not applicable to
determining whether a public school financing system violates the state's constitution), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J.)
(noting that "there is absent the principle of federalism which cautions against too
expansive a view of a federal constitutional limitation"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1973), reh'g granted, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975). For an
analysis, see Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: JudicialActivism Among State
Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 731, 790 (1982) (writing that "the absence of
federalism concerns significantly alters the terms of the judicial activism debate").
210 State judges are often elected into office and state constitutions are frequently
amended to reflect the popular concerns of the time. See Developments, supra note
196, at 1351-56 (discussing the political accountability of state judges and the
susceptibility of state constitutions to revision in response to popular opinion);
Brennan, supranote 202, at 551 (same). Thus, the state judiciary almost functions as
another branch of the state legislature. For a discussion of the frequency by which
state constitutions are amended, see Developments, supra note 196, at 1354 n.108
(noting that between 1970 and 1979 states adopted a total of 946 amendments to
their state constitutions).
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C. Methodologies of State Constitutional
Analysis

The primary criticism levelled at state constitutional advocates
is that their version of judicial activism runs the risk of becoming
thoroughly unprincipled.2 1' Although political capital may not be
as important to the state supreme courts as it is to the Supreme
Court, 212 any court that lacks the purse and the sword must rely
on legitimacy for its primary source of authority. Therefore, "[t]he

challenge is to develop a jurisprudence of state constitutional law,
Federalism and separation ofpowers concerns arejustifications strategically used
by the Supreme Court for exerting judicial restraint on a given issue. As one
commentator has noted, however, since adjudication at the state level is often as
much a matter of strategy as it is legal interpretation, state courts may legitimately
broaden and expand traditional conceptions of human rights. See Lawrence G. Sager,
Foreword: State Courtsand the Strategic SpaceBetween the Norms and Rules of ConstitutionalLaw, 63 T"X. L. REv. 959,973-76 (1985) (discussing the strategic disparity between
state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court).
Not all commentators are pleased with the growth of state court activism. Earl
Maltz charges its advocates with being disingenuous. According to Maltz, the
invocation of federalism as a justification for expansive state constitutionalism
contradicts the long-held antagonism of the liberal wing of the Court to federalist
principles. Maltz, an interpretivist, is troubled by instrumental, results-oriented
jurisprudence, and sees the possibility of state court activism as infringing on other
important rights. See Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 995, 1002, 1004 (1985) (arguing that state court activism restricts legislative
choices); Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the Theoiy of State
ConstitutionalLaw, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429,441-49 (1988) (advocating that state
constitutional provisions be given precisely the same level of protection as analogous
federal constitutional guarantees).
It is interesting to note, however, that not all interpretivists agree with Maltz.
Even ChiefJustice Rehnquist has acknowledged that state constitutions may provide
greater protection. In Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980),
Rehnquist noted that Supreme Court decisions did "not limit the authority of the
State... to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than
those conferred by the Federal Constitution." Id. at 81.
Rehnquist's acceptance of state activism reflects the conservatives' concern that
states' rights be preserved. Although conservatives are, by definition, not usually
receptive to judicial activism, many would find it difficult to challenge state court
activism without being inconsistent. Indeed, many conservatives may be overjoyed
by recent state activism in the area of substantive economic due process. Therefore,
at least in theory, both conservatives and liberals are content with the growth in state
judicial activism. See Gary L. McDowell, Foreword: Rediscovering Federalism? State
ConstitutionalLaw and the Restoration of State Sovereignty, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 797, 808,
818 (1990) (advocating that the Supreme Court give states greater leeway in areas
such as abortion, religion, and gun control).
211 By unprincipled, I mean result-oriented, as opposed to reasoned and neutral.
2
See supra note 210.
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ajurisprudence that will make more predictable the recourse to and
the results of state constitutional law analysis."213
Most common among state courts is ajurisprudence of original
intent, or textualism.2 14 Traditionally employed in federal constitutional interpretations by those with more conservative leanings,
textualism may not be, as a theoretical matter, the jurisprudence of
choice for state constitutional advocates. Nevertheless, its use has,
as a practical matter, legitimized more progressive rights-protection.2 15 Moreover, textualism at the state level has not faced as
much criticism as the federal version of original intent, further
2 16
facilitating its application.
Once a state court determines how to construe its own constitutional provisions, it must also consider, as an element of adjudication, its relationship to equivalent provisions in the federal
constitution. The three most recognized methodologies for relating
federal and state constitutional provisions are the primacy,
2 17
supplemental/interstitial, and dual sovereignty models.
213 Pollock, supra note 194, at 708. Moreover, if state constitutionalism simply
becomes a reaction to the Burger/Rehnquist era conservatism, then opposition will
likely form and constitutional amendments reversing innovative state rulings will
probably be enacted. A state constitutional jurisprudence, vis-a-vis federal constitutional analysis, will go a long way towards preserving the results of state court
activism. While advocates for the mentally ill cannot decide for a court what
methodological/jurisprudential approach it should take, arguments can, and should,
assume a more principled form. See Tarr,supranote 206, at 846-47 (stating that there
can be a principled basis for state rulings that diverge from U.S. Supreme Court
rulings because state courts often have to interpret guarantees that have no analogue
in the
Constitution).
214
See Tarr, supra note 206, at 848 (noting that thejustifications for not following
the lead of the Supreme Court pointed state judges toward textualism). Since state
constitutions are by virtue of their detail very much like statutes, courts generally
apply rules of statutory construction to state constitutional analysis. Depending on
how liberal or conservative the court is, and how ambiguous the constitutional
provisions that the court is interpreting are, statutory construction may allow for
either broad or narrow interpretations of legislative intent. See William F. Swindler,
State ConstitutionalLaw: Some Representative Decisions, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 166,
167-69 (1967) (stating that the basic rule of statutory interpretation allows for a
degree of flexibility).
215 See Tarr, supra note 206, at 853-55 (noting that advocates of state constitutionalism rely on textualism to legitimize independent state constitutional interpretations,
because textual criteria are likely to command "universal assent").
216 See id. at 851-52. Since most state constitutions are frequently amended and
many have been totally revamped within the last 30 years, the criticisms levelled
against use of original intent at the federal level, in terms of ascertaining the intent
of men dead for 200 years, do not apply with as much force in the context of state
constitutionalism. Of course, determiningwhose intent is relevant and whose should
be given priority remains a sticking point for any form of textualism.
2'7 For a general discussion on each of these three methodologies, see Phylis S.
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The primacy model is the most radical, and as the name
connotes, the most independent of the three approaches. Under
the primacy model, state courts rely first on their own state
constitutions before seeking a remedy in analogous federal provisions. 211 In doing so, the state courts not only insulate themselves
from Supreme Court review,"1 9 but also from doctrinal switches
in more uncertain areas of the law.22
Although the primacy
model has not been as popular as the other two models, presumably
because of the added work involved in developing independent
decisional grounds, several state courts have nonetheless used it.221
Bamberger, Methodology for RaisingState ConstitutionalIssues, in RECENT DEvELOPMENTS IN STATE CoNsTrrUIoNAL LAw 287, 301-06 (1985); Perlin, supra note 98, at

1274-75; Pollock, supra note 194, at 718.
218 Under the traditional "adequate and independent state grounds" test, the
Supreme Court used to assume that state court decisions were based on state
constitutional grounds, and thus did not review them. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324
U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (stating that "we will not review ajudgment of a state court that
rests on an adequate and independent ground in state law"). Today, however, the
Court has switched presumptions, requiring state courts to formally note that their
judgments have only used federal cases merely for guidance, and that these federal
cases did not compel the result reached by the state court. See Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983); see also Bamberger, supra note 217, at 290-98 (noting the
Court's recent practice of reviewing state court decisions unless they are dearly
premised on state law); Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and IndependentState Grounds as
a Means of Balaneingthe RelationshipBetween State and FederalCourts, 63 TEX. L. REv.
977, 982 (1985) (noting that a state court discussing federal law must make a "plain
statement" that it used federal law for guidance only). For a criticism of the Court's
more restrictive standard, see Developments, supra note 196, at 1336-42 (noting that
there
219 is no bright line between a state and federal constitutional basis).

See Developments, supranote 196, at 1336 (noting that "the autonomy principle
immunizes state court decisions from review").
22 An example of doctrinal uncertainty is the Supreme Court's search and seizure
jurisprudence. Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court has noted: "If we
construe the search and seizure clause of our state constitutions to follow the latest
Supreme Court holding under the fourth amendment .. ., what is the state's law
when the Supreme Court changes direction in the next [search and seizure] case?"
Pollock, supra note 194, at 712-13 (quoting Hans A. Linde, First Things First:
Rediscovering the State's Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379, 394 (1980)).

Another more recent area of doctrinal development has been in the free exercise
of religion jurisprudence. Until the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), state
courts generally applied a strict scrutiny/compelling interest test to free exercise
claims. After Smith's adoption of a minimal level scrutiny/incidental effects test, see
id. at 888-89, state courts that had interpreted their free exercise provisions
independently of the federal analog could still choose to follow the old standard.
States that had relied exclusively on Supreme Court analysis, however, were left with
fewer options.
221See; e.g., State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 (Haw. 1974) (stating the court's
willingness to extend the protection of Hawaii's Bill of Rights beyond those of the U.S
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As for the other two methodologies, the interstitial approach is,
ironically, the more progressive one. Since under the interstitial
model the U.S. Constitution is the primary source of protection, the
premise behind the interstitial model is inherently conservative.
Nevertheless, states are allowed to diverge from federal interpretations and raise rights above the federal floor as long as objective
criteria such as more expansive textual language in state constitutions or historical facts justify such a divergence. 22 2 In using the
final methodological approach, dual sovereignty, state courts find
support for their positions in both state and federal constitutions.
The advantage of such an approach is that it insulates both state and
federal law from review. 223 The disadvantage is that state constitutional doctrine never develops independently of federal constitutional doctrine.

224

Given the tension between the increased willingness of the
Supreme Court to review state court decisions and the need to rise
above the floor of federal rights in the mental health area, advocates
Bill of Rights); People v. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d 511,517 (Mich.) (noting that "[w]e can
... afford[] protections beyond those required by the United States Supreme Court"),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975); State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (N.H. 1983) (stating
that the court does not feel "bound to adopt the federal interpretations"); State v.
Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 67 (N.J. 1975) (stating that "each state has the power to impose
higher standards on searches and seizures under state law than is required by the
Federal Constitution").
See, e.g., Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 933 (N.J. 1982) (utilizing an
explicit privacy provision in the state constitution to require Medicaid to provide
assistance to women seeking an abortion, despite a Supreme Court holding to the
contrary in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)). For a discussion favoring the
interstitial approach, see Developments, supra note 196, at 1357-59 (discussing the
failings of the primacy model).
2' Under the Supremacy Clause, states constitutionally cannot amend a decision
that relies on an interpretation of federal law. Likewise, the federal courts cannot
review a state court decision that relies on adequate and independent state grounds.
See supra note 218.
"4 Justice Robert F. Utter believes, however, that the dual sovereignty model can
help federal constitutional law develop more progressively. Utter points to several
instances where state court decisions influenced subsequent Supreme Court opinions,
particularly in the areas ofjudicial review, due process, free speech, and eminent
domain. See Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court
Comment on FederalConstitutionalIssues When Disposingof Cases on State Constitutional
Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1025, 1030-41 (1985).
Despite Justice Utter's assurances, the clear import of the dual sovereignty

approach is that even the most progressive constitutional interpretations depend on
Supreme Court validation before they can take effect at the national level. Although
a court using the dual sovereignty model claims an independent state constitutional
basis for its decisions, heavy reliance on federal interpretations will likely subject its
decisions to Supreme Court review.
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for the mentally ill would benefit from couching their arguments to
satisfy the requirements of either the primacy or the interstitial
models. Although not all state courts will be receptive to these two
approaches, it is only by developing an independent source of
constitutional rights for the mentally ill, which these models ensure,
that a right to treatment in the least restrictive setting will ever be
realized.
D. Tools for EstablishingBroaderRights
Commentators have developed several bases for interpreting
state constitutional provisions more liberally than their federal
counterparts.2 25 The approaches which will be most useful depend, of course, on the courts in which they are applied. Historically, however, most state courts have relied primarily on textual
differences for breathing expanded rights-protections into their
22 6
state constitutions.

' See, for instance, the seminal article by A.E. Dick Howard, supra note 197, at
935-40. Professor Howard lists seven bases for more expansive interpretation: (1)
textual language; (2) legislative history; (3) state history and tradition; (4) localized

issues that implicated federalism issues when handled by the Supreme Court; (5)
minimal separation of powers issues that mandated judicial restraint for the Supreme
Court; (6) recent constitutional amendments reflecting fundamental values of the
state; and (7) the tradition of state courts as experimenters. See id.
' See, e.g., Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Township, 392 A.2d 266, 274-75 (Pa. 1978)
(applying heightened scrutiny to Pennsylvania's blue law provisions that discriminated
against businesses open on Sundays, and relying on Article III, § 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which explicitly forbids trade regulation classifications); People v.
Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 898 (Cal.) (holding capital punishment unconstitutional
because Article I, § 6 of the California Constitution stipulates that "no cruel or
unusual" punishment will be tolerated; unlike the federal analog which reads "no
cruel and unusual" (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
Even when the provisions are identical, state courts have been known to interpret
the state constitutional provisions more liberally. See, e.g., State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d
51, 58 n.6 (Haw. 1974) (expressing the policy of giving independent interpretation
to identically worded provisions where such divergence results in greater protection
of individual rights); State v.Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 n.2 (N.J. 1975) (interpreting
the state's search and seizure provisions more liberally than the federal analog); State
v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674-75 (S.D. 1976) (same).
State courts often combine constitutional provisions to justify more expansive
interpretations. An expression of such an approach can be found in City of
Portsmouth v. Weiss, 133 S.E. 781 (Va. 1926):
It is ... an established canon of constitutional construction that no one
provision of the [Virginia] Constitution is to be separated from all the
others and to be considered alone, but that all of the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purpose of the instrument.
Id. at 785.

796

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 142:739

In the context of finding a right to treatment in the least
restrictive setting, constitutional provisions that mention a specific
2 28
right (i.e., privacy)2 27 or a specific group (i.e., the mentally ill)
may prove extremely valuable. Not only do explicit expressions
evidence a heightened concern for the group or right in question,
but reliance on them may appease conservative jurists who reject the
legitimacy of expansive interpretations that rely on more ambiguous
and generalized provisions. 2 9
Whether based upon textual or
historical grounds, 230 equal protection and due process guarantees
that exceed their federal analogs, or are interpreted more liberally
in specific key cases, are especially useful tools for advancing the
claims proposed here.
V.

APPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO COMMUNrTY-BASED
TREATMENT IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS

The discussion up to this point has mapped out the theoretical
foundations for the right of the mentally ill to be treated in the least
restrictive setting appropriate to their needs.2s 1 We have learned
that what is most appropriate and what is least restrictive are not
mutually exclusive terms, but rather are mutually supportive
concepts, indicating the need for, as well as the right of, the
mentally ill to be treated in the community. 2 2 We have also
learned that the source of such a right is not likely to be found in
233
federal statutes, state statutes, or even the U.S. Constitution.

See infra text accompanying notes 313-22.
aSee infra text accompanying notes 343-56, 403.
See Maltz, supra note 210, at 1013-15 (noting that arguments based on specific
language can have a good deal of force).
For example, circumstances surrounding the adoption of the relevant state
constitutional provisions, see Developments, supranote 196, at 1361; or a long tradition
or commitment to a specific right, see Galie, supra note 209, at 765; or even based
upon the general heritage of the state, see Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975),
where the court, in finding a right to smoke marijuana in the privacy of one's own
home, noted:
Our territory and now state has traditionally been the home of people who
prize their individuality and who have chosen to settle or to continue living
here in order to achieve a measure of control over their own lifestyles which
is now virtually unattainable in many of our sister states.
Id. at 504.
231 See supra text accompanying notes 66-88.
232 See supra text accompanying notes 104-39.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 140-92.
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Given that it is "hard to accept that there can be any 'fundamental personal liberty' ... more fundamental than personal liberty,"2" 4 and given the increased threat to the civil liberties of the
mentally ill in the early 1990s," 5 the need to find a foundation for
protection is imperative. In light of the potentially expansive
interpretive opportunities available in state constitutions, this
Comment argues that a foundation for the protection of the
mentally ill may be found there.
The analysis is divided into two parts. Part V, Section A begins
by exploring several substantive due process doctrines that can help
advance claims on behalf of the mentally ill for a right to community-based treatment. For each, an underlying theory and strategy is
developed, followed by an analysis of potential applications in
various states. The presentation is organized around the tools of
state constitutional law that would most successfully develop the
respective doctrines and render them most effective. These tools
include liberally interpreted state due process provisions, privacy
provisions in state constitutions, and state constitutional provisions
for the mentally ill.
Part V, Section B explores the rights-expanding potential of state
equal protection provisions. Beginning with an analysis of equal
protection theory, this Part makes two claims. First, the mentally ill
should be considered members of a "suspect" class and, therefore,
any state action that affects their rights should be strictly construed.
Second, because those mentally ill persons who are most at risk of
being civilly committed are poor, any state action that deprives
them of liberty because of their poverty should be strictly construed.
At work in both the substantive due process and equal protection analyses will be the doctrine of least restrictive means. In the
context of substantive due process challenges, the doctrine of least
restrictive means will help unearth those civil commitment schemes
that in their overbreadth impact upon core constitutional values.
In the equal protection challenges, the doctrine will similarly expose
overbroad classifications, but classifications that in their overbreadth
treat certain groups of individuals with less dignity and respect. For
both, it will be shown that an honest and principled application of
the least restrictive alternative doctrine would require states to
develop effective and appropriate community-based treatment

' Chambers, supra note 18, at 1158 (footnote omitted).
2-"See supra text accompanying notes 51-65.
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services if they wished to preserve the constitutionality of their civil
286
commitment schemes.
A. Substantive Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[n]o State ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." 2 7 While it may, as a
matter of semantics, appear to provide more of a procedural than
a substantive limitation, courts have used the Due Process Clause to
block governmental actions that threaten core constitutional
values. 21' These values, though taking various forms, can be best
29
understood as supporting a unitary conception of liberty. 1
The genesis of what has come to be termed "substantive due
process" dates back to the late nineteenth century.2 4 ° It was
during that time that the Court began to rapidly strike down laws
that infringed on basic economic liberties, such as the liberty to
contract. 241 For example, in the case most symbolic of that era,
the Supreme Court in Lochner v. New York,242 invalidated New
York's maximum hours law for bakers on the grounds that it

' Although the arguments that follow should be made wherever and whenever
possible, arguably all that is needed is for one prominent state court to support a
constitutional right to community-based treatment and the rest might soon follow.
See Swindler, supra note 214, at 173 (noting how in construing a constitutional
provision, decisions of the courts in another state with substantially the same
provision will generally be given great weight); cf John P. Hagan, Patterns of Activism
on State Supreme Courts, PUBLIUS, Winter 1988, at 97, 113 (noting that generally when
one state court becomes activist, it tends to stay activist).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"See HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COuRT 122 (5th ed. 1988).
29
" See TRIBE, supra note 200, at 553-86, 1302-1435 (detailing the territorial limits
of substantive due process review, which include First Amendment liberties of speech,
association, and political action, as well as more modern conceptions of autonomy,
including
the right to privacy).
240
See ABRAHAM, supra note 238, at 123 (noting, however, that substantive due
process may have gotten its first start in Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 358 (1856)
(striking down a New York liquor prohibition)).
241Abraham

notes:

Socio-economic experimentation by the legislatures, such as minimum-wage,
maximum-hour, and child-labor regulations, was regarded with almost
unshakable disapproval by a solid majority of the Court. Again and again
the justices struck down, as unconstitutional violations of substantive due
process of law, legislation that large majorities ofboth the national and state
levels deemed wise and necessary.
Id. at 12.
242 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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interfered with both the bakers and the bakers' employers' ability to
contract freely. As was the case in Lochner, an invocation of
substantive due process meant that the courts would closely
scrutinize both the ends sought and means employed in challenged
economic and social legislation, analyzing with profound skepticism
the decisions made by experts and professionals. 243 This secondguessing of progressive 244 legislation continued virtually unabated
into the 1930s when what has been dubbed the "Lochner era came
245

to an abrupt halt.
Whether it was internal inconsistencies in applying the substantive due process doctrine or the economic and political exigencies
engendered by the Great Depression,2 46 governmental involvement
in the form of socioeconomic assistance and protection became
more widely accepted by the Court. 24 Liberty, in fact, came to be
seen as requiring governmental action, not merely governmental
abstention. Alternatively, infringement on non-economic rights,
particularly social and political rights, received more judicial
scrutiny than ever before. 24' Thus, it was now governmental
infringements on personal autonomy, personhood, and privacy that
demanded strict scrutiny review.2 49 Substantive due process had
essentially reconfigured itself into a more progressive conception of
political liberalism. The "right to be let alone," not the "liberty to
contract," became the clarion call of modern substantive due
process jurisprudence.
In applying this modern conception of substantive due process,
courts have traditionally engaged in a three-part analysis: assessing
the compellingness of the government's objective, the liberty
interests sacrificed in furthering that objective, as well as the
241
See TRIBE, supra note 200, at 565-74.
24

For a general discussion of the Progressive era, see 1 ARTHtJR S. LINK ET AL.,
1900, at 44-100 (1987).

AMERICAN EPOCH: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE

245 For most Court commentators, 1937 marks the moment when the Court
officially ended its Lochner-erajurisprudence. See ABRAHAM, supra note 238, at 13
(discussing President Roosevelt's court-packing plan and the "'switch in time that
saved nine'"); TRIBE, supra note 200, at 574-81 (discussing several factors, both
internal to the Court and external to it, that contributed to the Court'sjurisprudential switch). For a more historical perspective, see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 231-39 (1963).
246

See TRIBE, supra 200, at 574-78.

2

11See ABRAHAM, supra note 238, at 18-19.
24
" See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938);

ABRAHAM,
supra note 238, at 14.
249
See ABRAHAM, supra note 238, at 124; TRIBE, supra note 200, at 1302-1435.
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neatness of fit between means and ends. 25" This third prong of
the test is the least restrictive alternative doctrine.
As you may recall from our earlier discussion, the doctrine
requires that governmental purposes not be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the ends can be
more narrowly achieved. 251 If the scope of the deprivation is
"completely unlimited," 2 2 or as Tribe characterizes it, "substantially overbroad," 2 the government almost by definition must use
less restrictive alternatives if it wishes to preserve its legislative
scheme. The least restrictive alternative doctrine becomes, in other
words, the central constitutional standard by which regulations
substantially depriving individuals of core constitutional rights are

adjudged. Not merely a tool with which constitutional violations are
unearthed, the doctrine takes us one step further, delineating the
2
requirements for legislative survival. 1
In the context of mental health law, the doctrine of least
restrictive alternatives, as this author envisions it, would require the
2 55
If
state to develop effective alternatives to institutionalization.
the state is to constitutionally carry on its dual objectives of treating
the mentally ill, while ensuring public safety, it cannot do so by
employing the most liberty-restricting means-institutionalization.25 That there are other less-restrictive alternatives by which
the mentally ill can be treated and society protected requires that
the state adopt these alternatives if its legislative scheme is to
survive substantive due process review.
That those means may not have yet been developed and funded
by the state should not matter. Community-based treatment
services envisioned as being a less restrictive alternative to institutionalization do, in fact, exist. A fair application of the doctrine of
2

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,155 (1973) (infringement must be narrowly
drawn so as to pursue only a compelling state interest); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (same).
25 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 478, 488 (1960); see also supra notes 67-68 and
accompanying text.
22 Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488.
s TRIBE, supra note 200, at 1037.
This version of the least restrictive alternative doctrine is to be contrasted with
its use in equal protection jurisprudence, where the doctrine helps unearth the more
invidious characteristics of a given legislative scheme. See infra text accompanying

note 361.
25 See supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
' See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (characterizing civil
commitment as a "massive curtailment of liberty").
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least restrictive alternatives should therefore obligate the states to
bring these services within theirjurisdictions. The right to have the
state consider all appropriate alternatives before choosing institutionalization (a right implicit in many state legislative schemes)
would continue to be an empty right unless and until what the state
is required to consider actually exists.
1. Reliance on Expansively Interpreted
State Due Process Provisions
In applying the lowest level of scrutiny to decisions regarding
the treatment of the mentally disabled, the Supreme Court in
Youngberg v. Romeo2 5 7 made it known that federal courts might not
be as friendly a forum for the mentally ill as they had been in the
past. 258 The Supreme Court subjected each of the plaintiffs due
process claims to rational basis review, effectively letting mental
health professionals decide whether fundamental liberty interests
259
should be sacrificed or not.
Assuming one wants to challenge a state's incursion into the
liberty interests of the mentally ill, a tool for reversing Youngberg's
presumption of correctness is needed. Instead of rational basis
review, the courts should be subjecting these legislative schemes to
the strictest scrutiny possible. This would ensure that the means
employed by the states were the least restrictive means used to
further the states' objectives. If they were not, that is, if the means
employed were not necessary to achieve the states' goals, the civil
commitment scheme would be rendered unconstitutional and only
the creation of community-based services could save it. Although
there are several tools available for reversing this presumption,2 60
we begin here with states that have interpreted their due process
provisions more liberally than the federal analog.
Consider, for example, State v. Robb.261 Robb concerned the
constitutional claims of Harlan Robb, an insanity acquittee who in

-7

457 U.S. 307 (1982); see also supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.

' See id. at 324 (holding that although the involuntarily committed "enjoy[]...
constitutionally protected interests in ... reasonably nonrestrictive confinement
conditions," decisions made by "appropriate professional[s]" with regard to those
conditions are entitled to a presumption of correctness).
"9 See id. at 320-22. The Court noted that "[b]y so limiting judicial review of
challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with
the 2internal operation of these institutions should be minimized." Id. at 322.
1o See infra parts V.A.2, 3.
261 484 A.2d 1130 (N.H. 1984).
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1972 was committed to the New Hampshire Hospital for the murder
of his mother. 6 2 For ten years, Robb was periodically recommitted on the basis of court findings that he was still dangerous and
mentally ill. In 1982, the New Hampshire legislature amended its
recommittal statute to make commitments easier. Under the new
standard, if mental health professionals determined that an insanity
acquittee's mental condition had not substantially changed from the
time when the original criminal act was first perpetrated, the court
was required to find that the defendant was still dangerous. 263 In
1983, Robb was recommitted under the amended law, despite
"considerable disagreement among medical experts regarding the
defendant's condition," 264 and no current evidence of dangerous
behavior.
On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court accepted the
proposition that past acts may support an inference of potential
dangerousness, but nevertheless held the amended statute unconstitutional as a violation of the state's due process clause.2 65 Recommitment of an insanity acquittee solely on the basis of evidence of
past dangerous acts, without enabling the court to consider more
recent, mitigating evidence, placed too much power in the hands of
the mental health professionals. Noting that "'psychiatric opinions
are far from infallible, "'' 26 6 the court reiterated its holding from an
earlier case that the "'determination of mental disease and dangerousness are matters for the trial court to decide and that the
267
opinions of experts are not necessarily dispositive.'"
Contrasted with the Supreme Court's holding in Youngberg,
which constitutionalized virtually absolute deference to the decisions
of mental health professionals, 26 the Robb decision evidenced a
greater distrust of the commitment process, and concomitantly a
greater concern for the rights of the mentally ill and disabled. New
Hampshire, however, is not alone. In several other states, decisions
concerning various dimensions of the commitment process have
similarly advanced the rights of the mentally ill well beyond the
federal minima. For example, a host of states have interpreted their
due process clauses to require more evidentiary proof for civil
id. at 1131.
id.
264 Id. at 1132.
265 See id. at 1134.
26
Id. at 1133 (quoting State v. Gregoire, 384 A.2d 132, 133 (N.H. 1978)).
26
Id. at 1133 (quoting State v. Paradis, 455 A.2d 1070, 1072 (N.H. 1983)).
268 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
262See
263 See
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26 9
commitment than that required under the federal Constitution.
Other states have rendered their constitutions a source of expansive
rights-protection for the currently institutionalized and generally
270
subjected commitment schemes to strict judicial scrutiny.
Others in dicta have expressed a strong preference for less restrictive means of treating the mentally ill and have arguably constitutionalized the right to community-based treatment. 7 1 Still others

161 See, e.g., Heap v. Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1979) (mandating a "beyond a
reasonable doubt standard" for civil commitment, and rejecting the federal "clear and
convincing" standard enunciated in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 418 (1978));
In re Pickles, 170 So.2d 603, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (same); Denton v.
Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1964) (same); State v. O'Neill, 545 P.2d 97,
101 (Or. 1976) (same). Note that recently the United States Supreme Court upheld
Kentucky's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637,
2641 (1993).
"oSee, e.g., Fasulo v. Arafeh, 378 A.2d 553, 554, 556-57 (Conn. 1977) (invoking
the strict scrutiny requirement of "necessity" in ruling that Connecticut's due process
clause mandated that involuntarily civilly committed patients be granted periodic
judicial review of the propriety of their confinement); Cooper v. Morin, 399 N.E.2d
1188, 1191-92, 1195 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that while contact visitations for pretrial
detainees are not constitutionally mandated under the federal Constitution, they are
under New York's constitution, and cannot be circumvented by economic considerations), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980); cf. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341, 344
(N.Y. 1986) (holding forced medication of an institutionalized mental patient to be
violative of the state's due process clause, and obligating the state to prove that the
"proposed treatment is narrowly tailored to give substantive effect to the patient's
liberty interest, taking into consideration ... any less intrusive alternative treatments"); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 305 N.E.2d 903, 905, 907 (N.Y. 1973) (ruling
that the placement of a non-criminal, though dangerous, mentally ill patient in a
correctional facility, as opposed to a mental hospital, violated the state's due process
clause, and that the lack of staff or facilities cannotjustify subjecting "a person to a
greater deprivation of personal liberty than necessary"). See generally Burnor v. State,
829 P.2d 837, 839 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (noting that Alaska's due process clause
confers broader protection than its federal counterpart); State v., Berades, 795 P.2d
842, 843 (Haw. 1990) (similarly noting that Hawaii's due process provisions are not
necessarily limited to that provided by the Fourteenth Amendment); Cootz v. State,
785 P.2d 163, 165 (Idaho 1989) (noting the independence of Idaho's due process
provision from the federal provision).
2. See, e.g., 491 N.W.2d 508, 512 (Iowa 1992) (noting that "[i]t is not only the
customary procedure, but the constitutionallyand statutorily mandated requirement,
to treat even seriously mentally impaired persons in the least restrictive environment
medically possible," and holding that the State hospital cannot be held liable for the
actions of the recently deinstitutionalized (emphasis added)); Hawks v. Lazaro, 202
S.E.2d 109, 123 (W. Va. 1974) (noting that "community mental health facilities ...
[make it] possible for many nonviolent people.., to live outside of an institution,
and when these people prefer to do so,... the constitutionguarantees them the right
to follow their own desires," and holding the state's "in need of treatment" standard
for civil commitment to be overbroad and violative of the due process clause of the
state constitution (emphasis added)); cf. McGraw v. Hansbarger, 301 S.E.2d 857, 860
(W. Va. 1983) (requiring the state to finance and create a detoxification and
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have liberally interpreted their civil commitment statutes to advance
community-based placements, without reference to their state's due
272
process provisions.
In each of these jurisdictions, the courts have evidenced a
heightened concern for the liberty interests of the institutionalized,
the deinstitutionalized, or those "at risk" of being institutionalized.
Individuals seeking support (financial or otherwise) for communitybased alternatives to civil commitment should thus find these states
particularly amenable to their substantive due process claims. In
contrast to the minimalist scrutiny employed in Youngberg, these
jurisdictions have recognized the risks involved when the government extends its paternalistic reach. As noted in this Comment's
epigraph, "[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our guard to
protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent."271 But in Youngberg, instead of focusing on the liberty
concerns implicated by civil commitment schemes, the Court

alcoholism treatment program on the basis of a statutory provision requiring the
consideration of alternative, community treatment programs, as well as on Article X,
§ 3 of the West Virginia Constitution, which provides that money cannot be taken
from the Treasury "for any other purpose than that which it has been or may be
appropriated"). Note that the timing of when to order or not to order communitybased alternatives is often crucial. As the West Virginia Supreme Court held last
winter, if the legislature has already decided to spend its money one way, the court
should not try to change its funding priorities. See E.H. v. Matin, 428 S.E.2d 523, 526
(W. Va. 1993) (relying on state separation of powers principles for the conclusion that
the state court should not involve itself in enjoining the construction of a new mental
hospital because it would rather have the money spent on community treatment
centers).

22 See; e.g., In re S.L., 462 A.2d 1252, 1257-59 (N.J. 1983) (interpreting broadly the

state commitment statute to allow for a court-created class of individuals for whom
the state is required to make good faith efforts to find less restrictive alternatives to
institutionalization, and noting more generally that the "civil commitment process
must be narrowlycircumscribed because of the extraordinary degree of state control
it exerts over a citizen's autonomy" (emphasis added)); State v. Carter, 316 A.2d 449,
453,457 (NJ. 1974) (holding that an insanity acquittee should not be prevented from
participating in conditional release programs more traditionally used by the civilly
committed, and noting that the difficulty of achieving a balance between the
individual's and the public's rights cannot serve as an excuse for failing to "integratte]
the mentally ill back into the mainstream of society"), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289 (1975); In re W.H., 481 A.2d 22, 25-26 (Vt. 1984)
(interpreting state statute to require a consideration of all "feasibleless restrictive
alternatives" before an individual may be forcibly detained for an emergency
psychiatric evaluation, and noting that "'[tihe best interests of the mentally ill lie
more often than not in treatment that does not involve commitment ' " (quoting In re
Harris, 654 P.2d 109, 115 (Wash. 1982))); cf. In re Schmidt, 429 A.2d 631, 636-37 (Pa.
1981) (broadly construing statutory language to require the state to expend the funds
necessary to build facilities appropriate to the needs of the mentally disabled).
2" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
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presumably chose to see only the social welfare dimension of these
statutes. In doing so, the Court anchored its analysis of the
substantive due process claims to a post-Lochner era jurisprudence
of "rational basis" review, 27 4 thereby ensuring that "social and
economic legislation" of this sort would survive constitutional
challenges. 7 5
Alternatively, by classifying these due process
challenges as liberty claims and not merely as challenges to social
welfare legislation or to the states' police powers, state courts have
subjected these legislative schemes to strict judicial scrutiny. But
even this "recharacterization" of the constitutional claim may not be
necessary. Over the past two decades, there has been a resurgence
of Lochner-style jurisprudence, as state courts have with increasing
frequency applied a strict scrutiny standard of review to traditional
economic legislation.27 6
Consider, for example, Pennsylvania State Board of Pharmacy v.
Pastor.277 In Pastor, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held unconstitutional an economic regulation that forbade pharmacists from
advertising the prices of dangerous or narcotic drugs. Noting that
the Supreme Court would not substitute its social and economic
beliefs for the judgment of the legislative bodies, the Pennsylvania
4

'7

See

ABRAHAM,

supra note 238, at 13-14;

TRIBE,

supra note 200, at 578-86.

s See id. at 583; see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484, 487 (1969)
(upholding Maryland's AFDC grant regulations which impose a ceiling on benefits
regardless of family size and actual need, and noting that "state regulation in the
socialand economicfield [does] not affect[] freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights"
and thus "are not the business of [the] Court" (emphasis added)); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937) (upholding Washington state's minimum

wage law for women and minors and noting that liberty under the Due Process
Clause is subject to police power regulations adopted in the interest of the
community).
26 See e.g., Friday v. Ethanol Corp., 539 So.2d 208, 215-16 (Ala. 1988) (holding
Alabama's requirement that dealers of gasohol label all their products with the words
"gasohol" written in three-inch type to be a violation of the state's due process
provisions, and noting that legislatures cannot pursue means "that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved" (citing
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (applying the overbreadth doctrine to
regulations affecting one's right to free expression))); In re Aston Park Hosp., Inc.,
193 S.E.2d 729, 735 (N.C. 1973) (holding state regulations that required hospitals
operating on private property and with private funds to obtain a certificate of need
from the state an unconstitutional infringement of the state's due process provisions,
and noting that "'[i]f a statute is to be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police
power... it must be reasonably necessaty to promote the accomplishment of a public
good, or to prevent the infliction of a public harm'" (emphasis added) (quoting State
v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735 (N.C. 1949))).
" 272 A.2d 487 (Pa. 1971).
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court clearly distanced itself from post-Lochner jurisprudence.
The court, in fact, challenged the policy assumptions underlying
each of the state's asserted rationales, detailing alternatives that
would bear a more substantial relationship to the avowed goal of
279
diminishing the demand for narcotics.
Given the willingness of courts, like Pennsylvania's, to engage in
strict judicial scrutiny of economic regulations, at least an equal
level of scrutiny may be expected for decisions affecting personal,
and not merely economic, freedoms. As already noted, social and
economic regulations have traditionally been subjected to the same
level of "rational-basis" review in the post-Lochner age. 280 Therefore, if a state applies a more searching review of "economic" rights
(L la Lochner), it should also be compelled to more searchingly
review "social welfare" legislation, such as state civil commitment
procedures. Although economic conservatism may be the motivating force behind many of these state court decisions, only the most
unprincipled of courts would not extend their skepticism to social
legislation.
Whether civil commitment is primarily characterized as an
infringement of core, fundamental values, such as liberty and
autonomy, or as social welfare legislation designed to help a needy
class of individuals, the opportunity to subject these statutes to strict
scrutiny review is equally available. In terms of advancing constitutional claims to community-based alternatives to civil commitment,
resort to state due process provisions and the doctrine of least
restrictive means provides at least one avenue through which
litigants should travel.
2. Privacy Provisions in State Constitutions and the
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
A second due process argument for requiring the state to
provide community-based treatment for the mentally ill could be
conceptually grounded in the doctrine of "unconstitutional
conditions." 28 ' Developed most notably in the "abortion funding"
2'8 See id. at 490-91.
9
See id. at 492-93 (citing Florida Bd. of Pharmacy v. Webb's City, Inc., 219 So.
2d 681 (Fla. 1969) (applying the same level of scrutiny to its own state constitution);
Guy M. Struve, The Less-Restrictive Alternative Principleand Economic Due Process, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1463, 1472 (1967)).
280 See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
281

For a general discussion of the doctrine, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitu-

tional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989) (describing the doctrine of
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cases, 212 the doctrine can be anchored to the privacy provisions of
state constitutions to provide a right to community-based treatment
for those who voluntarily seek treatment from the state.
For mostjudges, it is clear that "when a state decides to alleviate
some of the hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the
manner in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional
limitations." 28 What those limitations are, however, is less clear.
For the mentally ill who must resort to the state for assistance, or
have the state assert itself on their behalf, the "hardships of poverty"
have made them particularly vulnerable recipients of state aid. Most
of those voluntarily or involuntarily committed to state mental
hospitals could not afford private forms of treatment, and could not
make use of community alternatives that did not exist.28 4 Although states are arguably not obligated to assist the mentally ill,
the decision to provide assistance, but only in the form of civil
commitment, goes beyond the constitutional limitations established
to preserve individual liberty. States that have not developed
effective community-based services have thus essentially conditioned
the receipt of medical assistance upon the willingness of the
mentally ill to relinquish their fundamental rights. For those who
are trying to make a choice between receiving the only form of aid
available-inpatient treatment-and receiving no aid at all, the cards
are clearly stacked against them: either choose aid and lose liberty,
or choose liberty and lose aid. And if one assumes that illness
diminishes an individual's freedom of action, choosing liberty may
28 5
ultimately undermine the liberty chosen.
unconstitutional conditions as forbidding government to "grant a benefit on the
condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government
may withhold that benefit altogether"). Sullivan critiques the current Court's analysis
for lacking consistency and suggests her own doctrinal formulation of "unconstitutional conditioning," which would require the application of a strict scrutiny analysis to
a broader array of cases. Id. at 1489-1505.
22 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977).
28
Maher, 432 U.S. at 469-70.
2

1 See

Richard Rapson, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Receive Treatment in the

Community, 16 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 193, 240 (1980) (noting that the "absence
of affordable... community treatment services may present a mentally ill individual
with no realistic alternative to seeking care from the state").
28 This line of reasoning cannot, of course, be extended to the involuntarily
committed. Only those who seek treatment voluntarily are forced to choose between
freedom and treatment. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 40.1-5-6(2) (1990) ("If it is
determined that the applicant [for voluntary admission] is in need of care and
treatment.., and no suitable alternatives to admission are available, he or she shall
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Arguments analogous to these have already been made before
the Supreme Court. In the context of welfare assistance, however,
the Court has generally rejected them.2 " At issue in the "abortion
funding" cases was whether the government violated a due process
liberty right by limiting the use of Medicaid funds to reimburse the
costs of childbirth, but not abortions. Although the case of Maher
v. Roe2 17 rested on an interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, Harris v. McRae2"8 directly confronted the substantive due
29
process claim of unconstitutional conditioning, and rejected it.
The Court noted that the Hyde Amendment, which withheld
Medicaid assistance to reimburse the costs of medically necessary
abortions, had not imposed a restriction on access to abortions that
did not already exist.290
Consequently, the Court refused to
require the state to remove those restrictions "not of its own
creation."2 11 Although the state had assumed the responsibility of
assisting the indigent sick, and thus should have been subjected to
what the Court had characterized in Maher as "constitutional limitations," 29 2 the Court allowed the state to "ride roughshod" over
fundamental liberty interests.2 98

be admitted for a period not to exceed thirty days."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 27A-8-1(2) (1992) ("The facility... may receive ... a voluntary patient... if...
[a] less restrictive treatment alternative is inappropriate or unavailable."). The
involuntarily committed will receive a state benefit whether they want it or not; for
them, there is no real sense of conditioningthe receipt of a benefit on a abdication of
fundamental rights. As Sullivan describes it, "[b]y its very nature, the doctrine serves
to protect only those rights that depend on some sort of exercise of autonomous
choice by the rightsholder." Sullivan, supranote 281, at 1426. Nevertheless, with the
exception of deciding which party to argue the right for, the voluntary/involuntary
distinction should as a practical matter be irrelevant. That is, whether the right to
community-based treatment hinges on the voluntarily committed or the involuntarily
committed, the acceptance of such a right by the courts would still translate into the
development
of community alternatives.
28
See Sullivan, supranote 281, at 1417 (noting that with the exception of having
held unconstitutional the denial of unemployment compensation to Saturday
sabbatarians, "the Court has rejected every other claim that conditions on food
stamps or welfare payments unconstitutionally burden" fundamental liberties).
287

432 U.S. 464 (1977).

28 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
289 See id. at 312-18.

': See id. at 317 (noting that the "Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman
with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically
necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no
health care costs at all").
291

Id. at 316.

29

Maher, 432 U.S. at 470.
Harris,448 U.S. at 331 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Turning to state courts and interpretations of their own state
constitutions, the concept of "unconstitutional conditioning" has
been more favorably received. In Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Myers,294 for instance, the California Supreme Court held
that California's budgetary provisions, limiting Medi-Cal funding for
abortions, was an unconstitutional infringement of fundamental
liberty.295 Contrasting its own decision to the Supreme Court's in
Harris v. McRae, the California court reasoned that the "explicit
constitutional status" of privacy in the California Constitution
affords the individual greater protection than the federal constitutional right.296 Following a lengthy discussion of the independent
grounds upon which California state constitutional provisions are to
be interpreted, 297 the court applied the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions, " 298 noting that:
[a]lthough the state has no constitutional obligation to provide
medical care to the poor, a long line of California decisions
establishes that once the state has decided to make such benefits
available, it bears a heavy burden ofjustification in defending any
provision which withholds such benefits from otherwise qualified
individuals solely because they choose to exercise a constitutional
right.

29 9

2 625 P.2d
25 See id. at

779 (Cal. 1981).

798.
' Id. at 784. California's privacy provision provides that "[a]ll people are by
nature free and independent and have certain inalienable rights. Among these are
enjoyingand defendinglife andliberty, acquiring, possessingandprotectingproperty,
and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
Several other state courts have come down with similar decisions, interpreting
their state constitutions more liberally, even without the additional justification of
having an explicit privacy provision in their state constitution. See Doe v. Maher, 515
A.2d 134, 135, 148-51 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (basing its decision on its due process
clause and a right of privacy implicit in that clause); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. &
Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 402 (Mass. 1981) (holding that the government's funding
restriction burdens the fundamental right to choice); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 405
A.2d 427, 431 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979) (noting that one's health is a
fundamental liberty which is shielded by Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey
Constitution which prohibits unreasonable and discriminatory restrictions); Hope v.
Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 976-80 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (relyingin part on the privacy rights
implicit in its due process clause), afT'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1993); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Department of Human Resources, 663 P.2d 1247, 1257-59 (Or.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a rule limiting state medical assistance for abortions
violated Oregon's privileges and immunities provision), afid, 687 P.2d 785 (Or. 1984).
..See Myers, 625 P.2d at 783-84.
29 Id. at 787.

2" Id. at 784.
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The court then subjected the budgetary provisions to a traditional
three-part (strict scrutiny) test, requiring the state to demonstrate
"(1) 'that the imposed conditions relate to the purposes of the
legislation which confers the benefit or privilege'; (2) that the 'utility
of imposing the conditions... manifestly outweigh[s] any resulting
impairment of constitutional rights'; and (3) that there are no 'less
offensive alternatives available for achieving the state's objective.' 300 The court concluded that the state had failed to satisfy
each of the three parts. 0 Several years after Myers, the California
Supreme Court confronted yet another "unconstitutional conditions" claim, but one which more closely parallels the civil commitment analogy.
In Robbins v. Superior Court,10 2 the California Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether state regulations requiring a welfare
recipient to reside in an institutional facility in lieu of cash benefits
violated the state's privacy provisions.
The court began its
analysis by first clarifying what the right to privacy included.
Arguing that it encompassed a variety of rights involving private
choices in personal affairs, the court capsulized the right as "the
right to be left alone," °4 and included within it Robbins's interests
in not being forced into a welfare facility as a condition for welfare
support.305
In determining whether Robbins's right had been violated by the
County's regulations, the court applied the same three-part test used
in Myers, noting that "[w]hen receipt of a public benefit is conditioned upon the waiver of a constitutional right, 'the government
bears a heavy burden of demonstrating the practical necessity for
the limitation. ' " 6 Holding that the county had failed to satisfy
the third, or "less restrictive alternative," prong of the Myers's test,
the court cited several less restrictive alternatives to involuntarily
0 7
confining individuals in welfare institutions."
Among the alter-

' Id. at 781 (quoting Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 421 P.2d 409,
414-15 (Cal. 1966)).
301 See id. at 790-98.
" 695 P.2d 695 (Cal. 1985).
303 See id. at 703.
'o' Id. at 703.
'so See id. at 707. Effective October 1, 1982, applicants were given the choice of
either residing in the institutional facility, an emergency shelter, or foregoing
benefits. See id. at 697.
'6 Id. at 704 (citation omitted).
"7 See id. at 705.
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natives mentioned by the court was the proposal that the county
construct low-income housing."' 8 Noting that it was not "unmindful of the budgetary constraints facing counties," the court nonetheless held that "financial considerations cannot justify an infringement of a basic constitutional right absent a showing that no less
onerous cost-cutting methods are available." 0 9 The court remanded the case instructing the trial court to preliminarily enjoin the
state from imposing this condition on Robbins's receipt of state
3 10
support.
In Robbins, unlike in Myers, the court tackled head-on the issue
of funding. While financial considerations were an element in the
court's balancing in Myers, the court was able to argue that requiring
the state to also fund abortions would ultimately save the state
money."' In Robbins, however, the alternatives envisioned actually
presented a serious financial burden for the state. Undaunted, the
court was willing to suggest that even if the costs were heavy,
constitutional concerns were weightier. In both cases, therefore, the
privacy provisions of the California state constitution provided the
conceptual link needed to advance constitutional claims of "unconstitutional conditioning" well beyond where the U.S. Supreme Court
was willing to go. As a strategy for advancing the claim that the
voluntarily committed mentally ill are constitutionally entitled to
community-based treatment alternatives, its applicability, at least in
California, is eminently clear.
As a general matter, focusing on state constitutional provisions
that recognize a specific right, such as privacy, is a commonly used
stratagem of state constitutionalism."' 2 A source of greater rights
protection in California for those making the substantive due
process claims argued for above, the privacy provisions of other
state constitutions3 13 provide similarly expansive rights-developing

3w See id.

-"9 Id. at 707.
310See id.

31 See Myers, 625 P.2d at 794.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 227-29.
313 Ten states have explicit privacy provisions. Five of the 10 (Alaska, California,

Florida, Hawaii, and Montana) are distinct from the constitutions' search and seizure
provisions, implying an even broader conception of privacy. See ALASKA CONST. art.
I, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 12,23; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10. The other five are more traditional search and seizure
type provisions. See ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8; ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 12; LA. CONST.
art. I, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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Alaska,3 14

Arizona, 15

Florida,3
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16

Hawaii,3' 7

Several states without privacy provisions have also chosen to read a right to
privacy into other provisions of their state constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Thompson,
760 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Idaho 1988) (interpreting privacy rights under search and
seizure claims more liberally than federal analog). In fact, in the mental health
context, several states have progressively furthered a patient's right to refuse certain
types of treatment. See, e.g., In re Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d 824,827 (Minn. 1989) (noting
that intrusive forms of medical treatment of the medically ill could conceivably violate
a right to privacy implicit in article I, §§ 1, 2, and 10 of the Minnesota Constitution).
The court further acknowledged that Minnesota's Constitution "may afford mentally
ill involuntarily committed patients greater privacy and due process procedural
protections than does the federal constitution." Id.; see also Jarvis v. Levine, 418
N.W.2d 139, 148-49 (Minn. 1988) (holding that involuntary treatment with
neuroleptic drugs can only be justified if it is the least drastic means available for
furthering a compelling state interest, deciding the case on the basis of privacy rights
under the Minnesota Constitution). The court inJarvisnoted that under Minnesota
law "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law." Id. at 149. (quoting Minnesota Bd. of Health v.
City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624 (Minn.), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976)).
For a general discussion of the use of privacy provisions in state constitutionalism, see Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Note, Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State
Constitutional
Law, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 631, 690-92 (1977).
314
See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975) (using the state's privacy
provision to allow the personal consumption of marijuana); Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d
159, 171-72 (Alaska 1972) (using the state's privacy provision to allow the wearing of
long hair in public schools). Alaska's privacy provision provides that "the right of the
people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed." ALASKA CONST. art. I,

§ 22.
s15 See State v. Ault, 724 P.2d 545, 552 (Ariz. 1986) (interpreting the Arizona
search and seizure provision more liberally than federal analog); State v. Wedding,
831 P.2d 398, 406 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that the Arizona Supreme Court has
in limited instances interpreted the Arizona provision more liberally than the federal
version). The Arizona search and seizure provision establishes that "[n]o person shall
be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
ARiz. CoNST. art. II, § 8.
..
6 See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190-91, 1196 (Fla. 1989) (holding a parental
consent requirement for minors seeking abortions unconstitutional and stating its
intention to interpret the state constitution's privacy provisions more expansively than
the Supreme Court's interpretation under federal law); see also In re Browning, 568
So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. 1990) (upholding the use of"living wills" under § 23 of the Florida
Constitution). Article I, § 23 provides that "[e]very natural person has the right to
be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as
otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's
right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." FLA. CONST. art.

I, § 23.
17

3 See State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372, 379 (Haw. 1988) (using the state constitution's
privacy provision to forbid the criminalization of pornography distribution, and
reasoning that an "adult person cannot read or view pornographic material in the
privacy of his or her own home if the government prosecutes the sellers of
pornography"). The court also noted that "in view of the important nature of this
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Louisiana,3 18 Montana,3 19 South Carolina,3 20 and Washington3 2' have each, in varying degrees, used their state constitutional

right, the State must use the least restrictive means should it desire to interfere with
the right." Id. at 378 (quoting STANDING CoMM. REP. No. 69, reprinted in 1
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 674-75

(1980)). The privacy provision in Hawaii provides that "[t]he right of the people to
privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right."
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6.
.18
See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 755 (La. 1992) (using that state's privacy
provision to prohibit the state from administering psychotropic drugs to a death row
prisoner for purposes of rendering him sufficiently competent to be executed).
Reasoning that the Louisiana Constitution can be interpreted so as to expand the
floor of fundamental rights, the court concluded that the state's privacy provisions
included the "right to decide whether to obtain or reject medical treatment." Id. at
757.
The court also cites several other states that have subscribed to a fundamental
right to choose one's own treatment program; a right that can only be infringed if the
state can show that its choice of a treatment program is "narrowly tailored" to the
government's ends. See Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (Ariz. 1987) (holding
that a patient's right to refuse treatment overrides the state's interest when death is
inevitable); Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1138 (Ct. App. 1986)
(stating that a patient has the right to refuse any medical treatment, even if the
treatment would save her life); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713,
718 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (stating that "state's interest in preserving life weakens
and individual's right of privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasions necessary for
treatment increases and the prognosis dims"); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,
Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 634 (Mass. 1986) (listing the criteria for when a state may
override a patient's right to refuse medical treatment); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,
664 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (stating that an individual may refuse
medical treatment when the "prognosis is extremely poor" and "bodily invasion is
very great"); see also supra note 313. The Louisiana privacy provision states that
"[e]very person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy."
LA. CONST. art. I, §5.
"' See Town ofEnnis v. Stewart, 807 P.2d 179, 182 (Mont. 1991) (holding that the
privacy rights of its citizens under the Montana Constitution were more substantial
than the rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution). The Montana privacy provision
provides that "the right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free
society and shall notbe infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
' 20 See State v. Austin, 409 S.E.2d 811, 815 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (interpreting the
South Carolina search and seizure provision more liberally than the federal analog).

The South Carolina search and seizure provision establishes that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated."
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10.
321 See State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 814-16 (Wash. 1986) (interpreting the
Washington search and seizure provision more liberally than its federal analog). The
Washington search and seizure provision establishes that "[n]o person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
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privacy provisions to advance substantive liberty interests beyond
the federal analog. While none of the cases cited have involved the
doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," each has expressed, either
explicitly or implicitly, a commitment to providing greater protection to fundamental liberty interests than that provided by the
current Supreme Court. Therefore, each presents the opportunity
to ground a right to community-based treatment for the mentally ill
3 22
in their respective state constitutions.
3. Specific Constitutional Provisions for the
Mentally Ill and the Custody Rationale
A third strategy for advancing the claim that the mentally ill
have a constitutional right to community-based treatment services
could be grounded in the substantive due process doctrine of
"custody." As developed in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social
Services Department,32 state "custody" over an individual triggers
an affirmative obligation to ensure certain basic rights.3 24 As
applied, the doctrine will be shown to be most effective in those
states where the needs of the mentally ill have been recognized in
particular state constitutional provisions. Moreover, the doctrine
will be shown to include as a basic right, the right to have community-treatment programs developed.
In DeShaney, the petitioner (Joshua Deshaney) was a young child
beaten into a coma by his chronically abusive father. Several
reports of beatings had originally convinced the Department of
Social Services ("DSS") of Winnebago County to "obtain[] an order
from a Wisconsin juvenile court, placing Joshua in the temporary
custody of the hospital."3 25 But after being hospitalized for three
days, Joshua was released from the custody of the court. A DSS
caseworker did periodically check up on Joshua's condition, but
despite observing evidence of child abusei the caseworker took no

" As for Illinois, while one commentator believes the drafters of Article I, § 12
had intended the privacy provision to extend protection beyond the search and
seizure context, see Cope, supra note 313, at 715, no case has interpreted it as such.
See Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist., 281 N.E.2d 659, 662 (111. 1972) (noting that § 12
isjust a remedial provision expressing a philosophy of the state). Section 12 provides
that "[e]very person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs
which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain
justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
3-

489 U.S. 189 (1989).

"' See id. at 199-200 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25
Id. at 192.
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action. After the incident in question, Joshua and his mother
brought suit against DSS. They claimed that the state had "deprived
Joshua of his liberty interest in 'free[dom] from ... unjustified
intrusions on personal security,' by failing to provide him with
3 26
adequate protection against his father's violence."
Holding for DSS, the Court reasoned that "[w]hile the State may
have been aware of the dangers thatJoshua faced ....
it played no
part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any
more vulnerable to them." 2 7 That the "State once took temporary
custody of Joshua," did not render it "the permanent guarantor of
IJoshua's] safety." 2 Had a "special relationship" existed between
the state and Joshua such that the state had assumed the role of
protector, but failed to protect, then the state could have been held
liable. 29 Such a "special relationship" would have existed had
Joshua been technically within the "custody" of the state. But
limiting its conception of "custody" to instances of institutionalization and incarceration, the Court refused to extend it to Joshua's
3 30

situation.

Referring to the mental health context, the DeShaney Court did
reaffirm the Youngberg v. Romeo33' rule that the institutionalized
are entitled to a minimal level of training and treatment.3 2 But
3 33
at no point did the Court, nor has the Court or the lower courts

extended this "affirmative right" to those who are no longer, or
have never been, institutionalized. As the dissent in DeShaney
noted, "[b]ecause of the Court's initial fixation on the general
principle that the Constitution does not establish positive rights, it
is unable to appreciate our recognition... that this principle does
not hold true in all circumstances.3 3 4
Id. at 195 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)).
Id. at 201.
328Id.
329 See id. at 197.
330 See id. at 198-201.
1'457 U.S. 807 (1982); see also supra notes 164-72.
532 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
313 See, e.g., Philadelphia Police & Fire Ass'n v. Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 166-68
(3d Cir. 1989) (holding that Pennsylvania's withdrawal of assistance to developmentally disabled individuals living at home did not violate the substantive due process
rights of the plaintiff class despite claims that such a withdrawal would inevitably lead
to the deterioration of the plaintiff and subsequent committal in an institution). The
court reasoned that under DeShaney no "special relationship" existed between the
plaintiff class and the state to justify requiring the state to provide a certain minimal
level of aid. See id. at 168.
I" DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121

32
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ForJoshua, the illogic of DeShaney has been brutally self-evident.
Similarly for the deinstitutionalized, the release into the streets
without effective transitional assistance has meant personal
deterioration at the micro-level, and. an escalation of homelessness
Some states have acknowledged their
at the macro-level."3 5
responsibility to the deinstitutionalized mentally ill, passing statutes
that reflect this concern. 3 6 But most states have not provided the
funding necessary to make transitional assistance a reality. In a very
real sense, then, the deinstitutionalized are still dependent on the
state.
For individuals who have never before been committed to
institutions, but because of their illnesses are brought into the civil
commitment process, "custody" begins immediately. In all fifty
states, individuals alleged to be mentally ill and in need of treatment
can be detained in an institutional setting. Depending on the state,
these evaluative and treatment detentions can last anywhere from
three days to thirty days, even before any final decision is made on
the individual's commitment status.337 Whether these individuals
-5" See TORREY, supra note 17, at 14-16.
356 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-185 (1991) (noting that the state's mental
health department has "an affirmative duty to provide adequate transitional treatment
and 37
care for all patients released after a period of involuntary confinement").
3 See ALA. CODE § 22-52-8 (1990 & Supp. 1993) (30 days); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 47.30.710 to .725 (1990) (7 days); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-535(B) (1993) (6
days); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-205(b) (Michie 1991) (12 days); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 5206,5250 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993) (20 days); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 27-10105(1)(a), -107(6) (1989) (15 days); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-502 (West 1992) (30
days); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5005(2), 5008(1) (Supp. 1992) (15 days, at least);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.463(2)(c), 394.467(3)(a) (West 1993) (8 days); GA. CODE ANN.

§§

37-3-64(a), 37-3-81(a) (1982 & Supp. 1993) (19 days); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 334-59,
334-60.5(b), (g) (1985 & Supp. 1992) (10 days, at least); IDAHO CODE §§ 66-326(d), 66329(0 (1989 & Supp. 1993) (7 days); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 405, para. 5/3-704(a), -706

(Smith-Hurd 1993) (8 days); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 12-26-4-1 to -5-11 (West Supp. 1992)
(15 days); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.11 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (5 days); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 59-2912, -2914(a)(1) (1983 & Supp. 1992) (14 days); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 202A.071(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (21 days); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 28:53(A)(1), 28:54(C) (West 1989) (15-18 days); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B,
§ 3864(2), (5) (West 1988) (10 days); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10-632(b)
(Supp. 1992) (14 days); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, §§ 8B(c), 12(a), (d) (Law Co-op.
1989 & Supp. 1993) (24 days); MICH COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 330.1430, -.1452 (West
1992) (11 days); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 253B.05 subd. 3, 253B.08 subd. 1 (West 1982
& Supp. 1993) (24 days); MiSs. CODE ANN. §§ 41-21-67(4), -71 (1993) (7 days); Mo.
REv. STAT. §§ 632.305(2), 632.335(1) (1988) (11 days); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-21122(2)(b)(ii)(C), 53-21-124 (1991) (8 days); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-1023, -1026, -1036
(1987) (11 days); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 433A.150, 433A.220(1) (Michie 1991) (14
days); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-C:29, 30,32 (1990) (10 days, at least); NJ. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30:4-27.10, -27.12 (West Supp. 1993) (20 days); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-10
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are seen as merely within the "clutches" of the state, or fully within
state "custody," an affirmative right to at least some level of
minimally adequate treatment should be formally recognized. What
are the contours of that right and how can it translate into a right
to community-based services are questions that remain to be
answered. In a recent article in the Yale Law Journal, Professor
3 8
Susan Stefan offers some answers. 3
Stefan provides a solid foundation for building a right to
community-based services. She does so by interpreting the right to
minimal training established in the Youngberg case as requiring more
than mere judicial deference to the judgment of mental health
professionals.33 9
In characterizing what is minimally required
when the mentally ill are within the state's "custody," Stefan argues
that courts should not be allowed to abdicate their responsibilities
as guardians of freedom once the professional judgment standard

(Michie 1993) (8 days); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39(a) (McKinney 1988) (15 days);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-263, -268 (1989 & Supp. 1992) (10 days); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 25-03.1-11, .1-17, .1-26, .1-29 (1989 & Supp. 1993) (21 days); Orno REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 5122.10, 5122.14 (Anderson 1993) (12 days); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 5-211
(West 1990 & Supp. 1993) (28 days); OR.REv. STAT. ANN. § 426.095(2) (Supp. 1992)
(8 days); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7302(d)(2), 7303(0 (Supp. 1993) (25 days); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 40.1-5-7(6), 40.1-5-8(4) (1990) (31 days); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-410(3)
(Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1992) (15 days); S.D. CODIFMD LAWS ANN. §§ 27A-10-5,
27A-10-7 (1992) (6 days); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-3-501, 33-3-606, 33-6-103(v) (1984
& Supp. 1993) (15-30 days); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 574.005, 574.013,
574.026 -.027 (West 1992) (30 days); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-12-232(3), 62A-12234(3), (8) (1989 & Supp. 1993) (18 days); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7508(d), 7510(a),
(b), 7615 (1987) (17-27 days); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.1 (1990 & Supp. 1993) (4
days); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.180, 71.05.200(1) (West 1992) (20 days); W.
VA. CODE § 27-5-2 (1992) (30 days); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20( 7 )(c) (West 1987 &
Supp. 1993) (14 days); WYO.STAT. § 25-10-109 (1990) (16 days).
Compare this to the time frame envisioned by the National Task Force on
Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment:
Established law requires that an evidentiary hearing be held within a
reasonable period of time after a respondent is admitted and involuntarily
detained in a mental health facility or a petition for involuntary civil
commitment is filed.
(a) A hearing should be held as soon as possible, but no more than three
court days after a respondent has been taken into custody or a
petition for involuntary civil commitment has been filed and is
pending with the court.
INsTrUTE ON MENTAL DISABIL1TY AND THE LAw, NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
GUIDELINES FOR INVOLUNTARY CrvIL COMMITMENT 60 (1986) (Guideline F2(a))

(emphasis added).
338 See Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the 'Experts" From Deference to
Abdication Under the ProfessionalJudgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639 (1992).
...
For a discussion of Youngberg, see supra text accompanying notes 164-72.
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is invoked. 4
Instead, Youngberg should be interpreted to establish a right to treatment that would ensure that those within the
state's custody are treated so that their "release from confinement
could be expedited." 4 1 Although Stefan defines "custody" as
institutionalization, her argument could and should be extended to
other forms. of "custody."
Thus, for the deinstitutionalized,
community-based treatment would be justified as necessary to
prevent re-institutionalization. And similarly for the "potentially"
institutionalized, community-based services would be the natural
antidote for civil commitment.
Granted, this approach is not only an extension of the DeShaneyYoungberg logic, but arguably also of Stefan's 42 For this reason,
it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would support it. Since
the argument requires that the mentally ill have a constitutionally
based, affirmative claim to treatment in the community (as a
condition of ensuring minimal basic rights under Youngberg), an
effective location for making such a claim would be in state
constitutions that have expressed a particular interest in the rights
of the mentally ill.
In Texas, for example, a court of civil appeals used Article I,
Section 15(a) of its state constitution to make the same type of
argument that Professor Stefan has made. 4 ' Article I, Section
15(a) provides that "[n]o person shall be committed as a person of
unsound mind except on competent medical or psychiatric
testimony. The legislature may enact all laws necessary to provide
for a method of appeal from judgments rendered in such cases."34 4 As the court in Moss construed it, Section 15(a) requires
that "[a] person suspected of mental illness not be deprived of
liberty on the basis of medical expert opinion alone." 4 ' Instead,
because of the extensive liberty interests involved, both medical and
legal determinations must be made. In accepting the plaintiff's
claim that there were insufficient factual grounds upon which to
110See

341

Stefan, supra note 338, at 644-45.

Id. at 692.

' See id. at 694 n.268 (limiting her argument, in light of DeShaney, to those
already in the state's custody).
'4 See Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 949-50 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); see also
Holliman v. State, 762 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Moss for the

proposition that expert medical opinions are not sufficient to deprive an individual

of liberty).
34

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15(a).
Moss, 539 S.W.2d at 949.
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base her civil commitment, the court noted its general distrust of
the ability of psychiatrists to make predictive decisions about human
behavior.

46

Moss lays an essential foundation for going beyond what
Youngberg has been traditionally interpreted as requiring. If Stefan
is correct, and Youngberg should be interpreted as requiring
treatment necessary to ensure an expedited release from confinement, then Moss provides the necessary tools for advancing the
"custody" argument outlined above. Moreover, like Texas, the
of Arkansas,3

states
5

47

Idaho,3

48

Mississippi,3

4

1

Ohio,"'0

Okla-

52

homa, ' and Washington
also have constitutional provisions
that refer to the mentally ill. Unlike Texas, however, these six all
phrase the rights involved in affirmative terms, rendering these
jurisdictions even more likely to support a state constitutional right
to community-based treatment.3 3
See id. at 950-51.
U3 See ARK. CoNsT. art. XIX, § 19 (stating that the General Assembly must
"provide by law for the support of institutions ... [and] for the treatment of the
insane").
34 See IDAHO. CONST. art. X, § 1 (providing that "institutions... for the benefit
of the insane... shall be established and supported by the state").
S4 See MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 86 (stating that "it shall be the duty of the
legislature to provide by law for the treatment and care of the insane"); id. art. XIV,
§ 262 (allowing provision of "asylums for those persons who, by reason of age,
infirmity, or misfortune, may have claims upon the sympathy and aid of society").
3-0 See OHIO. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (providing that "[i]nstitutions for the benefit of
the insane, blind, and deaf and dumb, shall always be fostered and supported by the
state; and be subject to such regulations as may be proscribed by the general
assembly"). In one case interpreting this constitutional provision, the Ohio Supreme
Court ruled 4-3 that the juvenile court lacked the authority to order the department
of mental health to pay for the cost of caring for children placed in private, nonpublic
psychiatric hospitals. See In re Hamil, 431 N.E.2d 317, 318 (Ohio 1982). The court
in Hamilessentially interpreted the state statute as providing a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting available. If a better alternative is not available, however,
the plaintiff must remain in the more restrictive environment. See id. at 321.
5
' s See OKLA. CONST. art. XXI, § 1 (mandating establishment and support of
institutions
for the insane).
52
3 See WASH. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (mandating that institutions "for persons who
are mentally ill or developmentally disabled ... shall be fostered and supported by
3

the state").

...
Affirmative rights can also be found in other state constitutional provisions,
and can be used as a source of expansive rights protection, as well. See e.g.,
California First Bank v. State, 801 P.2d 646,658 (N.M. 1990) (holding that a cause of
action exists for plaintiffto sue-as the representative of the estates of those killed by
a drunk driver-the city, and noting that the due process clause of the New Mexico
Constitution expressly guarantees the right "of seeking and obtaining safety"); Hodge
v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245, 247 (W. Va. 1983) (holding that the homeless are
entitled to protective services under Article III, § 10 of the state constitution, because
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Several other states are also fertile territories for advancing this
argument. And though their constitutional provisions and state
court decisions do not, like Texas's, self-evidently tie into the
Youngberg-DeShaney "custody" approach, these states have interpreted their constitutional provisions to justify treating the mentally ill
and mentally disabled as constitutionally protected classes. In fact,
courts in Louisiana, 3s4 Montana, M and Michigan 56 employ
dicta evincing constitutionally based concerns for the provision of
less restrictive residential alternatives.

the constitution is meant to guarantee the benefits of legislative enactments); see also
N.Y. CONST., art. XVII, § 1 ("The aid, care and support of the needy are public

concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in
such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine"); MONT. CONST., art. XII, § 3(3) ("The legislature may provide such economic
assistance and social and rehabilitative services for those who, by reason of age,
infirmities, or misfortune are determined by the legislature to be in need."); Butte
Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Mont. 1986) (applying heightened
scrutiny to regulation that abridged welfare rights which the court found to be
important but rejecting proposition that welfare is a fundamental right because
Article XII, § 3(3) is not part of the Declaration of rights).
-" See Clark v. Manuel, 463 So. 2d 1276, 1285 n.14 (La. 1985) (holding unconstitutional a discriminatory city zoning ordinance, and noting that Article I, § 3 of the
Louisiana Constitution, as well as statutory provisions passed to implement § 3 rights,
clearly evinced a concern for the promotion of less restrictive residential alternatives
for the mentally retarded). Article I, § 3 provides that "[n]o law shall arbitrarily,
capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex,
culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations." LA. CONST. art. I, § 3
(emphasis added).
355 See State v. District Ct., 609 P.2d 245, 247 (Mont. 1980) (quashing an injunction
that had enjoined the opening of a group home for the developmentally disabled).
The court interpreted Article XII, § 3 of the state constitution as establishing, among
other things, the constitutional rights of the "'developmentally disabled to live and
develop within.., community structure as a family unit, rather than be segregated
in isolat[ion].'" Id. at 247 (quoting State v. Missoula, 543 P.2d 173, 177-78 (Mont.
1975)).
" See City of Livonia v. Department of Social Servs., 378 N.W.2d 402,416 (Mich.

1985) (holding that the wording of Article VIII, § 8 of the state constitution was
specifically revised to reflect the belief that the treatment of the mentally ill should
not be restricted to institutionalization). Article VIII, § 8 expansively provides that
"[i]nstitutions, programs and services for the care, treatment, education or
rehabilitation of those inhabitants who are physically, mentally or otherwise seriously
handicapped shall always be fostered and supported." MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 8.
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B. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
provides, in part, that "[n]o State shall ...

deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."3 57 Under
the traditional standard of equal protection review, a legislative
classification will be sustained if there is a rational basis for
distinguishing between the class to which the law is applicable and
the class to which it is not.35 8 Because under such a standard the

reasonableness of the classification is presumed, the party challenging it has the burden of establishing its invalidity. As has been the
case with post-Lochner substantive due process review, this rationalbasis standard applies primarily to economic classifications and
those dealing with general social welfare regulations. s5 9
When classifications, however, tend to impinge upon a fundamental right or disadvantage a "suspect" class of individuals, the
presumption of constitutionality that marks traditional, rationalbasis review is reversed."' 0 Instead, under strict-scrutiny review,
the state must illustrate that its classification is the least restrictive
means by which to further some compelling state interest. If the
means employed are not the least restrictive, the classification will
be deemed to be motivated by a bias towards the class affected, and
the statute will be rendered unconstitutional.
As applied to civil commitment statutes, the least restrictive
alternative doctrine should assist courts in unearthing legislative
schemes that are "overinclusive," that unnecessarily and improperly
institutionalize individuals who would be better treated in the
community. The states' failure to develop and fund communitybased services would thus be seen by courts as reflecting the states'
disdain for the individualized needs of the mentally ill. 6' To
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 314 (1978)
(subjecting to rational basis review a Massachusetts statute that requires uniformed
police officers to retire at age 50).
See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
'6 See Muigia, 427 U.S. at 312; see also TRIBE, supra note 200, at 1451-54.
"' Cf. C. Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive
Contentof EqualProtection, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1983). Baker interprets the Equal
Protection Clause as designed to ensure that the inherent worth of a category of
citizens is not subordinated or denigrated. See id. at 959. Application of the Equal
Protection Clause standard aids the Court in disclosing "subordinating and
denigrating purposes." Id. at 974-76, 992. As John Hart Ely characterizes this
process, the Equal Protection Clause "flush[es] out unconstitutional motivations."
ELY, supra note 115, at 153; cf. TRIBE, supra note 200, at 1515 (developing an
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trigger strict judicial scrutiny, two approaches will be proposed.
First, it will be argued that the mentally ill are a suspect class and
any classifications affecting their interests should employ the least
restrictive means appropriate. Second, it will also be argued that
the mentally ill most "at risk" of being civilly committed are the
poorest of a class of very poor individuals. Any classifications that
restrict their ability to exercise a fundamental right should also be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.
1. Courts Characterizing the Mentally Ill as a Suspect Class
Suspect classifications that trigger strict scrutiny review are not
easy to characterize.
In fact, the uncertainty of the Court's
jurisprudence in this area has resulted in powerful criticisms being
levelled against it, not the least of which has come from the Court's
own membership. 6 2
In San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez,36 however, the Court attempted to provide some
guidance, listing as to the "traditional indic[es] of suspectness:" that
a class be "saddled with such disabilities, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process. "see Commentators, in turn, have focused on the "immutability of the classifying
trait," "stigmatization," and membership in a "discrete and insular"
minority to define the contours of a suspect class."' 5 But despite
"antisubjugation" principle for equal protection analysis, "which aims to break down
legally created or legally reenforced systems of subordination that treat some people

as second-class citizens.).
12 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Court should not apply "one standard of review in some cases and
a different standard in other cases"); see also Jeffrey H. Blattner, The Supreme Court's
IntermediateEqual ProtectionDecisions: Five Imperfect Models of ConstitutionalEquality,

8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777, 779, 817 (1981) (noting that the Court's determination
of who is truly "disadvantaged," depends on a particular social vision, or on a "theory

ofjust and unjust disadvantaging");John H. Ely, The ConstitutionalityofReverse Racial
Discrimination,41 U. CHi. L. REV. 723, 734 (1974) (noting that the Court has provided
no guidance on how to determine who should be characterized as a suspect class);
Douglas R. Widin, Comment, Suspect Classifications: A Suspect Analysis, 87 DICK. L.
REV. 407, 432 (1983) (noting that regardless of whether a black woman is irrelevantly
classified on the basis of her sex, rather than race, it "does not change the character
of the burden imposed or vitiate the equal protection violation").
n' 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
s" Id. at 28.
" ELY, supra note 115, at 150-53 (discussing the different perspectives that
commentators bring to this issue). Ely argues that "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities" is the proper standard since it limits the Court's concern to those
who, because of legislative prejudice or generalizations, have not been treated with
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attempts to make sense of the Court's "suspect classification"
doctrine, there is still no coherent set of principles that guides
US.

3 66

What we do know, however, is that the current Supreme Court
is unlikely to treat the mentally ill with the same level of judicial
solicitude provided racial and ethnic groups. In City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center,"' the Supreme Court grappled with the
issue of whether a city ordinance that required the mentally
retarded to obtain special use permits for group homes violated the
Equal Protection Clause. In rendering its decision, however, the
Court seemed less preoccupied with the particulars of the case, and
more preoccupied with determining the threshold question of where
to place the mentally disabled along the continuum of classifications. Downplaying the lengthy history of discriminatory treatment
against the mentally disabled, the Court instead emphasized the
number of political victories accorded the mentally disabled and the
costs of extending suspect status to yet another class of individuals. 68 After six pages of analysis, the Court concluded not only
that the mentally disabled did not need the Court's help, but also
that even if they did the Court was not interested in providing

any."
Although the Court subjected the classification of the
mentally disabled to rational-basis review, the Court did what it
almost never does when applying minimal level scrutiny; it invalidat3 70
ed the ordinance.
In his partially concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice
Marshall moved away from the majority's political participation
analysis, arguing that given the "'lengthy and tragic history' of
segregation and discrimination" that has riddled the lives of the
mentally disabled, any level of scrutiny lower than heightened would
be inappropriate.3 7 ' Marshall reasoned further that "political
equal concern and respect and who have been effectively excluded from political
participation. Id. at 150-70.
' See id. at 149; Note, The ConstitutionalStatus ofSexual Orientation:Homosexuality

as a Suspect Classification,98 HARv. L. REv. 1285, 1297 (1985).
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
See id. at 440-46.
mSee id. at 446.
3'0 See id. at 448 (invalidating the ordinance as applied and noting that the only
explanation available for the classification was fear of, and prejudice towards, the
mentally retarded); see also id. at 459-60 n.4 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting how infrequently legislation has been struck down under
rational basis review).
57
Id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting
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powerlessness of a group and the immutability of its defining trait
are relevant insofar as they point to a social and cultural isolation."3 7 2 Chronicling historical as well as current indices of
isolation, Marshall concluded that from a social and cultural
perspective the mentally disabled should, in fact, be characterized
as a discrete and insular minority.373 Marshall did not win the
interpretive battle, nor did he identify the indices of suspectness
that has motivated the Court's multi-tiered review. Nevertheless, his
conception of the mentally retarded as a group that has been
subordinated throughout history, both socially and culturally,
weaves together several strands of thought on what constitutes a
37 4

suspect class.

If, under Marshall's analysis, classifications affecting the mentally
retarded should be viewed with suspicion, then so should classifications affecting the mentally ill.
Consider the following two
depictions:
[P]eople who are involuntarily committed tend to be social
outcasts even before they walk through the hospital door.
Overwhelmingly, they are poor and unemployed or working in

poorly paid jobs. They rarely have more than a high school
education, and most lack [the] skills or experiences for anything
17
but the lowest-paying jobs.
The care of the severely mentally ill in twentieth century America
has been a public disgrace. Over fifty years of warehousing
patients in inhumane state hospitals has been followed by almost
forty years of dumping them into bleak boarding homes or onto
the streets. It has been an era of remarkably poor planning and

University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978)).
7 Id. at 472 n.24.
" See id. at 465-73 & n.24; see also Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 291-95

(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing the developmentally disabled as a discrete and insular
minority for purposes of interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
-" See, e.g., ELY, supra note 115, at 160 (noting that while political access is
important, social access is an equally relevant consideration in understanding what
constitutes a discrete and insular minority); TRIBE, supranote 200, at 1516 ("Mediated
by the antisubjugation principle, the equal protection clause asks whether the
particular conditions complained of, examined in their social and historical context,
are a manifestation of a legacy of official oppression."); Baker, supra note 361, at 976
(highlighting his "equality of respect model's no subordinating purpose principle").
375 LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 11, at 140-41; see also Rapson, supra note 284,
at 215 (describing the mentally ill as "economically, politically, and legally vulnerable"); News & Notes: MentalIllness Remains a Source of Stigma, NationalSurvey of Public
Attitudes Finds, 41 Hosp'. & CoMMuNrrY PSYCHIATRY 819, 819 (1990) (65% of those
polled "believe that a great deal of stigma is attached to mental illness").
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inept policy formulation. Professional self-interest has been
confused with altruism, official inaction with benevolence,
76
ideology with science, and ignorance with omniscience!
Feared, stereotyped, and poorly treated, the mentally ill would even
appear to meet the Cleburne majority's "political powerlessness"
37
criterion for suspectness 7
Given the overwhelming historical evidence of social, cultural,
and political isolation and subordination, courts should subject all
laws affecting the mentally ill to strict judicial scrutiny. With
respect to the civil commitment process, application of the "least
restrictive alternative" prong of strict scrutiny analysis would require
states to establish and finance effective community-based alternatives if they wanted their legislative schemes to survive. Because not
financing such alternatives would essentially render all individuals
with mental illnesses civilly committable, those who could be more
effectively treated in the community would be unnecessarily
deprived of their liberty and of the opportunity to receive appropriate care. Failing to finance and develop community-based alterna-

TORREY, supra note 17, at 199.
See Bach, supra note 17, at 1160 (noting that "[t]he mentally ill lack the
constituency necessary to effect majoritarian reform"); see also Rapson, supranote 284,
at 216 ("[T]heir economic powerlessness is paralleled by their lack of political
influence. Because they are uhlikely to organize around issues that affect them or
take other actions that would generate political influence, the mentally ill are not a
weighty constituency."); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification, 83 YALE L.J.
1237, 1259 (1974) (noting that classifications affecting the mentally ill should be
accorded strictjudidal scrutiny because the mentally ill are often denied the right to
vote, are in the minority, are consigned to insularity because of people's aversion to
personal contact with them, and are typically victimized by ill-fitting legislative
classifications). But see Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1229-30 n.153 (1974) (noting that while "mental illness
involves some of the indicia normally associated with suspect classification," mental
illness is not an "immutable personal characteristic, determined at birth, which bears
little relation to the individual's ability to perform many tasks").
Moreover, as compared to the mentally disabled, the mentally ill have historically
been at a political disadvantage. Not only do the mentally disabled lobby more
aggressively and effectively than the mentally ill, but those who do the lobbying are
also more understanding of the needs of those they lobby for. See BRAKEL ET AL.,
supra note 30, at 337-38, 616-17 & n.121, 619; Jeffrey Wilson & Anthony Kouzi,
Quality of the Residential Environment in Board-and-Care Homes for Mentally and
Developmentally Disabled Persons, 41 HosP. & COMMUNrTY PSYCHIATRY 314, 317-18
(1990) (noting how relatives of the mentally disabled often play a large role in the
lobbying efforts for the mentally disabled while only "concerned citizens" and
professional groups tend to rally for the mentally ill, and noting that, at least in the
area of community-based, residential treatment, the mentally disabled are able to get
significantly more funding per patient than the mentally ill are).
'"
'7
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tives, while still maintaining the coercive authority to commit the
mentally ill, would, in other words, belittle the individualized needs
of the mentally ill. This lack of respect and concern is precisely
37
what the Equal Protection Clause is designed to eliminate. 8
With the U.S. Supreme Court intimating that classifications
79
affecting the mentally ill will not enjoy heightened scrutiny,
resort to state constitutionalism becomes even more of a necessity.
Although no state court has yet officially characterized the mentally
80
ill as a suspect class, only one has ever said they are not.3
Moreover, some states have even voluntarily expressed an appreciation for the discreteness and insularity of the mentally ill. In Estate
of Roulet, 81 for example, the California Supreme Court noted that
"[t]he former mental patient is likely to be treated with distrust and
even loathing; he may be socially ostracized and victimized by
employment and educational discrimination.... [T]he individual's
hospitalization and posthospitalization experience may cause him to
Similarly, the New
lose self-confidence and self-esteem."38 2
Hampshire Supreme Court noted that "an enlightened view of
mental illness 'does not yet prevail,'" and proceeded to quote the
California court."' 3 As for the remaining states that have not even
considered the discreteness and insularity of the mentally ill, at least
fourteen of them have historically interpreted their equal protection
provisions more liberally than the federal analog, and would likely
84
be amenable to characterizing the mentally ill as a "suspect class."3
...
While it may certainly cost more in the short-run to make the fit better, it is
warranted. See ELY, supra note 115, at 169 (to make a "more individualized test of
qualification[,].. .[t]he unusual dangers of distortion in situations ofself-aggrandizing
generalization seem also to demand that we bear the increased costs of more
individualized justice").
3*9 Although Cleburne's characterization of the mentally disabled would alone
suffice to draw this conclusion, the Court also explicitly makes reference to the
mentally ill. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445-46 (noting that since it is not about to
extend suspect or quasi-suspect status to the mentally ill, it certainly is not about to
extend it to the mentally disabled).
*BoSee Williams v. Secretary of Executive Office, 609 N.E.2d 447, 456 (1993).
31 590 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979).
sSId. at 7.
Proctor v. Butler, 380 A.2d 673, 676 (N.H. 1977) (quoting People v. Burnick,
535 P.2d 353, 362 (Cal. 1975)), overruledby In re Sanborn, 545 A.2d 726 (N.H. 1988).
*21 The 14 states are: Alaska, see Herrick's Aero-Auto Repair v. State Dep't of
Transp., 754 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Alaska 1988); Patrick v. Lynden Trans., Inc., 765 P.2d
1375, 1377 (Alaska 1988); California, see Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 950 (Cal.
1977); Connecticut, see Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 160-61 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986);
Hawaii, see State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58-59 (Haw. 1974); Michigan, see Doe v.
Director of Dep't. of Social Servs., 468 N.W.2d 862, 870-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991),
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2. Courts Liberally Construing Wealth Classifications
Even if a court were reluctant to characterize the mentally ill as
a suspect class, there still remain other aspects of the civil commitment process that merit strict scrutiny. Most notably is the degree
of poverty experienced by those institutionalized, the deinstitutionalized, and those "at risk" of being institutionalized for the first
time. For each of these groups, the correlationbetween poverty and

mental illness is beyond doubt; all that has remained at issue is the
causal relationship between the two."'

As Judge Bazelon noted

rev'd on othergrounds, 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1992); Montana, see Pfost v. State, 713
P.2d 495, 500 (Mont. 1985), overruled on other grounds, 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989);
New Jersey, see Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 936-37 (N.J. 1982); New
Mexico, see Chapman v. Luna, 701 P.2d 367, 368 (N.M. 1985); Oregon, see Cooper v.
Oregon Sch. Activities Ass'n, 629 P.2d 386, 391 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); South Dakota,
see Behrns v. Burke, 229 N.W.2d 86, 88-89 (S.D. 1985); Texas, see In re McLean, 725
S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987); Utah, see Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d
634, 637 (Utah 1989); West Virginia, see Robertson v. Goldman, 869 S.E.2d 888, 892
(W. Va. 1988); Wyoming, see Washakie v. County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 606 P.2d 310, 332
(Wyo. 1980).
Very few states actually have "equality" provisions that mirror the federal Equal
Protection Clause. Instead, most states have interpreted a right to equal protection
under the law pursuant to their state due process provisions. The logic behind this
approach can be traced back to the Supreme Court's decision in Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954), where the Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment's
requirements of equal protection to the District of Columbia's public schools through
the Fifth Amendment's due process provision. See id. at 499.
Only eight states have "equality" provisions as we commonly understand them.
See Sidney Z. Karasik, Equal Protection of the Law Under the Federal and Illinois
Constitutions: A Contrast in Unequal Treatment, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 270 n.33
(1980). As interpreted by most state courts, however, these provisions differ
fundamentally from their federal analog. As one commentator put it, "whereas the
equal protection clause was designed to safeguard minorities from majoritarian
excesses, the state equality guarantees ... largely served to protect the majority
against legislative creation of special privileges or exemptions that destroy equality
under the law." Tarr, supra note 206, at 860.
' See Bruce P. Dohrenwend, Socioeconomic Status and PsychiatricDisorders: The
Causation-SelectionIssue, 255 SCIENCE 946, 951 (1992) (noting that since 1855 the
relationship between poverty and mental illness has proven to be "remarkably
consistent," and concluding that "social causation theory," by which poverty causes
mental illness, was a stronger factor than the "social selection theory," which holds
that the mentally ill are genetically predisposed to mental illness and become poor
as a consequence); Virginia A. Hiday, Civil Commitment: A Review of Empirical
Research, 6 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 15, 18 (1988) (noting that the "sociodemographic
characteristics of civil commitment candidates are so well established that articles
addressing this subject are noticeably absent in the post reform period," and that
these candidates tend to be poor or indigent); see also Ludwig, supranote 16, at 109293 (pointing out that 85% to 90% of long-term state hospital patients have been
indigent, have exhausted or have been stripped of most of their assets by the time
they were committed); Arthur J. Lurigio & Dan A. Lewis, Worlds that Fail: A
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in describing the plight of Ms. Lake,
[t]his appellant, as appears from the record, would not be
confined in Saint Elizabeths if her family were able to care for her
or pay for the care she needs. Though she cannot be given such
care as only the wealthy can afford, an earnest effort should be
made to review and exhaust available resources of the community
86
in order to provide care reasonably suited to her needs.
While mental illness certainly does affect the middle and upper
classes, these individuals (unlike Ms. Lake) often have the family
support and the financial support to make use of private, noninstitutionalized alternatives. Those who are committed, as well as
candidates for civil commitment, tend to be, however, the poorest
of the poor, "overwhelmingly from the bottom of the social
structure." "The more privileged have their own alternatives:
resources to provide care at home or in a private hospital, [and]
education and resources to 7seek and obtain help before symptoms
8
become truly dangerous."
But is indigency a suspect class? Do legislative schemes that
disproportionately impact upon the poor warrant strict judicial
scrutiny? Beginning with the Warren Court and continuing into the
early years of the Burger Court, several decisions conveyed the idea
that indigency was, in fact, a suspect classification. In Griffin v.
Illinois,"s ' for example, the Supreme Court noted that "[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color.""8 9 And in Tate v.
Short, 9 ' the High Court held that to incarcerate an indigent civil
offender simply because he could not afford to pay his fines was a
denial of equal treatment. 9'

Longitudinal Study of Urban Mental Patients, 45 J. Soc. ISSuES 79, 81 (1989) (finding
that a sample of state mental patients in Chicago were "predominantly poor,
unemployed, and on welfare"); Perlin, supra note 11, at 102 (noting that "persons of
lower socioeconomic status are more likely than those of middle and upper status to
develop symptoms of distress in response to problematic life experiences").
'"Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
1 Hiday, supra note 385, at 18 (noting that the few middle class candidates tend
to be more physically violent and thus are the ones most appropriately suited for civil
commitment).

351 U.S. 12 (1956).
"9 Id. at 17 (holding that Illinois must provide indigent criminal appellants with
a free transcript of trial proceedings because a transcript was required before Illinois
courts would grant appellate review).
3- 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
391See id. at 398-99.
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These cases and others 92 reflected the belief that while
disparities in wealth were inevitable, one's ability to make use of the
political and judicial processes should not be affected by such
disparities. As time went on, however, the Burger Court "abandoned the ardent rhetoric of equal justice for the poor, rhetoric
which promised more than even the Warren Court had delivered,
and far more than the Burger Court was prepared to deliver in the
name of equal protection of the laws." 93 As a result, the Court
began to subject classifications affecting the poor to rationality
review, ensuring that the most needy would not find redress in the
federal courts. 9 4 In fact, the Court in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.95 made absolutely clear that wealth
classifications alone would not be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."
Classifications, however, that impermissibly interfered with
the exercise of a "fundamental right" would still be subjected to
strict scrutiny review, even if the classification itself did not involve
a suspect class. 97 Although the Rodriguez Court narrowed its

I See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding
Virginia's poll tax unconstitutional); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963)
(holding the state's refusal to provide indigent appellants counsel for their first appeal
an equal protection violation).
3'3 TRIBE, supra note 200, at 1626; see also Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy,
and ConstitutionalLaw, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1306 (1993) (noting that the Burger
Court began to "mechanically attach the usual presumption of constitutionality to
classifications that affect the poor, without inquiring into the democratic legitimacy
of the underlying process").
"4 See e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (holding constitutional,
after applying rationality review, a $25 filing fee to appeal state welfare agency
decisions reducing benefits); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
55 (1973) (upholding Texas's school financing scheme despite wide funding
disparities between property-rich and property-poor school districts).
a 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
s See id. at 29. While some commentators have been in agreement with the
Court's modem characterization of the indigent, see, e.g., ELY, supranote 115, at 162
(arguing that most classifications affecting the poor are not based on prejudice or
stereotyped generalizations, but rather on the states reluctance to raise taxes), others
have not. See, e.g., Loffredo, supra note 393, at 1367 (arguing that wealth driven
politics distort and corrupt the democratic process, and therefore that the
impoverished should "comprise precisely the type of politically powerless minority
that the Court has deemed worthy of extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process"). Although Loffredo acknowledges that several welfare programs
do exist, arguably attesting to the indigents' political access, he notes that most of
these successes result "not from a democratically inclusive politics, but rather from
a convulsive mass politics of the dispossessed." Id. at 1329-30. In other words, many
social programs originate not out of genuine concern for the poor, but rather because
the majority
hopes to "purchase social peace and lower-class docility." Id.
3"7 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29; see alsoMemorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
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understanding of "fundamental rights" to only those explicitly or
implicitly protected by the Constitution, 9 8 (rendering education
non-fundamental), its reliance on constitutional definitions of
39 9
fundamental rights, its acceptance of the earlier indigency cases,
and finally its reliance on federalism concerns to "buttress" its
opinion,"° paved the way for state constitutional applications of
this line of equal protection analysis.
For states that in the spirit of the Warren Court treat wealth
classification as suspect, or accord mental health rights constitutional status, their civil commitment schemes should be subjected
to strict judicial scrutiny. Analogizing from Rodriguez, states that
regard treatment of the mentally ill as a fundamental right, but offer
institutionalized care as the only available setting for treatment,
would be ideal candidates for strict scrutiny review. As I noted
earlier, if a state has not developed community-based alternatives,
only the poorest of the mentally ill-those without family support or
other material means-face the prospect of involuntary and
ineffective treatment in a state mental hospital.4"'
Those less
financially strapped, can escape this predicament. Moreover, as
several civil commitment statutes are currently designed, evidence
of family support actually eliminates the need to commit many of
the mentally ill who would otherwise be unable to care for themselves.
These individuals are then able to receive treatment
voluntarily in the'community, while those without family support
are subject to involuntary commitments."'
Given that only the

254, 269 (1974) (holding Arizona's durational residency requirement for indigents
seeking non-emergency hospitalization or medical care to be an invidious classification infringing on the right to interstate travel).
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 31-35.
See id. at 17-28. The Court distinguished the wealth discrimination at issue in
Rodriguez from other "indigency cases" in two ways. First, the Court emphasized how
difficult it is to prove that financing in property-poor school districts disproportionately affects the poor, as compared to the more direct and discrete incidents of
poverty discrimination in the criminal trial and appellate processes. As the Court
noted, poor individuals may very well live in property-rich districts; and conversely,
the rich may very well live in property-poor districts. See id. at 23, 28. Second, the
Court noted that disparate school funding did not result in an absolute deprivation of
a right, but rather only arguably in a relative deprivation. See id. at 20.
o See id. at 40, 44, 58 (noting how distinctly local both taxing and educational
issues are, and how invasive a holding of unconstitutionality would be to the entire
Texas educational system); see also supra note 209.
401See supra notes 386-87 and accompanying text.
4o2 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250(d)(1) (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 22-10-102(5)(b) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1)(a) (West 1993). Several
state statutes provide that if "others" are willing to help satisfy a mentally ill
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poorest of the poor mentally ill receive inferior, institutionalized
treatment, such legislative schemes would likely be rendered
unconstitutional under state law applications of this equal protection analysis.
As discussed earlier, seven states have constitutional provisions
establishing an affirmative right to mental health care. 0 3 Several
other states have held their public education financing schemes
unconstitutional without even relying on separate "education"
provisions to hang their constitutional hats. 4 In these states, it
would not matter whether the right to mental health care enjoyed
constitutional status, the wealth classification itself would be
enough. In each, the argument outlined above would compel courts
to review their state civil commitment statutes to ensure true
equality of treatment for the mentally ill. If such equality did not
exist, these states would be required to develop community-based
services either by redistributing funds from state hospitals to

individual's needs, that individual will not be deemed civilly committable. See. e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2(h) (West Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C3(11)(a)(1)(I) (1989 & Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301(b)(2)(i) (Supp.
1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7101(17)(B)(ii) (1987); WYo. STAT. § 25-10101(a)(ii)(C) (1990 & Supp. 1993). Moreover, some state statutes provide that if
community alternatives are available, individuals who would otherwise be deemed "in
danger of harm" are not committable. Conversely, if there are no community-based
alternatives, the individual is committable. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 5122.01(B)(3) (Anderson 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.15(1)(a)(3)-(4) (West 1987).
Since some states leave it up to the counties to determine how much money to spend
for community-based care, individuals who live in poorer counties would be subjected
to commitment while those in richer counties would not. Cf. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 5670(b) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that "counties may implement the
community residential treatment system described in this chapter either with available
county allocations or as new moneys become available").
403 See supra text accompanying notes 343-52 (discussing Arkansas, Idaho,
Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington). Note that in Arkansas and
Washington the courts have had experience applying the wealth classification/
fundamental rights approach to equal protection claims, relying on their own
constitutional provisions involving education, to hold their public education financing
schemes unconstitutional. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95
(Ark. 1983); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 82-83 (Wash. 1978); see also
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294-95 (N.J. 1973) (relying on a New Jersey
constitutional provision requiring the state to provide a "thorough and efficient
system of free public schools" to hold its public school financing scheme unconstitutional), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 913 (1975).
'4' See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1976);
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (ultimately basing its decision on
Article III, § 10); Washakie CountySch. Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310,332-33
(Wyo.) (relying on a more broadly construed equality provision, Article I, § 34), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
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community mental health centers or by raising the aggregate level
of state funding available for mental health. Although courts may
be hesitant to compel tax increases, the concerns of federalism that
halted the Rodriguez Court do not similarly exist when state courts
40 5
dictate to state legislatures.
An alternative to Rodriguez's line of reasoning can also be found
in analogies drawn from the Warren Court's judicial process
decisions, particularly Tate v. Short.4 6 As argued in Tate, the state
cannot constitutionally make the payment of a fine the punishment
for a wealthy civil offender, but convert the fine to imprisonment
for an impoverished civil offender. 4 7 Although states have the authority to restrict an individual's liberty, Tate speaks for the
proposition that such restrictions should be applied irrespective of
economic status. In the context of civil commitment regulations,
while the state may restrict the rights of the mentally ill and even
institutionalize some individuals, those who are civilly committed
should only be committed because of concerns for public safety or
the safety of the patients themselves. As we have seen, however,
when the state fails to develop community-based alternatives for
those who are treatable in the community, the most impoverished
of the mentally ill are unnecessarily deprived of their liberty.
Alternatively those with familial and financial support are able to
avoid the clutches of the state and seek treatment or have treatment
provided in other less restrictive settings.
Although all courts should subject these wealth-based disparities
in public coercion to strict judicial scrutiny, the unwillingness of the
Supreme Court to extend applications of its wealth-classifications
beyond the criminal procedure cases 408 renders federal courts an
inhospitable forum for such claims. As for the state courts, while
only one court has apparently granted suspect status to wealth
classifications, independent of fundamental rights claims, 40 9 we

o See supra note 209.
401 U.S. 395 (1971).
407 See id. at 398-99. But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 227
& n.5 (4th ed. 1992) (arguing that "fines and imprisonment are simply different ways
of imposing disutility on violations," and that the Supreme Court was wrong in Tate,
in believing that imprisonment for failure to pay a fine discriminates against the
poor).
408 See TRIBE supranote 200, at 1653; see also supranotes 388-92 and accompanying
text.
'o See Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 744 P.2d 895, 897 (Mont. 1987) (noting
in dicta that "wealth ... is a suspect class" under Article II, § 4 of the Montana
Constitution).
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have already seen that fourteen others have interpreted their equal
protection provisions more liberally than the federal analog and
thus should also be receptive to wealth classification arguments.4 10
Moreover, several courts have applied the logic of Tate v. Short
pursuant to their own constitutional provisions. 41 ' In each of
these states where community-based services have not been
adequately developed, strictjudicial scrutiny would disclosejust how
little respect and concern the mentally ill poor are accorded.
Therefore, only by equalizing the way the mentally ill are treated in
the civil commitment process (that is, only by financing the
development of less restrictive alternatives to civil commitment)
would these classifications clear the constitutional hurdles of equal
protection analysis.
CONCLUSION
The mentally ill have faced many challenges in the past. Before
deinstitutionalization swept across the United States in the late
1950s, society handled the disparate needs of the mentally ill by
carting hundreds of thousands of individuals off to state-run
hospitals. There, they were housed for years, deteriorating both
physically and mentally--quickly forgotten by those who had sent
them there. In time, however, several forces combined to free the
mentally ill from the state's shackles and return them to the society
that had discarded them. Promised care and treatment in settings
less restrictive to their liberty, the mentally ill looked forward to
living normalized lives in the community. Tragically, the promise
proved to be a false one. Once back in the community, the same
prejudices and hostilities that had previously rendered the mentally
ill social outcasts reappeared.
Today, although the era of wholesale institutionalization has
surely passed, the mentally ill continue to face powerful challenges
to their medical needs and their personal freedom. Two such
challenges have been addressed here.
First, because of the
perceived correlation between deinstitutionalization and homelessness, many states have moved, albeit moderately, towards easing
their civil commitment criteria. Second, little has been done to
make community-based treatment services a viable alternative to
410

See supra note 384.

411See,

e.g., Palumbo v. Manson, 400 A.2d 288, 289-90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979);
State v, Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 109 (N.D. 1980).
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institutionalization. Of the two, this Comment has sought a solution
to the second challenge, not the first.
Although eased commitment criteria threatens to bring many of
the mentally ill back to the asylum, it is the dearth of community
mental health centers that actually underlies this trend. Consider
aftercare services. Had states provided community-based, transitional assistance to the formerly committed mentally ill, "deinstitutionalization" would not have become as forceful a scapegoat for our
homelessness problem. Similarly, the current demand for recommitment would not have been as great. Of course, many individuals
will always believe that "deinstitutionalization" was a mistake-not
because confinement in a state mental hospital is necessarily good,
but rather because the loss of state control over the mentally ill has
had its costs. But even for those who want states to resume control
over the mentally ill, it is difficult to see why community treatment
services could not also be developed. The establishment of a right
to community-based treatment should, in fact, be compatible with
whatever position one takes on the issue of eased commitment
criteria. If one favors easing the civil commitment criteria to reach
more of the homeless mentally ill, the development of community
mental health centers simply provides a less restrictive setting in
which to care for these individuals. For those who oppose such an
extension of the state's parens patriae power, the development of
alternative residential settings simply provides a housing option to
those who wish to be housed. In its most liberty-restricting form,
therefore, the homeless mentally ill are taken off the streets, and
receive care in the least restrictive environment appropriate to their
needs. That these possibilities are not mutually exclusive serves
only to show that both sides of the debate can disagree on when the
mentally ill should be subjected to state coerced treatment, and yet
agree on how and where that treatment should be conducted.
In spite of this theoretical common ground, however, there has
not been a strong commitment towards the development of
community-based services. Although most state civil commitment
schemes provide for the consideration of less restrictive alternatives
to institutionalization, few states have provided the funding to make
these alternatives a reality. Therefore, to compel such funding, this
Comment has proposed constitutionalizing the right to communitybased treatment-a right that would extend to the civilly committed,
the formerly committed, and those "at risk" of being committed.
Of course, constitutionalizing such a right, and having courts
dictate to legislatures on how public funds are to be spent, is not
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uncontroversial. For some, constitutionalizing a right to community-based treatment (even if it extends only to those "at risk" of being
committed or already committed before) brings the judiciary
beyond the institutional boundaries of self-restraint. Since courts
are traditionally envisioned as only interpreting, not making, the
law, once these boundaries are crossed, they risk losing their
legitimacy as passive, neutral players in our governmental scheme.
If state courts lose their legitimacy, they also risk losing their ability
to bind the coordinate branches of government and the people to
their mandates. A constitutional right to community-based services
would mean nothing if the courts could not compel their state
legislatures to develop these services.
While it is vitally important that state courts not lose their
legitimacy and their effectiveness as the interpretive voices of our
constitutional values, it is equally important that state courts not
waver in their responsibility to protect the most vulnerable members
of our society. As Abram Chayes wrote in summing up his piece on
public law litigation, "judicial action only achieves... legitimacy by
responding to, indeed by stirring, the deep and durable demand for
justice in our society."412
Although recognition of the right
proposed here requires state courts to walk a fine line between legal
interpretation and legal creation, decision-making that is principled,
open and honest would preserve the courts' authoritative voice,
while simultaneously advancing the interests of those most deserving
of the courts' protection.

412Abram Chayes, The Role of theJudge in PublicLaw Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1281, 1316 (1976).

